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ABSTRACT 
How inclusive is inclusive finance? In this thesis, I examine a phenomenon which I 
describe as ‘bifurcated banking’. Exploring the case of Pakistan, I observe that policies of 
inclusive finance generate a heterogeneous financial space. The institutionalisation of 
inclusive finance leads to the emergence of a bifurcated banking system. Such a system is 
defined by mainstream commercial banks based on a traditional bank intermediation 
model on the one hand, and inclusive finance based on a disintermediated, or 
shadow banking model, on the other. My study of the Pakistani financial system shows 
that a bifurcated banking system is not transitory, but a structural feature of a developing 
capitalist country, where key relationships between inclusive finance and access to finance 
are best understood through what I call, shadow financial citizenship. My thesis is 
organised as two parts. In the first part, I develop a conceptual lens to analyse bifurcated 
banking. In the second part, I use Pakistan as a case study of inclusive finance to examine 
the core themes and concepts identified above.  
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0. BIFURCATED BANKING: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF INCLUSIVE FINANCE IN PAKISTAN 
0.1 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW  
My doctoral thesis is not about poverty, but like many other studies on the topic of 
financial access in poor countries, begins with Dr Muhammad Yunus’ story of becoming 
a banker to the poor. Yunus’ initial experience in the 1970s of using a small sum of his 
own money to alleviate the debts, improve the livelihoods, and spur the 
entrepreneurship of a small group of women in rural Bangladesh was the basis for 
creating the Grameen bank. As the founder of this institution, Yunus became the most 
prominent spokesperson for the transformational potential of microcredit and won a 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2005.  For Yunus, the key problem which microcredit could 
overcome was the reluctance of mainstream banks to lend to the poor. This reluctance 
ostensibly came from a misperception about the capacity of the poor to repay their 
loans. To resolve this, the Grameen model used a joint liability system where villagers 
applied for loans as a group. Because they shared liabilities, they were expected to exert 
social pressure on each other to ensure that these loans were repaid. This strategy lost 
prominence as the microcredit movement underwent shifts and became 
commercialised and profit oriented. Microfinance replaced microcredit as the focal 
point of this movement and eventually microfinance was replaced by financial 
inclusion.  
In his biographical account of this movement, Yunus reveals that he saw gaps in 
financial access as a structural problem (Yunus, 2009). Fixated with addressing this 
shortage, he developed a lending approach that made the risk of default much smaller 
than what a commercial banker might assume, showing that ‘the poor always pay back’ 
(Dowla and Barua, 2006). But in doing so, the Grameen model sought to address the 
symptoms of a structural problem; and not its causes.  As such, inclusive finance is a 
part of a family of development interventions — along with ‘base of pyramid’ (Prahalad, 
2005) and ‘band-aid’ (Birdsall and Szekely, 2003) strategies — that sidesteps 
engagement with the problem of what Else Øyen, the Norwegian scholar of social 
policy, calls ‘poverty production’.  
The concept of poverty production, in Øyen’s (2004) commentary on social 
policy discourse, may be directly contrasted with that of poverty reduction. Strategies 
such as microcredit and its antecedents are described as poverty reducing; but they 
engage only superficially with the question of poverty production. So for instance, while 
poverty may come across as being ‘produced’ by a lack of access to finance which leads 
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to dependence on usurious money lenders, the discussion on why the lack of access to 
finance persists has been given limited attention in poverty reduction strategies. In the 
context of this study, perhaps the most relevant takeaway from Øyen’s approach is the 
distinction she emphasises between frameworks of harmony and frameworks of conflict. 
Whereas the former exert disproportionate influence on social policy and generally lead 
to a consensus based on the lowest common denominator; the latter require that the 
opposing or contradictory agendas of different actors are confronted rather than drawn 
into a consensus. Given respective frameworks, consensus in development interventions 
may be regarded as reflective of either a lowest common denominator arrangement in 
which the most effective or well thought out policies are not the ones eventually agreed 
upon; or as contentious in which interventions reflect the preferences of the most 
powerful actor.  
Inclusive finance is one such development intervention and reflects a ‘lowest 
common denominator arrangement’ as well as the preferences of a powerful actor. The 
problem of the lowest common denominator is not a novel one in this context: it  is 
intrinsic to commentaries on how the transition from microfinance to financial 
inclusion was embraced by development as well as financial communities because its 
amorphous terminology allowed it to resist claims that it did nothing to combat poverty 
(Mader, 2015; Mader and Sabrow. 2015). Additionally, the consensus that motivates the 
ascendancy of inclusive finance in contemporary development practice reflects the 
preferences of the immensely powerful actor that is global finance capital.  
To interrogate this consensus for inclusive finance then is to, like Yunus and the 
Grameen Bank, approach the need for inclusive finance as a structural problem, 
recognising that there is a reticence or inability on the part of the mainstream banking 
sector to serve certain segments of the public.  This situation is reflected in what I 
describe as ‘bifurcated banking’: a phenomenon in which there is a separation in the 
banking sector between the areas of inclusive finance and mainstream finance. 
Bifurcated banking systems are a feature of poor countries in which financial access is 
used as a tool of development strategy. But what is often missing from the discussion is 
the presence of a large and robust commercial banking sector which offers the non-poor 
a level of service comparable to that in advanced capitalist countries.  
Even in advanced capitalist countries, particularly those operating with an 
Anglo-American economic model, divisive practices in the financial sector gained the 
attention of geographers who noted how shifts in banking models disadvantaged large 
segments of the public (Dymski, 2005; Dymski and Veitch, 1996; Pollard, 1996; Leyshon 
and Thrift, 1995).1  A key objective of this study is to highlight the relevance of this latter 
set of scholarship for poor countries: to draw attention to how the processes and 
practices that create bifurcated banking structures in the Global South are the very 
same that underlie financial exclusion in the Global North.  
_____________________________ 
1 The Anglo-American economic model emphasises low government involvement and a flexible labour force: it may be 
contrasted with the European social model based on relatively more government regulation and protections for workers.  
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To do this, I begin with a straightforward question: why are poor people offered 
financial inclusion products?  Within existing scholarship, one answer to this question 
is that the poor have unique financial needs and require financial institutions and 
instruments tailored for their particular conditions (Collins et al., 2009). This 
explanation sees poverty as the driver of demand for inclusive finance but engages only 
superficially with the question of why mainstream financial institutions are unable to 
accommodate the poor.  
The alternative explanation, which is the focus of my research, is that the 
demand for inclusive finance is driven by practices which I liken — but do not equate — 
to ‘financial infrastructure withdrawal’: this is the very same process behind the rise of 
predatory lending in the Anglosphere (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995) and reveals that 
financial systems have inbuilt tendencies to be exclusionary (Dymski and Veitch, 1996). 
Given these tendencies, scholars of financial exclusion in advanced capitalist countries, 
have developed a concept of financial citizenship which notes that like nation states, 
financial systems have an inside and an outside (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995).  Those who 
can access finance only in the form of, for instance, high-cost loans and not through 
mainstream banking institutions are relegated to the outside and are hence not 
financial citizens. The processes that underlie this relegation include the tendency of 
mainstream banks to cross-sell products within groups, privileging ‘blue-chip’ clients by 
offering them subsidies in exchange for brand loyalty. Less wealthy clients, as a result, 
inevitably pay more for the same products and services than their more affluent 
counterparts. For advanced capitalist economies, this separation in access to financial 
services is described as an issue of financial citizenship. The concept of financial 
citizenship captures the presence in the financial system of an ‘outside’ in relation to an 
‘inside’.  
These practices may be attributed to shifting models of banking, as practices of 
disintermediation mean that lending and borrowing activities are no longer closely 
linked. Whereas in the past the dominant model was one in which banks relied on 
depositors to provide funds that could be loaned to borrowers, newer approaches to 
banking focus more on the ‘slicing and dicing’ of loans (Chick and Dow, 1988). These 
have pushed a departure from the branch-oriented approach to banking and allowed 
banks to overcome geographical constraints. In poor countries disintermediation has 
occurred in the inclusive finance segment for two reasons. One of these is because of 
the ready availability of finance from private sources, including through ‘privatised 
Keynesianism’ (Bonizzi, 2017) and from the ‘philanthropy-finance-development 
complex’ (Gabor and Brooks, 2017).  This arrangement is not only a manifestation of 
shadow banking in the Global South but also an extension of shadow banking in the 
Global North. Shadow banking refers to credit intermediation activities carried out by 
entities outside of the regular banking system and is commonly associated with the 
global financial crises of the last decade. The institutions and practices of shadow 
banking wield immense influence over the shape of inclusive finance in the Global 
South: the two key mechanisms that drive shadow banking in rich countries are the 
same as those in poor countries and are respectively associated with (1) regulatory 
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avoidance and arbitrage, and (2) the demand for yield from institutional investors 
(Nesvetailova, 2017; Pozsar, 2013).   
These mechanisms are studied in this thesis using case examples from the 
financial sector in Pakistan, with a focus on deposit taking microfinance banks. 
Inclusive finance is presented in this context as a form of regulatory avoidance as the 
microfinance banks studied here are equipped to circumvent rules related to financial 
stability and counter-terrorism: namely, the capital adequacy and leverage limitations 
imposed by institutions such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and the 
know-your-customer (KYC) requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to 
counter money laundering and terrorist funding (de Koker, 2014). Additionally, the 
prominence of microfinance investment funds, and the involvement of global banks in 
impact investing and social ventures are also presented in the light of shadow banking. 
These investing practices are also described as ‘market-based finance’ and many 
scholars of international development have expressed deep concern over the 
increasingly commercial and privatised nature of developmental strategies (Gabor, 
2018). As a result of this arrangement in which inclusive finance has been absorbed by 
shadow banking networks and practices, the poor always pay more, not only for their 
loans but also for other services such as remittances and payments: disparities underlie 
bifurcated banking systems in poor countries.   
In this thesis I make the claim that bifurcated banking exists and persists. To 
understand why this is so I develop the concept of shadow financial citizenship: this 
builds on the work of Leyshon and Thrift (1995) to account for the grey area between 
financial exclusion and full financial citizenship, drawing attention to how financial 
inclusion differs from financial citizenship. When inclusive finance is presented as a 
remedy to financial exclusion or to the circumstance of being ‘unbanked’ or even 
‘underserved’, bifurcated banking emerges because of exclusionary practices. This is so 
because these exclusionary practices that obstruct financial citizenship are embedded in 
the financial landscapes of poor countries. Shadow financial citizenship is the analytical 
lens that I use in this thesis to conceptualise how these practices arise from the shadow 
banking and inclusive finance nexus. 
In the following section I show that the concept of bifurcated banking is an 
original contribution of my study. But in addition to that, it is also a starting point for 
the analysis of financial citizenship in a poor country. As such, the central claims of this 
dissertation are two pronged; (1) that a phenomenon of bifurcated banking exists, and 
(2) that this phenomenon has distinct drivers that can be conceptualised through a lens 
of financial citizenship.  
0.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THEMES  
The main purpose of this study is to probe the tendency of inclusive finance to bifurcate 
banking systems. I argue that bifurcated banking systems are caused by the absorption 
of inclusive finance into shadow banking. Such banking systems may be understood 
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better through a shadow financial citizenship lens which highlights how financial 
inclusion often precludes financial citizenship.  My study is guided by the following 
research questions:   
(1): How ‘inclusive’ is inclusive finance?  
(2): What is the relationship between inclusive finance and bifurcated banking? 
The process to answer these questions is centred on three core themes: (1) 
bifurcated banking, (2) inclusive finance, and (3) shadow banking.  These are at the core 
of the concept of shadow financial citizenship, developed in this thesis. These themes 
are briefly summarised below, and then followed by a discussion on the relationships 
and causal mechanisms that link these concepts to each other: 
Bifurcated banking 
The concept of bifurcated banking is my original contribution to the literature on 
financial access. I identify and draw attention to this phenomenon as part of a 
systematic approach which critiques the capacity of inclusive finance to be 'inclusive' 
and enhance financial access.  
Over the course of this study, to explain why bifurcated banking impedes 
financial access, I assemble the conceptual framework of shadow financial citizenship. I 
thus draw heavily on the financial geography literature from the 1990s — which 
described the nature of financial exclusion in the United Kingdom and the United States 
— to show how impediments in financial access in Pakistan are closely linked to those 
that emerged in the Global North because of shifts in banking models.  
The idea that banking systems can be bifurcated in the context of poverty or 
exclusion has two possible contexts. One of these is that of informality, particularly in 
the Global South where the informal economy has historically been extremely large. The 
other context is that of credit rating and scoring processes, particularly in Anglo-
American countries where segments of the population are deemed ‘sub-prime’ or not 
eligible for access to the mainstream financial system.  
The former context may be studied in the light of early development economics 
literature, particularly the work of Sir Arthur Lewis on markets with unlimited supplies 
of labour (Lewis, 1954); also the field research of Keith Hart which introduces the 
concept of an informal economy (Hart, 1973); and the work of the Dutch colonial 
economist J.H. Boeke — who noted that there was a ‘dual economy’ in Indonesia which 
was separate from the capitalist model of the Netherlands (Boeke,  1942) — must also be 
mentioned here.  
The dual economy conceptualisation is central to Lewis’ (1954) study in which 
he describes developing countries as characterised by a market economy and a non-
market economy; the latter lies outside the former.  Lewis’ seminal conceptualisation of 
a developing economy as comprised of two sectors — subsistence and capitalist — is 
relevant here for its assumption that the two would merge when the capitalist sector 
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became large enough to subsume the traditional sector. This eventual and hypothetical 
merger was premised on the notion that informality was a temporary phenomenon: this 
two sector model of a formal and an informal sector highlighted the wage gap between 
the two sectors (Lewis, 1954). The differential was attributed to the exclusivity of 
reproducible capital, which was available only to the capitalist sector. As a result, the 
capitalist sector would invariably outpace — and absorb — the subsistence sector as:     
‘Output per head is lower in this sector than in the capitalist sector, because it is 
not fructified by capital (this is why it was called “unproductive” ; the distinction 
between productive and unproductive had nothing to do with whether the work 
yielded utility, as some neo-classicists have scornfully but erroneously asserted)’ 
(Lewis, 1954: 147).    
But as Hart (1973) and subsequently the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 1972) 
contended, the informal economy is better seen as a passive adjunct of growth 
originating outside of the formal economy and thus carry the potential for economic 
transformation.2 Both studies saw the phenomenon of urban unemployment as the 
underlying cause for informality. Further, they took a positive view on informality and 
concluded that the informal sector had considerable potential for income generation 
(Chen, 2012). Hart’s (1973) study is notable for advancing a consensus on ‘the informal 
sector’ as a specific term: this facilitated the construction of operational definitions, 
leading to empirical studies based on quantitative approaches. Chen (2012: 8) notes that 
the ‘informal sector as an economic reality received a mixed review in development 
circles’ with no agreement on whether or not it would eventually disappear. Also, as 
the assumption that industrial development would not follow the pattern seen 
previously in developed countries gained traction, there was a reasonable basis to 
assume that the informal economy might continue to expand.3     
Bifurcated banking in poor countries is closely related to the notion of a 
historical separation between the formal and informal economy. Colonial banking 
systems in the Indian subcontinent — which are discussed in Chapter 4 — did not 
actively service the informal economy which relied on individual moneylenders in 
addition to alternative sources such as familial and other networks for credit. The usury 
of moneylenders has been a core argument for microcredit (e.g. Yunus, 2009; Sengupta 
and Aubochon, 2007; Barr, 2004). And one of the most important successes claimed by 
inclusive finance practitioners has been the formation of an alternative to the 
extortionate rates charged by these same moneylenders. 
_____________________________ 
2 Hart’s 1973 paper was based on findings from an earlier study which the International Labour Organisation drew upon for 
their report.  
3 Subsequent studies tweaked this dualist conceptualisation but retained the perception of a resilient, growing informal 
economy. For instance the structuralist view is captured in a set of studies compiled by Portes, Castells and Benton (1989): 
these present the informal economy as a permanent, albeit subordinate and dependent, feature of capitalist development 
given the reorganisation of production into small, decentralized and more flexible economic units. The work of Hernando 
de Soto (1986, 2000) emphasizes a legalist view which is based on the growth potential of an informal economy 
empowered with property rights: it is argued thus that the informal economy should be facilitated and not countered.  
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But despite these successes, inclusive finance continues to operate separately 
from, and does not merge with mainstream finance. What is more or less absent from 
discussions on the transformative potential of credit — realised through freedom from 
usurious lending, consumption smoothing, and enterprise growth — is the observation 
that mainstream commercial banks operate in parallel with deposit taking microfinance 
banks.  While not all inclusive finance is offered through such institutions — other 
structures include institutions that only lend, many of which are non-profit 
organisations — the widespread presence of commercially oriented deposit taking 
microfinance banks that are separate from commercial mainstream banks reflects a 
persistent separation. The puzzle in this arrangement then is this: why are mainstream 
banks and microfinance banks doing the exact same thing? Or, why have mainstream 
banks not stepped in to offer the services that microfinance banks are offering?  The 
existing scholarship on this is discussed in the upcoming Chapter 1 and is shown to have 
gaps arising from its orientation with poverty reduction. I suggest an alternative 
approach which resists the urge to analyse the causal chain that links inclusive finance 
with poverty reduction. Instead, I draw on the literature on financial infrastructure 
withdrawal in advanced capitalist economies to critique inclusive finance as a product 
of shifting models of banking, and for its links with shadow banking practices and 
networks.  
Financial infrastructure withdrawal refers to strategies for cost cutting and risk 
management in banking and relates to the second context for bifurcated banking: this 
context highlights how shifting models of banking, in the United States and Britain, 
have resulted in uneven access to retail financial services.   
‘During the 1980s changes in regulation saw retail financial services markets 
expand as financial services firms competed for new customers. In the 1990s, faced 
with more difficult operating conditions, financial services firms have adopted 
more exclusionary strategies and have embarked upon a “flight to quality”. Firms 
have begun to focus upon a more affluent, middle-class client base in line with a 
decline in the importance of debt-related financial products and a rise in the 
importance of investment-related products’ (Leyshon and Thrift, 1994: 268). 
This focus on a relatively affluent client base is analogous in the Global South to the 
emphasis by mainstream banks on what approximates a ‘non-poor’ client base. As a 
result, and as discussed in Chapter 1, clients who are poor — and as a result lack the 
eligibility to access mainstream banking and financial services — may access only 
inclusive finance, including through microfinance banks. And just as Anglo American 
communities became more reliant on pawnbrokers and licensed money lenders because 
formal financial services were less reachable, the poor of the Global South were pushed 
towards inclusive finance because mainstream banks were reluctant to serve them.  
Bifurcated banking is analysed in this thesis as an outcome of (1) the failure of 
mainstream banking and finance to serve large segments of the population in poor 
countries, and (2) the push from a global shadow banking industry to generate new 
income streams through inclusive finance. This latter outcome is revealed in the spread 
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of shadow banking practices; particularly disintermediation as wholesale funding rather  
than deposits is used to fund loans. The role of the global shadow banking industry is 
also reflected in the presence of shadow banking networks which connect inclusive 
finance to international financial capital. These observations are and elaborated in the 
following sections about inclusive finance and shadow banking respectively.   
Inclusive finance 
Inclusive finance may be understood as the outcome of a set of conceptualisations and 
in the light of its antecedents: microcredit, microfinance, and financial inclusion are all 
similar but also different to inclusive finance. The three shifting conceptualisations 
mentioned here are based on the various shapes that banking and finance policies for 
the poor have assumed since the 1980s. The earliest conceptualisation is that of 
microcredit; as discussed earlier this was offered on the assumption that the poor 
require loans to grow their livelihoods. A reconceptualisation then produced the 
concept of microfinance; this was done on the assumption that the poor need not only 
loans but also insurance, payments services, and savings products. Another 
reconceptualisation then resulted in a movement for financial inclusion; unlike its 
antecedents, this was presented as an ‘enabler’ for reducing poverty and not a tool for 
poverty reduction. Mader and Sabrow (2015) discuss all of these shifting 
conceptualisations as ‘strategic mission shift’. More recently, and primarily to capture a 
technological emphasis, the concept of inclusive finance has come to be used — 
perhaps most frequently in the grey literatures of the development and the finance 
communities — as a generic term for development interventions based on financial 
access. As such, inclusive finance may be used interchangeably with prior 
conceptualisations.  
An enduring topic in the critical literature on all of the above conceptualisations 
is centred on the tension between profitability and socio-economic outcomes.  Primarily 
for the first three conceptualisations described above, the focal point is the 
transformative meeting of microfinance and ‘the Market’ which commenced in the 
1990s (Cull et al., 2009). This occurred when it had become clear that the deposited 
savings of the poor, even when combined with subsidised capital and charitable funds, 
would not be nearly enough to reach all those who were ‘unbanked’ and ‘underserved’: 
thus the shift from ‘socially oriented nonprofit microfinance institutions to for-profit 
microfinance’ (Cull et. al, 2009: 167). Debates on the trade-off between profitability and 
social goals question the choices and predilection of microfinance institutions to service 
those most in need, to offer these services at a reasonable cost, and in a responsible 
manner. Many studies note how this is rarely done in actuality (e.g. Mader 2015; 
Bateman and Chang, 2012; Dichter and Harper, 2007).  
A key argument of this thesis is that the specific nature of inclusive finance calls 
for a renewed approach to critiquing financial access as a development intervention. 
This entails a departure from the discussion on whether or not commercially oriented 
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microfinance can achieve social goals. The emphasis of inclusive finance on technology 
makes it reliant on infrastructures that are markedly more complex than those 
associated with earlier approaches. While this reliance may be attributed largely to the 
role of digital and data oriented methodologies for business development, it relates also 
to more traditional products and services such as microcredit: this is discussed in 
Chapter 8 and reflected in the push for products such as loans that are offered as mobile 
money and approved through smartphones using geospatial metadata and other 
innovative credit scoring techniques.  As such, inclusive finance raises questions about 
the strategies on which technology is centred; this is reflected in an emerging literature 
on how such strategies seek to turn the poor into ‘generators of financial assets’ (Gabor 
and Brooks, 2017: 423) and how this produces ‘troubling new kinds of social sorting and 
segmentation’ (Aitken, 2017: 274).  
Because these strategies actively differentiate between the poor and the non 
poor, they espouse a financial system in which there is an inside, an outside, and a grey 
area.  It is for this reason that the concept of bifurcated banking is useful for 
interrogating inclusive finance not only as a development intervention but also as an 
integral part of a wider financial system. A bifurcated system is hence not an 
unintended consequence but a deliberate tactic. Over the course of this dissertation I 
show that this tactic is exerted through a set of causal mechanisms which link inclusive 
finance to bifurcated banking. In this depiction, inclusive finance assumes the form of 
shadow banks; shadow banks thus play a crucial role in shaping bifurcated banking. For 
this reason, the phenomenon of shadow banking, particularly its function in 
contemporary development interventions in the Global South, is also a core theme of 
this thesis.  
Shadow banking 
Shadow banking is a core theme in this study because it offers an analytical basis to 
approach transformations in banking models. A detailed discussion on shadow banking 
is available in Chapter 3; this builds on the argument presented earlier, that transitions 
in banking models play a crucial role in shaping financial citizenship. These transitions 
— which are captured by the academic term ‘financialisation’ — are reflected in the 
emergence of shadow banking practices and also shadow banking networks. 
For instance, for shadow banking practices, perhaps the most relevant transition 
is that from OTH ‘originate to hold’ to OTD ‘originate to distribute’. The OTH model 
guided the operation of a ‘typical bank’ in the 1950s and 1960s. 4 Under this arrangement 
the bank accepted deposits and registered them as liabilities on the balance sheet, 
whereas loans were registered as assets; the business of the bank was thus ‘maturity 
transformation’, and its focus was on managing the constraints and risks associated with 
deposit taking and lending.  The role of the bank is different in an OTD model: here, the 
_____________________________ 
4 This notion is discussed in more depth through the example of the ‘Jimmy Stewart’ bank in Chapter 3.  
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bank is a financial intermediary that links the supply of capital with demand. This is 
done by originating loans with clients and then selling these loans to other participants 
in the financial system. These two models are also described as relationship/ 
conventional banking and shadow banking, respectively. 
As observed by Nesvetailova (2017), new financial technologies and regulations 
were instrumental to the shift from OTH to OTD. Shadow banking is a form of financial 
innovation, the purpose of which is to create new techniques, products, and markets, 
and institutions, but also to subvert existing routines, rules, and boundaries 
(Nesvetailova, 2017; Polillo, 2011). The idea that inclusive finance is a form of shadow 
banking— and an example of financial innovation — is central to my study. 
To elaborate further, in addition to shadow banking practices, I draw attention 
also to shadow banking networks. This are particularly relevant from the standpoint of 
the case study presented later in this dissertation. In addition, the notion of shadow 
banking networks complements the analysis on OTH vis-a-vis OTD as a transformation 
in practice, noting that the ‘distribute’ aspect of OTD is an extension of the yield 
seeking imperative of global financial capital.  
This ‘inclusive finance as shadow banking’ contention is assembled in this thesis 
both conceptually and empirically. The conceptual argument understands that shadow 
banking as supply driven as well as demand driven:  supply driven explanations depict 
financial innovation as a response to regulation and similar constraints, whereas 
demand driven explanations portray financial innovation as emanating from a search 
for yield. The empirical argument incorporates both explanations and draws upon a 
variety of case examples from Pakistan; these relate to macroeconomic structures 
including public finance constraints, the policies of international institutions, the role of 
private finance in development, and the growth strategies of inclusive finance providers.  
Relationships and Causal Mechanisms 
The concepts described above are the basis for the central claims of this study. My 
dissertation is thus centred on three observable implications of inclusive finance as a 
tool for enhancing financial access. These implications form the bases for three 
arguments, which I detail over the course of this study.  
First, I make the claim that inclusive finance is a form of shadow banking. This 
is revealed in the practices of the institutions that offer inclusive finance products and 
services using disintermediated models of banking, and in the networks that have 
emerged from an immense global shadow banking industry. The empirical basis for this 
claim is found in the official reports and audited financial statements of the institutions 
in this study. These documents are primarily used to analyse operating models and 
ownership structures. 
Second, I argue that inclusive finance causes the banking system to be 
bifurcated. This bifurcated banking structure is characterised by a separation between 
mainstream commercial finance, which operates on a traditional banking model of 
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intermediation, and inclusive finance institutions which operate on a shadow banking 
model based on disintermediation, funded by global organisations which include 
private institutional asset managers, donor agencies, and philanthropic foundations. 
This is thus closely related to the above claim. Empirically, this claim is reflected in the 
reports and studies published by these global organisations, which is corroborated by 
the Pakistani financial institutions which receive this funding.  
Third, I contend that bifurcated banking results in an inferior form of financial 
access. To analyse this, I generate a conceptual framework of shadow financial 
citizenship. This draws on the financial citizenship literature which describes 
impediments to financial access as a consequence of banking systems which have a 
distinct inside vis-a-vis a distinct outside. This separation is the outcome of shifting 
models of banking. I argue, using empirical evidence from Pakistani regulatory and 
policy institutions, as well as banks that the bifurcated nature of Pakistani banking 
should be attributed to the absorption of inclusive finance by shadow banking practices 
and networks. My analysis shows that shadow financial citizenship is expressed in a set 
of inequities; in rates and pricing, in eligibility and requirements, and in privacy and 
surveillance.  
There is a core argument that joins these claims: a bifurcated banking system 
complicates financial access for the poor. More specifically, the financial landscape of 
Pakistan is shaped by shadow banking networks and practices; these have assumed the 
guise of inclusive finance, drive exclusionary practices, and result in a bifurcated 
banking system. Exclusionary practices make this bifurcated system problematic. I 
engage with these exclusionary practices by generating a conceptual framework of 
shadow financial citizenship. This conceptual framework examines the relationship 
between inclusive finance and bifurcated banking. To do this, I draw on previous 
explorations of how the strategies of financial institutions constrain financial access. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter outlines how these claims will be given 
theoretical and empirical support over the course of this thesis. 
0.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
My thesis contains two sections. The key contribution of the first section is the 
conceptual framework of shadow financial citizenship. As mentioned above, the 
objective of this conceptual framework is to analyse the link between inclusive finance 
and bifurcated banking; to understand how and why a bifurcated banking system 
complicates financial access. In Chapter 3, I discuss in detail how the literatures on 
shadow banking and financial citizenship are the core of my conceptual framework; the 
remainder of this section offers a concise summary of this is done.    
The shadow financial citizenship conceptual framework is prepared by first 
describing the exclusionary facets of financial systems in the Global South; this is done 
in Chapter 1 using the notion of ‘bifurcated banking’ and drawing upon the ‘grey 
literature’ — that is, reports and other publications from inclusive finance practitioners 
and other commentaries on policies and regulation — as well as academic scholarship 
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on inclusive finance. After this, in Chapter 2, inclusive finance is described as shadow 
banking in the context of the ‘financialisation of development’, which has occurred 
through shifts in development paradigms which have led to (1) the ascendancy of 
private finance, and (2) advances in financial innovation. Following this, in Chapter 3, 
there is a consideration of a ‘social contract’ in banking; this is joined with discussions 
on financial citizenship and shadow banking. These concepts are examined for their 
relation to bifurcated banking, and the analytical framework of shadow financial 
citizenship is used to conceptualise bifurcated banking 
The second section contains analyses of inclusive finance in relation to the 
wider financial system in Pakistan; bifurcated banking is a product of this relation. 
Chapter 4 presents the institutional context of the financial system in Pakistan, drawing 
attention to the dominance of private capital. Chapter 5 highlights the structural 
features of banking and finance in Pakistan, particularly the penchant for banks to lend 
to large corporate institutions and the government; here inclusive finance is likened to 
shadow banking because it is a response to the reluctance of banks to service large 
segments of the public. Chapter 6 discusses how these trends and strategies have 
shaped the practices of two specific deposit taking microfinance banks — Telenor 
Microfinance Bank and the First MicroFinance Bank — and how this reflects the nature 
of shadow financial citizenship and the inequities that characterise it: (1) inequities in 
pricing, (2) inequities in eligibility, and (3) inequities in surveillance. Chapter 7 
considers the demand side explanation for shadow banking in the light of practices such 
as blended finance and impact investing; these strategies are drawn to inclusive finance 
and reflect the responses of institutional investors to a ‘global glut of savings’.  Chapter 
8 consolidates these findings and shows how they are the outcome of Pakistan’s specific 
encounter with broader, structural patterns of financialisation.  
0.4 DATA SOURCES  
The data used for the second section includes primary sources, secondary sources, and 
grey literature. Additionally, during fieldwork, I conducted 19 semi-structured 
interviews with professionals working in inclusive finance and allied areas, including in 
the central bank, commercial banking, development agencies, fintech, and social 
enterprise.5 All of them were based in either Pakistan or the United Kingdom: 
Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, or London. These interviews expedited my access to 
primary sources and grey literature. Interviewees, during some meetings, shared official 
copies of reports and regulatory documents, and on occasion drew my attention to 
other published materials to support our conversations. Over the course of my 
fieldwork it became clear that the nature and quantity of the data available in the public 
domain is not only substantially rich, but also expansive enough to substitute for any 
analysis generated through interview content. The role of the interviewers in this study 
has thus been to facilitate the collection of data. The analysis in this dissertation is 
_____________________________ 
5 A list of institutions is included in Appendix A.  
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principally based on published materials which constituted primary sources, secondary 
sources, and grey literature. 
The primary sources used included policy and regulatory documents from 
government and multilateral institutions, and also the audited financial statements of 
financial institutions; through this, I obtained quantitative data for descriptive analysis. 
Secondary sources are comprised of the academic literature that relates to the political 
economy of finance and development in Pakistan. This was used mainly to draw 
linkages between country specific resources and materials, and broader regional and 
global trends.   
Grey literature refers to research reports, white papers, and other commentaries 
published by government departments, policy institutions and think-tanks, non-profit 
organisations, financial institutions, businesses, and industry organisations, as well as 
other resources that are not produced by commercial publishers. Some of these 
materials overlap with what are considered primary sources; for example, World Bank 
studies that suggest how policy makers might use private finance for development.  
0.5 CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
My principal unit of analysis is the inclusive finance industry in Pakistan: I review 
different aspects of inclusive finance — its evolution, institutions, regulation, and 
sponsors — to study the extent to which it exemplifies shadow banking.  This single 
case study approach, like all research strategies, has its weaknesses as well as strengths.  
The weaknesses associated with this approach pertain to (1) its limitations in offering 
generalisable inferences and (2) issues of subjectivity and researcher bias (Flyvberg, 
2006). These weaknesses have been debated in the literature about methodology in the 
social sciences (e.g. Yin, 2009) but look considerably less formidable in relation to the 
strengths of this approach: primarily that it is ‘comparative’, albeit to varying extents 
depending on much engagement there is with comparative themes (Halperin and 
Heath, 2012). The research strategy applied here is an exercise in theory building and 
generating hypotheses; the ‘comparative’ element emerges through arguments and 
theories that are relevant to other contexts and offer meaningful commentary not just 
about the case being studied, but also about general political phenomena.  
As such, inclusive finance in Pakistan, is treated here as what some 
methodologists (e.g. Halperin and Heath, 2012; Yin, 2009) might describe as a 
‘revelatory’ example: one used to study relationships that would not be clear otherwise. 
For this, I use a historical explanation approach (e.g. Mahoney et al, 2009) to examine 
and analyse published materials and fieldwork observations in the light of the research 
questions identified earlier, and thus to describe political and social phenomena and 
evaluate causal relations. The historical explanation approach is used in this thesis to 
explore the specific causal mechanisms that underlie the association between inclusive 
finance and bifurcated banking. My approach to this process is informed by the 
methodological literature on counterfactual analysis, in which outcomes are described 
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as the result of combinations — potentially four in total — of either necessary or 
sufficient causes (Mahoney and Barrenechea 2019; Mahoney et al, 2009; Goertz and 
Levy, 2007). 
The causal mechanisms that link inclusive finance, as a component of the 
banking system — as the cause — to bifurcated banking — as the effect — involve the 
shifting strategies of institutions; domestic as well as international. The objective of 
identifying and describing these mechanisms is to arrive at conclusions that expand the 
academic literature on inclusive finance — and by extension financialisation — in 
Pakistan, and also offer tools to study similar phenomena elsewhere. 
Thus, in my dissertation, and as shown through the central claims outlined 
above, the causal mechanism linking cause to effect involves the decisions of regulatory 
and policy institutions to formalise the provision of credit to the poor in the form of 
microfinance banks and institutions; this is revealed through the analysis of documents 
from the multilateral institutions which have endorsed and given financial support for 
formal microfinance in Pakistan, as well the regulatory framework launched by the 
central bank in Pakistan.  An analysis of subsequent documents shows how these 
microfinance banks and institutions eventually come to rely on external sources of 
financial capital from private and public donors, as well as commercial organisations to 
fund banking services for the poor. Empirical support for these trends is drawn from 
documentation related to the United Nations led FfD or Finance for Development 
Agenda, which is closely linked to the targets set for the Millennium Development 
Goals, and Sustainable Development Goals.  
The need for an alternative set of banking services is augmented by and 
expressed in the publications of international bodies such as FATF, in response to 
concerns about terror financing, and by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
to address apprehensions about financial stability. These trends catalyse innovation — 
through private investments — in banking products directed at mobile phone users and 
technologies which harvest mobile phone usage patterns and related behaviours to 
produce data for credit scoring.  These strategies are revealed in the merger and 
acquisition patterns in the Pakistani banking and telecom industries. They serve to 
expand the suite of products and services which are created specifically for the poor. A 
bifurcated system of banking is thus the outcome of the institutionalisation of inclusive 
finance.   
An alternative set of causal mechanisms may also be found in the literature. 
These form the view that is widely accepted among policymakers and donor 
institutions; that the poor have complex financial needs, which are not addressed 
through mainstream banking and finance, so the pressing need is for products and 
services designed specifically for poor people. In this perspective, the outcome of 
bifurcated banking is triggered by poverty. Here, the causal mechanism linking cause to 
effect involves altruistic donors and private investors providing poor people with 
alternatives not only to the traditional banking system but also to the informal money 
lender; this strategy is boosted by the involvement of the global development 
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community which sees lending to the directly poor as preferable to larger ‘big ticket’ 
projects; as awareness grows around the complexities of managing meagre incomes, 
financial institutions and technology companies create even more specific products to 
accommodate the circumstance of poverty. A bifurcated system of banking, in this 
narrative, is the outcome of persistent poverty.   
Pakistan is selected as a case primarily because of the attention it has drawn 
within the ‘grey literature’ for enabling microfinance through its legal and regulatory 
frameworks (EIU, 2011). Along with the Philippines, Peru, and Bolivia, Pakistan is one of 
a few countries that has a separate legal framework in the form of prudential regulations 
for deposit taking microfinance banks (MFBs), and a separate regulatory framework for 
non-deposit taking microcredit institutions; additionally, the financial sector has been 
shaped by state led efforts to expand coverage through retailers and mobile network 
operators.  This arrangement has its roots in the 2001 Microfinance Ordinance, which 
was passed by the Parliament to ‘regulate the establishment, business and operations 
of microfinance institutions’ (SBP, 2001). These rules articulate an explicit role for the 
private sector; this is unsurprising given that the Microfinance Ordinance — as 
discussed in Chapter 4 — is an extension of the 1990s Pakistani financial liberalisation 
policies moulded by the Washington Consensus. From the standpoint of the 
financialisation literature — particularly that focused on poor countries — what makes 
the Pakistan case especially appealing is how it reveals the contours of the transition 
from the Washington Consensus to what has very recently come to be described as the 
‘Wall Street Consensus’  (Gabor, 2019).   
0.6 CONTRIBUTION TO SCHOLARSHIP 
The disciplinary contribution that I make through this thesis is to the international 
political economy scholarship on the Global South, and by extension, the field of 
development studies. In doing so, I augment the academic literature on financialisation; 
more specifically, the literature on financialisation in poor countries.  I do this through a 
novel critical analysis of inclusive finance in Pakistan, for which I build the analytical 
tool of shadow financial citizenship. I use this as a conceptual framework to study 
bifurcated banking, a phenomenon that is defined, described, and explained here as 
occurring when inclusive finance becomes a form of shadow banking. A bifurcated 
banking system emerges from the practices, processes, and products of inclusive 
finance, when the latter is absorbed by shadow banking institutions, practices, and 
networks.  
As such, the contribution made here augments scholarship on the ‘activity 
centred’ view on financialisation which emphasises — particularly where it draws on 
Post-Keynesian perspectives — the role of institutions in managing economic outcomes 
driven by investment (Nesvetailova, 2012).  Financialisation is seen to affix the ‘real’ and 
the ‘financial’ realms together, by dispensing mounting quantities of assets into the 
financial system (Nesvetailova, 2012: 85). This activity centred view may be contrasted 
with an ‘accumulation centred’ or systemic view which emphasises the transformation 
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in capitalism that has occurred over recent decades (Lapavitsas, 2013; Krippner, 2005; 
Arrighi, 1994). There is no fundamental incongruity between these two views, but the 
study of inclusive finance carried out in this thesis is more given to expanding the 
scholarship on the former, rather than the latter. The former, ‘activity centred’ view is 
more appropriate for the analysis of financialisation outside of advanced capitalist 
economies because it resists the notion — central to the systemic view — that 
financialisation is a universal, homogenising process.  The micro-level analyses carried 
out in this study show how inclusive finance — given empirical examples from Pakistan 
— is a form of shadow banking, and how this, in turn, bifurcates banking. 
The linkages drawn in this thesis, between inclusive finance and shadow 
banking, place this study firmly within the set of literature that interrogates 
financialisation specifically in the context of poor countries, and generally in the context 
of countries that are not advanced capitalist economies. Inclusive finance is thus 
presented here predominantly as (1) an instance of the peculiarity of financialisation in 
Pakistan, but also as (2) an indirect instance of the generality or financialisation in 
developing and emerging countries; also known as ‘subordinate financialisation’ and 
characterised by burdensome foreign reserve accumulation patterns and currency 
hierarchies (Bortz and Kaltenbrunner, 2018; Lapavitsas, 2013).  
0.7 OUTLINE  
In addition to introductory and concluding chapters, this thesis contains eight chapters 
organised as two parts. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 form Part One which focuses on theoretical 
and conceptual issues. Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 form Part Two, which uses case 
examples from Pakistan and also contains a discussion section to reflect upon the 
salient conceptual and empirical features of the overall study. A final chapter concludes 
by offering a summary, as well as limitations and avenues for further research. 
Chapter 1 surveys the literature on inclusive finance and its predecessors, 
acknowledging the shifts that have occurred since the microcredit model of 1970s first 
gained credibility.  The overview presented here also scrutinises how policies centred on 
financial access for the poor are ‘inclusive’ and thus a counter to financial exclusion. 
This is done primarily by invoking research, from various sources including grey 
literature, to compile a list of characteristics of financial access given the banking 
structures of poor countries. These underscore the bifurcated nature of banking in 
countries where financial access for the poor is a policy goal. In a bifurcated banking 
system there is a previously undefined grey area, or a space between financial exclusion 
and access to mainstream finance. 
Chapter 2 draws attention to the linkages between inclusive finance and 
transformations in development thought and practice. This discussion considers the 
implications of a Post Washington Consensus in the framing of development and 
poverty reduction as issues of inclusion and inclusive growth. More recent approaches, 
endorsed by international institutions, have retained a focus on inclusion and 
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incorporated the role of private capital in strategies to attain it. These shifts underlie the 
incursion of shadow banking into development, which is the subject of an emergent 
Wall Street Consensus.  
Chapter 3 presents a conceptual framework that applies a financial citizenship 
lens to bifurcated banking which is seen as emerging from a nexus between inclusive 
finance and shadow banking. The issue of bifurcated banking is problematised by 
drawing on the notion of a social contract in banking. This is linked this to the historical 
example of black banking in the United States and its connection with the American 
racial wealth gap. Through this analysis, two contentions are made: (1) that financial 
systems have an inside and an outside, and (2) that recent transformations in banking 
structures limit access to this ‘inside’. These contentions demonstrate that shadow 
banking advances exclusionary practices that obstruct financial citizenship, noting that 
some of these exclusionary practices are already embedded in the financial landscapes 
of poor countries. The conceptual framework of shadow financial citizenship is 
developed thus. It is used to conceptualise the exclusionary practices which are 
demonstrated by the phenomenon of bifurcated banking. This phenomenon is 
expressed as a grey area that occupies a space between financial exclusion and access to 
mainstream finance.  
Chapter 4 introduces the case study of inclusive finance in Pakistan. Processes 
of privatisation, liberalisation, and deregulation have shaped Pakistan’s banking sector 
and created the setting in which the commercialised model of microfinance, offered 
primarily through specially licensed deposit taking institutions, came to be seen as 
globally successfully. This model, which exists parallel to a large and tightly regulated 
mainstream commercial banking sector has driven policy innovation in funding, and as 
argued here, functioned as a gateway to shadow banking through institutional 
investment. These trends arise from endogenous as well as exogenous factors. The 
endogenous factors pertain to the operating strategies of mainstream banks fixated with 
investments in government paper over lending; the exogenous factors include a search 
for yield from overseas investors which translates into debt and equity investments in 
the Pakistani inclusive finance industry.  
Chapter 5 draws attention to the institutional and structural factors that 
underlie bifurcated banking in Pakistan. These include pressures from international 
institutions including multilateral donors and regulatory regimes such as the Basel 
Accord and FATF Guidelines, which limit banks in who they can service. Additionally, 
macroeconomic structures constrain mainstream banks from lending outside of large 
corporates and the government. These drive a form of shadow banking which is akin to 
that which emerges from regulatory avoidance and arbitrage, presents the building 
blocks for the inequities that characterise shadow financial citizenship: these three core 
inequities are (1) inequities in rates, (2) inequities in requirements, and (3) inequities in 
surveillance.  
Chapter 6 discusses the nature and implications of bifurcated banking, which 
are examined here through two deposit taking microfinance institutions: TMB and 
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FMFB. Despite clearly different strategies and goals, both institutions came to adopt 
very similar approaches: this reveals the homogenising influence of global finance 
through the push to make institutions ‘sustainable’ through profit orientation. 
Bifurcated banking is seen to occupy a grey area between financial exclusion and 
financial citizenship and results in high service charges for loans, the compulsion to 
provide fungible collateral, and the insidious forfeiture of digital privacy. These 
outcomes are conceptualised through a shadow financial citizenship framework and 
reflected in the set of inequities highlighted earlier: (1) eligibility/ requirements, (2) 
rates/ pricing, and (3) privacy/ surveillance.  
Chapter 7 revisits earlier discussions about financing development, particularly 
the specific, growing features of the global financial system that advance the nexus 
between shadow banking and inclusive finance. The Pakistan specific context for impact 
investing exemplifies contemporary development strategies in general and inclusive 
finance in particular. The role of patient capital in development offers a gateway for 
shadow banking practices, particularly given the shifts and transformations that have 
occurred over recent years in development initiatives by incorporating private and 
philanthropic capital. A focus on the specific practice or ‘asset class’ known as impact 
investing ties together some core themes centred on global finance and development 
practice. In particular, the proclivity for impact investors to seek out base-of-pyramid 
projects has been an important driver of shadow financial citizenship. 
Chapter 8 brings together the observations made earlier to reiterate that 
inclusive finance is responsible for a bifurcated banking system. Built on this is the 
contention that inclusive finance, particularly as reflected through the case study of 
Pakistan, contains generalisable features which reveal its connections with broader, 
structural patterns of financialisation. More specifically: inclusive finance as a form of 
shadow banking exemplifies subordinate financialisation, and Pakistan’s bifurcated 
banking system is related to its subordinate position in the global financial system. The 
notion of debtfare is applied to Pakistan to expand upon this connection. The 
macroeconomics of debt and austerity, and also the intrusions made by debt capital into 
an informal economy, make the Pakistani state prone to applying a mode of governance 
which facilitates a ‘poverty industry’.  Inclusive finance is a component of this poverty 
industry, which may be considered through a lens of subordinate financialisation. Such 
an approach acknowledges that financialisation is encountered differently by poor or 
emerging capitalist countries relative to their advanced capitalist counterparts.  As such, 
suggestions to overcome shadow financial citizenship rely on strong participation from 
the state and also entail the need for an overhaul of the state’s role in contemporary 
banking practice.  
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1. ACCESS, EXCLUSION AND THE SPACE IN BETWEEN: 
A GREY AREA 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The literature surveyed in this chapter problematises inclusive finance. This is done by 
querying the extent to which such policies are indeed inclusive, and thus a counter to 
financial exclusion.  The key argument here is that inclusive finance does not resolve the 
problem of financial exclusion. More specifically, financial inclusion is not the notional 
opposite of financial exclusion. Rather than resolving financial exclusion, it creates a 
grey area. This grey area occupies a space between financial exclusion and financial 
citizenship. 
This distinction presents a fresh critique of financial inclusion. Negative 
appraisals in the past have tended to focus on how microcredit does not work: it does 
not result in poverty reduction and does not empower women.  Such claims carried 
especial relevance when microcredit was promoted as the poor country version, 
particularly because of large informal economies, of enterprise finance.  But over the last 
decade or so, microcredit has come to be just one of a suite of products offered by firms 
known as microfinance institutions or banks. Microfinance products are thus likened 
more to retail finance, and less to enterprise finance.  The aspirations of microfinance 
institutions have changed as a result: there is now less emphasis on growing small 
business and more emphasis on ‘financially including’ groups that are described as 
‘unbanked’, ‘underbanked’, and ‘underserved’. But access to the mainstream banking 
system is limited — and often non-exisent — for those who use inclusive finance. 
Despite a widening and deepening of initiatives to expand microcredit, microfinance, 
financial inclusion, and most recently, inclusive finance, there are substantial 
differences in the nature of financial access for the poor, relative to the non-poor.  
The conceptual transitions associated with the shifting initiatives mentioned 
above are discussed in section 1.2 which is a concise history of financial inclusion 
critiques. Following that, some features of inclusive finance, presented as stylised facts, 
are listed in section 1.3 to bring to light the nature of financial inclusion, particularly in 
relation to mainstream banking.  In section 1.4, the need for an appropriate analytical 
framework is underscored: one that moves beyond an inclusion and exclusion binary 
and to identify the systemic facets of uneven financial access.  Concluding remarks are 
presented in 1.5.  
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1.2 INCLUSIVE FINANCE: A CONCISE HISTORY 
The starting point for this study is, in many respects, the DFID funded document 
known as the Duvendack Report: this uses a systematic review methodology to analyse 
the impact of microcredit on poor people. 6  Well known for the verdict that there is ‘no 
good evidence to support the claim that microfinance has a beneficial effect on the well-
being of poor people’, the authors of this report neither ‘support nor deny the notion 
that microfinance is pro-poor’ (Duvendack et. al, 2011: 75).  In the words of Bateman and 
Chang (2012: 16), this was a ‘quite devastating blow to the microfinance industry’: it also 
closely followed two key occurrences that undermined the positive narrative of 
microfinance.  
One of these was the proliferation of studies that questioned the positive effects 
of microfinance. Critical of the empirical link between microfinance and poverty 
alleviation (Roodman and Morduch, 2009; Banerjee et al., 2009; Karlan and Zinman 
2009; Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 2011), these studies complemented earlier 
scholarship: indignation over the public listing of Mexican Banco Compartamos, in 
2007, had amplified discontent about commercialised microfinance (Bateman, 2010; 
Lewis, 2008) and validated an economic development literature with an unsympathetic 
view of microfinance (Dichter and Harper, 2007).  
The other occurrence was a global wave of ‘hugely destructive sub-prime-style 
“microfinance meltdowns”’ between 2008 and 2010 in Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, 
and Bosnia as well as potential upheaval in the microfinance industries of Lebanon, 
Peru, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan (Bateman and Chang, 2012: 16).  
‘One far-reaching result of all this bad news is that the microfinance industry has 
begun to drop the important claim to be facilitating poverty reduction, moving 
very quietly to redefine a new goal for itself in terms of facilitating the far more 
nebulous concept of ‘financial inclusion’ (Bateman and Chang, 2012: 17).  
The transition to ‘financial inclusion’ from ‘microfinance’ is detailed in Mader and 
Sabrow (2015) as an occurrence that underlined the failings of microenterprise lending. 
More specifically, microenterprise lending was until a certain point, the core product of 
microfinance but became less prominent as microfinance was likened more to retail or 
household finance and less to enterprise finance (Cull and Morduch, 2017).  These 
transitions are as described in Table 1.1. The shift in focus underlies the ‘strategic 
mission shift’ implemented by the microfinance industry in response to three trends: (1) 
growing criticism from new research, (2) an embrace of ‘financialisation and its new 
rationalised myths’, and (3) the immense influence of the Consultative Group for Action 
on Poverty or CGAP, a think-tank organisation housed within the World Bank (Mader 
and Sabrow, 2015: 19).  
_____________________________ 
6 ‘Systematic reviews aim to find as much as possible of the research relevant to the particular research questions, and use 
explicit methods to identify what can reliably be said on the basis of these studies.’ (EPPI Centre, 2018).  
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Table 1.1: Paradigm shifts around financial access 
Paradigm Microcredit Microfinance  Financial 
inclusion 
Inclusive finance 
Strategy Providing credit to 
microenterprises. 
Providing all 
financial services 
to improve  well-
being of poor 
women and men 
Providing and 
developing 
financial services 
that account for 
the diverse needs 
of poor women 
and men.  
Use of digital 
technology for 
financial services 
(fintech) such as 
agent network 
managers, 
payment 
aggregators for 
digital finance 
ecosystem 
 
 Issues Evidence that 
though some effect 
on business 
expansion and 
profitability, very 
little effect on 
women’s 
empowerment, and 
virtually none on 
poverty alleviation. 
Narrow supply-
led view that 
does not account 
for broader 
financial 
ecosystem and 
thus tends to be 
reliant on donor 
funding and 
subsidised credit.  
Effective use 
hampered by 
asymmetries of 
information as 
well as unsuitable 
product features 
or accessibility 
requirements.  
High costs, weak 
infrastructure: 
closed systems 
make integration 
of broader range 
of solutions into 
existing payment 
platforms costly 
and cumbersome. 
Also many financial 
services require 
significant physical 
touch points. 
 
Responses Broadening of 
objectives beyond 
economic 
development and 
poverty alleviation 
to include ability of 
poor women and 
men to better 
manage risks, 
smooth income, 
productively, and 
build assets. 
Espousal of 
holistic view of 
the sector and a 
more 
coordinated 
effort by 
government and 
industry to focus 
on increasing 
financial inclusion 
and, making 
markets work 
better for the 
poor. 
 
Technology and 
innovation for 
new customers 
and for new 
service providers: 
such as agent 
network 
managers, 
payment 
aggregators etc.  
Enhanced use and 
development of 
new technologies 
and strategies to 
induce investment 
in technology.  
Source: Compiled by author based on Collins et al., (2010) and Ledgerwood et al. (2013) 
In subsequently published research, Philip Mader (2018: 462) builds on this to depict 
financial inclusion as a ‘contested and contestable enterprise’ given the scant evidence 
for three core assertions made to promote financial inclusion: one is that it results in 
broader socio-economic development; another is that it has immediate benefits for the 
poor, and a third is that it has a compelling business rationale. Two of these assertions 
are recognizable from earlier critiques of microfinance, whereas the third offers an 
opening to query the meaning and nature — and not just the definition — of financial 
30 
 
inclusion. Such an approach, which acknowledges that financial inclusion and exclusion 
overlap, is an alternative to the characterisation of financial inclusion and exclusion as 
binaries and opposites. The ‘overlap’  may be conceptualised as a grey area: this is 
elaborated later in this chapter through a list of the exclusions the ‘financially included’ 
still encounter.   
Philip Mader’s work in this regard then may be seen as beginning where the 
Duvendack report ends, for whereas this particular systematic review offers a 
compelling set of findings that question the role of microfinance in poverty reduction, 
its focus is methodological and not economic. In singling out the dubious assertions 
that socio-economic development, and immediate benefits for the poor, are respective 
outcomes of financial inclusion, Mader (2018) enriches the arguments made earlier, for 
instance by practitioners, for instance Sinclair (2012), and scholars of international 
development (A. Roy, 2010; Dichter and Harper, 2007), of anthropology (Karim, 2011; 
Elyachar, 2005), and of international political economy (Weber, 2014; 2004; 2002; 
Soederberg, 2014; 2013). 
Together, these studies form a core literature that has been consistent in 
querying the role of microfinance, and subsequently financial inclusion, in 
development.7 Some themes stand out within these sources. For example, the rollback 
of the state is the subject of Julia Elyachar’s (2005) study of market expansion in Egypt. 
The neoliberalism of NGOs is examined in Lamia Karim’s (2011) research on indebted 
women in Bangladesh. Sinclair’s (2012) insider account documents concerns about 
extractive practices. These themes have overlaps in Dichter and Harper’s (2007) 
collection of studies of various organisations, practices, and geographic regions. Perhaps 
most relevant to Mader’s (2018; 2015) research are perspectives that link financial 
inclusion to the widening and deepening of ‘finance-led capitalism’ (Soederberg, 2014: 
92), and note the growing linkages between inclusive finance and global capital markets 
(Bonizzi, 2013; Aitken, 2010).  
These growing linkages arise from a turn to commercial sources of funding for 
on-lending. Instead of subsidies, grants, or even client deposits, microfinance banks 
have, over the last decade or so, been accessing wholesale funding from large publicly 
and privately owned financial institutions (Cull et al., 2009). The commercial version of 
microfinance and subsequently financial inclusion has thus been the subject of various 
studies ever since the role of subsidies became questionable in the late 1990s, 
particularly because they came to be seen as limiting scale through donor dependence 
(Morduch, 2000; Ledgerwood, 1998).  
The business case for microfinance was bolstered in subsequent years with the 
proliferation of microfinance banks that had previously been non-profit organisations, 
but transformed to become profitable enterprises (Drake and Rhyne, 2002). As the 
terminology of financial inclusion has gained ascendancy over microfinance in the last 
decade, inclusive finance tools based on information and communication technologies 
_____________________________ 
7 A detailed list of sources is available in Mader (2015)  
31 
 
(ICT) are seen to promise a trend of cheaper financial services, implying more 
profitability for providers (WEF, 2011). 
Such research endorses the view that commercial motives are not inconsistent 
with social motives; that it is possible for institutions selling inclusive finance to be 
doing well by doing good, or as the Economist (2008), commenting on the 
Compartamos controversy, puts it: ‘Doing good by doing very nicely indeed’. Several 
scholars of the political economy of development find this ostensible harmony between 
commercial and social motives problematic. For instance A. Roy (2010) notes that the 
profit motive incentivises lenders to extend credit to those who do not need loans and/ 
or lack the means to repay; Taylor (2012) finds that the commercial model encourages 
coercive practices to push repayment; and Mader (2015) argues that commercial 
microfinance is a tool for capital accumulation — by financial institutions — as it 
extracts resources from the poor.  
The commercialised nature of financial inclusion is thus contentious, but it also 
underlies both the success and failure of the agenda: whereas the success is the capacity 
to be profitable, its failure is in the continued presence of swathes of ‘unbanked’ and 
‘underserved’ populations. This is Mader’s third example of a core assertion of financial 
inclusion that prevails despite scant evidence.  
‘For ﬁnancial inclusion to make good business sense, ﬁnancial actors must succeed 
at proﬁtably offering decent-quality services at affordable prices and at 
encouraging clients to use them’ (Mader, 2018: 474). 
Worded differently, this stance uses the persistence of financial exclusion to argue that 
financial inclusion as business does not work, because if it did it would have obliterated 
exclusion. This observation speaks to the problem at the core of this thesis: the need to 
interrogate the nature of financial inclusion and ask how ‘inclusive’ it actually is. This 
line of questioning is a departure from the business proposition argument which sees 
financial inclusion and financial exclusion as binary and separate. This binary view is 
troublesome because it implies that financial inclusion — applied through inclusive 
finance — extinguishes financial exclusion. The next section shows how this is not the 
case, and instead, the ‘financially included’ occupy a grey area and remain separated 
from the mainstream financial sector.   
1.3 ATTRIBUTES OF INCLUSION: A GREY AREA BETWEEN 
FINANCIAL EXCLUSION AND MAINSTREAM FINANCE? 
How and why do the ‘financially included’ remain separated from the mainstream 
financial sector? This question will be answered in two parts: the first part highlights the 
limited capacity of inclusive finance products to facilitate access to mainstream finance, 
the second part of the question requires an analysis of the structural aspects of banking 
and finance that impair its accessibility. This latter part will be addressed in Chapter 3 
which conceptualises bifurcated banking using a lens of shadow financial citizenship.  
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The segmentation of markets for financial services has been problematised by 
scholars in the context of products such as payday loans and credit cards with 
exorbitant fees (Appleyard et al. 2016; Soederberg, 2014; Dymski, 2005). Outside of this 
research there has been only limited discussion about the stark differences between the 
financial products and services offered to customers of inclusive finance and 
mainstream finance respectively. This issue is partially addressed by Collins et al. (2009) 
in ‘Portfolios of the Poor’, a study of how those with low, erratic, and unpredictable 
incomes sustain themselves on a daily basis and in unforeseen situations. A key 
argument extended is thus: the poor have complex financial needs, which are not 
addressed through mainstream banking and finance, so the pressing need is for 
products and services designed specifically for poor people.  
This view is influential and has obscured the potential of inclusive finance to 
serve as a stepping stone to mainstream finance.8 The emphasis on ‘the poor’ thus 
motivates an agenda for inclusive finance that is centred on designing and selling 
financial services that are relevant only for the poor, or for those with no alternative. 
Under this arrangement a segment of the population is offered financial services of a 
nature that impede ‘their ability to participate fully in the economy and to accumulate 
wealth’ (Dymski, 2005: 440).  This is detailed below by highlighting the circumstances of 
the poor who seek financial access, or worded differently, the attributes of inclusion.  
The poor live and work in the informal economy 
A sizeable overview of the relationship between informality and inclusive finance is in 
the seminal article by Milford Bateman and Ha Joon Chang (2012) ‘Microfinance and the 
Illusion of Development’.  A key argument of their work is that microfinance ignores the 
role of scale economies: 
‘By definition, microfinance produces microenterprises – that is, enterprises and 
agricultural units that are very small and almost always operate below minimum 
efficient scale. However, it is widely accepted that for all enterprise sectors there 
remains an identifiable minimum efficient scale of production, and operating 
below this level makes it virtually impossible for any enterprise to survive and 
prosper in a competitive business environment’ (Bateman and Chang, 2012: 17). 
As such, microfinance is prone to being a poverty trap: its focus on small, informal 
enterprises draws away finance from firms, particularly small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). Because it limits finance for enterprises that have the capacity to generate 
_____________________________ 
8 A point evidenced by CGAP’s placement of ‘Portfolios of the Poor’ in its list of recommended readings. 
http://www.cgap.org/topics/financial-inclusion  
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employment, microfinance has unfavourable implications for the macroeconomy.9 
Bateman and Chang (2012) base this claim on examples from India, Bangladesh, and 
Mexico and also link it to the ‘fallacy of composition’.  The latter is apparent in the 
tendency for development policy to ignore the existence of local demand constrictions 
and assume that microeconomies have unlimited capacity to absorb the unemployed 
through an expansion of the informal — local enterprise — sector. Alice Amsden, the 
scholar of state-led economic development, notes that: 
‘To create employment requires action on the demand side, in the form of capital 
investments to expand entrepreneurial opportunities and increase productive jobs. 
Yet the anti-poverty programs that have swept through Africa take a “Capabilities 
Approach”. They focus exclusively on the individual’s supply side, as though a 
greater supply of better-qualified job-seekers (in terms of education, consumption, 
mobility housing and human rights) will automatically stimulate the demand to 
employ it, as in the Eighteenth-century “law” of the conservative French economist 
Jean Baptiste Say’ (Amsden, 2012: 114). 
Additional arguments that relate microfinance strategies to informality are based on: 
one, a hypothesis of deindustrialisation, and two, the issue of connectivity between 
enterprises of various sizes (Bateman and Chang, 2012). The deindustrialisation 
argument is extended to question the emphasis on trade and subsistence based 
enterprises which — given the example of informal economy growth in sub-Saharan 
Africa — constrains large scale industrialisation. Similarly, the ascendancy of survivalist 
enterprises limits prospects for horizontal and vertical relationships, based on 
cooperation, between enterprises; these inhibit large firms from expanding locally as 
they incentivise them to import instead. 10 Also, investment is obstructed when there is 
a lack of sub-contractors, particularly for greenfield projects; local enterprises tend not 
to be equipped to respond to the demands of technology and scale. 
These concerns are reflected by Meagher (2015) who views the spread of 
informality in African countries as the outcome of adverse incorporation. The concept 
of 'adverse incorporation' sees poverty and inequality as a result, primarily, of unequal 
economic and power relations, thus requiring efforts to change the societal, political 
and economic dynamics that keep people disadvantaged (e.g. Hickey and Du Toit, 2013; 
Bird et al., 2002). Meagher (2015) thus draws attention to the relationship between 
inclusive finance and informality by noting how market led growth strategies — despite 
attempting to execute a kinder, gentler, approach to development by focusing on 
poverty reduction — result in selective inclusion. 
_____________________________ 
9 Such a claim assumes that banks are intermediaries of loanable funds: in this ILF model, banks accept deposits of pre-
existing real resources from savers and then lend them to borrowers. The alternative view is the financing through money 
creation (FMC) model in which banks create their own funding, through deposits, in the act of lending, in transactions that 
involve no intermediation whatsoever. These differing views on the role of banks are discussed in the Post Keynesian 
literature such as Lavoie (2006) and Fontana (2003). Whereas many central banks appear to have endorsed the ILF model 
(Jakab and Kumhof, 2015), it can be argued, building on Chick and Dow (1988: p 2) that , for developing countries an ILF 
model is appropriate because the choice of model depends on ‘whether or not the relevant stage of banking development 
has been reached’.   
10 Bateman and Chang (2012) describe these as ‘productivity-enhancing horizontal (‘proto-industrial districts’) and vertical 
(sub-contracting) connections’. 
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‘The very design of this donor-led stable of inclusive market programmes views the 
informal economy as a boundless sponge, and takes no account of the power 
struggles taking place within it. Instead of addressing the stresses of market 
saturation, poverty and exclusion of the less advantaged, these policy packages 
channel graduates into the informal economy from above, and pump micro-credit 
borrowers into survival activities from below, intensifying the pressures already 
crowding out the poor, uneducated and desperate’ (Meagher, 2015: 16).  
The poor are disadvantaged by KYC requirements of mainstream 
finance  
KYC or ‘know your customer’ requirements are a primary reason for financial exclusion. 
For businesses — financial institutions as well as others — KYC requirements 
necessitate the identification and verification of clients to deter money laundering and 
crime, particularly terror financing. The emphasis on KYC can be attributed to the USA 
Patriot Act of 2001, pursuant to which the United States Treasury issued regulations that 
made KYC mandatory for all banks. A related event is the October 2001 meeting of the 
G10 central banks and other supervisory authorities on terror financing where it was 
noted that —  to prevent abuse of the financial system — it was necessary to develop 
and implement effect KYC and CDD (customer due diligence) procedures (Bantekas, 
2003). 
These events also underlie the transformation of the organisation known as 
FATF  or the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. Formed in 1989 by the 
G7 with the goal to combat money laundering from drugs crimes, until 2002 this was 
simply an intergovernmental body entrusted with the development and promotion of 
relevant domestic and international policies. However, at an extraordinary plenary held 
in late 2002, it broadened its mandate to encompass terrorist financing. More recently, 
FATF has formally acknowledged that financial exclusion is a money laundering and 
terrorist financing risk: this is detailed in its 2012– 2020 mandate (FATF, 2012).  
FATF rules necessitate the use of careful documentation and procedures to 
verify the identity of clients; these are based on KYC and CDD, with the latter seen as a 
subset of the former.11 Based on a survey conducted by the World Bank, Allen et al. 
(2012) note that tedious documentation requirements are the reason — reported by 17 
per cent of adults— for not having a formal bank account. 12  One response to this, by 
some countries, has been to offer simplified accounts. These ‘no-frills’ accounts are 
suited to FATF guidelines because they limit transaction frequency and quantities; they 
thus allow the issuing bank to take a risk based or ‘proportional’ approach to KYC, 
which assumes that the risk from low value transactions is inconsistent with the need 
for onerous documentation (FATF, 2014). However, as de Koker (2011) explains, such 
_____________________________ 
11 CDD or Customer Due Diligence is an information gathering exercise to assess the extent to which the customer exposes 
it to a range of risks: these include money laundering and terrorist financing. 
12 Of over 65,000 adults who participated in the study (Allen et. al. 2012) . Other reported reasons: “[banks] are too far 
away” (20 percent); “[I] don’t have the necessary documentation” (17 percent); and “[I] don’t trust [banks]” (13 percent); 
“because of religious reasons” was cited by 5 percent of adults; and “someone else in the family already has an account,” 
which identifies the group of indirect users (23 percent) (Allen et. al. 2012). 
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products almost invariably have rigid usage restrictions, such as caps on transaction 
amounts, injunctions on cross border transactions, and limits on frequency and 
maximum balances: while these accounts serve basic needs they are not flexible enough 
to meet the diverse needs of the underbanked, particular in the case of emergencies, 
illnesses, or other unforeseen circumstances.  
‘The CDD principles and the related “KYC” language reflect an era of banking 
where bankers and clients had personal relationships, where accounts were only 
opened after introductions and interviews and where transactions were primarily 
processed by persons who knew the client and could be struck by patterns of 
transactions that are at odds with their knowledge of the client’ (de Koker, 2011: 
368). 
The poor face indignity and disrespect when accessing financial 
services 
Mainstream commercial banks and microfinance banks often occupy neighbouring 
physical spaces. The issue of indignity and disrespect here speaks to a key puzzle; why 
are the financially excluded — particularly in urban centres where geographical 
proximity is not a constraint — unserved by mainstream commercial banks? One 
answer to this: rude staff. Client surveys— reported in the grey literature as well as 
academic research —indicate that this is a routine occurrence for clients and potential 
clients of mainstream institutions (Anjum et. al, 2017; Qureshi and Jalbani, 2012; de 
Montoya and Haq, 2008). 
Anjum et al. (2017) demonstrate through an econometric study that staff 
behaviour is a key factor dampening consumer satisfaction. Qureshi and Jalbani’s study 
on enterprise loans makes a related observation: 
‘There were political involvements in the process of loan sanctioning. Most of the 
participants stated that the loan processing time was a big problem. Regarding 
customer dealing, many participants expressed that the behavior of the concerned 
bank officers was bureaucratic and typically rude, while some had no issue with 
respect to customer service’ (Qureshi and Jalbani, 2012: 87). 
Haq and de Montoya (2008) report how survey participants ‘often noted that they 
lacked the knowledge needed to understand bank services, were intimidated by them, 
and felt disrespected by bank staff’. Similar findings are made by Abbott and 
Rwakabamba (2010) for Rwandan banks, and by Honohan and King (2012) in a cross 
country analysis of Africa: these indicate that habitual encounters with rude staff are 
not unique to Pakistan.  
Like mainstream institutions, microfinance institutions too may compromise 
the dignity and respect of clients, particularly when they are borrowers. This happen 
because of direct confrontations initiated by bank staff but also indirectly when co-
borrowers as well as family members, neighbours, friends, and acquaintances are 
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involved. The use of such shaming techniques to reduce late payments and 
delinquencies has been criticised extensively (Mader 2015; 2017; Hina, 2014; A. Roy, 2010; 
Karim, 2008) not least so because antagonistic loan recovery techniques undermine the 
claim that microfinance can empower women. Ananya Roy illustrates this with a quote 
from Goetz and Sengupta’s study on rural credit in Bangladesh, in which it is noted that 
lenders prefer women clients. This is because they are:  
‘…are easy to locate, being much less able than men to leave a locality temporarily 
to evade field workers, and they are easier to intimidate into repayment than men, 
who can always threaten violence. In effect, the household is internalizing the high 
transaction costs of lending to men . . . These costs are primarily those of 
monitoring men’s loan use and enforcing regular repayment. Women in effect 
offset these costs by using intrahousehold gender relations of obligation or 
persuasion to recover weekly loan repayments’ (Goetz and Sengupta 1996: 55 cited 
in A. Roy, 2010). 
A recent push for ‘dignity and consumer protection’ (CFI, 2017; CGAP, 2017) can be 
attributed to the negative attention drawn to microfinance because of coercive 
practices. Results from a cross country analysis done by the Smart Alliance — an 
initiative to promote respectable banking — show that clients in various countries are 
dissatisfied with how staff treat them.  
‘A basic demand from clients is for respectful and humane treatment. In Pakistan 
and Benin, clients complain that MFP staff lack human decency in dealing with 
clients who have problems paying their loans. Clients view the public shaming that 
is used in Benin and Pakistan extremely unfavorably. In Peru, 26 percent of clients 
report that MFPs do not treat clients equally, favoring those who are better dressed 
or who have personal connections to MFP staff. Poor service quality is not unique 
to financial services: respondents reported that nearly all formal institutions they 
interact with, such as schools, clinics, and police, treat them badly and like 
inferiors’ (Meka and Sanford, 2016: 6).  
The issue of problematic staff behaviour may be theorised as a class issue: it has a wider 
context in the literature on class structures. For instance, the anthropologist David 
Graeber, commenting on the rise of the professional managerial class, notes how mass 
indebtedness — an outcome of the financialisation of housing and higher education — 
had a severe impact on imagined class positions:  
‘An easy rule of thumb is: if you see a policeman on the street at night and feel 
more safe, rather than less safe, chances are you’re middle class. This would 
anyway explain why most people in, say, Pakistan or Nigeria do not feel middle 
class, and most people in the United States, traditionally, have done. But one 
paradoxical result of financialization is that this is reversing. One recent survey 
revealed that for the first time, most Americans no longer consider themselves 
middle class. It’s not hard to see why. If you find yourself facing eviction from your 
house, owing to an illegal robo-signing foreclosure that the government refuses to 
prosecute—even though armed government agents are, nonetheless, willing to 
arrive to actually expel you from your family home—then it doesn’t really matter 
what your income level is. You will not feel particularly middle class. And millions 
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of people are now finding themselves in this or in analogous situations’ (Graeber, 
2014: 76). 
By attributing class experiences to ‘vulgar Foucaldianism’, where ‘games of power create 
social reality itself’, Graeber (2014) offers a lens to study poor countries as well: these did 
not — for various reasons, including colonialism — experience the social levelling and 
flattening of traditional hierarchies following the great depression and the crisis of two 
world wars (Halperin, 2013).  For most clients and many providers of inclusive finance in 
Pakistan the understanding is, that equal terms of service for poor and non-poor clients, 
and respectful and courteous treatment at all times from staff is unlikely in the absence 
of considerable social change.13  
The poor have limited options for recourse 
The oppressive practices of lenders came to be seen as a dire problem, a decade or so 
ago, when repayment pressures following the global credit crunch, threatened an 
industry wide collapse. The prevalence of farmer suicides occurring across rural India 
and particularly in the state of Andhra Pradesh (Taylor, 2011), is associated with the debt 
traps that are described below: 
‘Beginning in the early 2000s, the industry began to display an “irrational 
exuberance” – a dramatic proliferation in MFIs, accompanied by an aggressive 
approach to extending the borrowing base – accompanied by increasing reports of 
the use of coercion. The pressure to repay, coupled with the increased availability 
of credit from a multiplicity of lenders, resulted in “overlapping” – or borrowers 
taking loans from one MFI to pay back another – and thereby getting caught in a 
debt-trap’(Haldar and Stiglitz, 2014: 5). 
The response by the inclusive finance industry, to reports of mistreatment, has been to 
emphasise the importance of consumer protection, particularly of a nature that can be 
enforced outside of a formal judicial system. The costs of going to court tend to be high 
in relation to the relatively small sums of money in question making consumers prone 
to either not lodging, or abandoning complaints against lenders (Rutledge 2010). CGAP 
— the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor — suggests that this a predicament 
associated with base of pyramid (BoP) clients and markets and that it may be remedied 
through non-judicial means of recourse (CGAP, 2013).  
This problem of the disengagement between the aggrieved poor and formal 
institutions has not been a salient feature of multilateral initiatives such as the G20 
Principles of 2009 (GPFI, 2018) and the Maya Declaration of 2011 (AFI, 2017): both these 
agreements underscore that consumer protection is an essential feature of financial 
stability but do not attempt to remedy the matter of inadequate legal institutions in 
poor countries. Susanne Soederberg describes such initiatives, which are both 
_____________________________ 
13 Private communications with microfinance practitioners in Karachi (August, 2017) 
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transnational and voluntary, as obfuscating the power relations that underlie inclusive 
finance: part of a global financial inclusion agenda, these are enshrined in a ‘neoliberal-
led global development project and finance-led capitalism’ and also rely on an uneven 
balance of power between debtors and creditors (Soederberg, 2013: 599).  
Recent data from the Smart Campaign (2017), which employs a cross country 
qualitative methodology to survey clients of microfinance, indicates that less than a 
quarter of aggrieved clients actually file a complaint and report the need for more 
channels, particularly beyond the loan officer (Meka and Sanford, 2016).14 Specifically 
for Pakistan, the limits of recourse for customers of inclusive finance became acutely felt 
from fraudulent digital transactions and cyber-attacks on financial institutions: in cases 
where funds were transferred from commercial banks to microfinance banks and mobile 
money accounts, victims were limited in redress because the jurisdiction of the 
government ombudsman does not extend beyond commercial banks (Dawn, 2017).  
The poor lack essential information about financial services 
In responding to these negative consequences of financial inclusion, international 
organisations have emphasised the need for ‘responsible finance’, which CGAP (2011) 
describes as mutually beneficial for consumers and providers — as well as funders — of 
financial services. This draws on the mainstream corporate premise that ‘the best way 
for corporations to do well is by creating shared value for customers and communities 
as well as shareholders’(Porter and Kramer, 2011 cited in CGAP, 2011).  
Underscored in this concept, is the vital point that the poor have limited 
literacy, limited formal education, and limited financial knowledge (CGAP, 2011). Such a 
description is euphemistic because in many of the countries where microfinance usage 
is common, literacy rates are very low.15 For example, in Pakistan only 57 per cent of 
adults over the age of 15 are considered literate, this is 73 per cent in Bangladesh, and 69 
per cent in India16.  
Once widely acknowledged however, lack of information about financial 
services was confronted in the Global South with tools that were tried and tested in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries.17 These had previously been applied in the late 1990s and early 
2000s to offer financial literacy education as a remedy for high levels of consumer debt 
and complex financial products (Wolf, 2018) and appear to inform the OECD position as 
well:  
_____________________________ 
14 With respondents from Pakistan, Peru, Benin, and Georgia 
15 Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can both read and write with understanding a 
short simple statement about their everyday life. For more details on measuring literacy please see 
https://data.worldbank.org  
16 Based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics data which is available at https://data.worldbank.org  
17 For instance in the United States the Jump$tart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy: https://www.jumpstart.org/. 
And in the United Kingdom, Young Money (formerly pfeg) https://www.young-money.org.uk/   
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‘For one thing, the growing sophistication of financial markets means consumers 
are not just choosing between interest rates on two different bank loans or savings 
plans, but are rather being offered a variety of complex financial instruments for 
borrowing and saving, with a large range of options. At the same time, the 
responsibility and risk for financial decisions that will have a major impact on an 
individual’s future life, notably pensions, are being shifted increasingly to workers 
and away from government and employers’ (OECD, 2006).  
Later, in 2008, the OECD-backed Russia Trust Fund for Financial Literacy and 
Education was set up to support the advancement of financial literacy and capability 
programmes in low and middle-income countries: funding was provided by the Ministry 
of Finance of the Russian Federation, and the World Bank (OECD, 2018). This was 
followed by the OECD International Network on Financial Education project 
(OECD/INFE) which began in 2009.  Recent survey results from an OECD led financial 
literacy survey indicate that weak financial literacy is not a phenomenon exclusive to 
the consumers of microfinance (OECD, 2016).18 
‘On average, just 56 % of adults across participating countries and economies 
achieved a score of at least five out of seven (considered to be the minimum target 
score), compared with an average of 63 % across OECD countries, indicating that 
many adults around the world are currently unable to reach the minimum target 
score on financial knowledge’(OECD, 2016: 9). 
These gaps in financial knowledge — a component of financial literacy — create the 
justification for financial education: in the OECD context this tends to refer to ‘the 
introduction of financial education into the school curriculum and the design and 
implementation of dedicated learning frameworks’ (OECD, 2013: 3).  
For instance, with the support and collaboration of various organisations 
including the Asian Development Bank, Pakistan Microfinance Network, and the 
Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund, Pakistan’s central bank launched a Nationwide 
Financial Literacy Program (NFLP) in 2012 (SBP, 2012). Yaseen Anwar, who was at that 
time the governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, described the need for financial 
education as a ‘demand side solution’ to the bottlenecks that impeded financial 
inclusion, noting that ‘the very low level of financial awareness and confidence of 
financially excluded groups remains a strong barrier to their access and use of financial 
services’ (SBP, 2012: 2).   
Such initiatives have been equated by Wolf (2018) to the mechanisms that 
enable a curated suite of ideas to influence policy design: this is a key theme in the work 
of Ban et al. (2016) on the role of international organisations in global financial 
governance. However there are key differences that become apparent in the execution 
_____________________________ 
18 Countries and economies that participated in the survey are Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, British Virgin 
Islands, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, Jordan, Korea, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, South Africa, 
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom. 
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of transmitted policies of this nature. For instance, unlike in the OECD countries, 
financial education in the official Pakistani context refers to central bank organised 
‘financial workshops for low-income Pakistanis across the country’ (NLFP, 2012). Policy 
design here reflects the reality of a weak educational system that makes financial 
education at the school level unfeasible; a reminder of the gap that is difficult to address 
outside of a state directed effort.  
The poor pay more for financial services, particularly loans and 
payments 
Interest rates and their size are at the core of what makes microfinance controversial. As 
financial viability came to be a priority for microfinance providers, the line between 
microfinance and mainstream finance became blurred. Jonathan Morduch refers to this 
shift as ‘the microfinance schism’ where financial performance and social impact are 
incompatible: there is nevertheless backing for a supposed ‘win-win proposition’ where 
the principles of mainstream banking ensure wider client coverage despite high interest 
rates (Morduch, 2000). This ‘double bottom line’, though sought by many practitioners, 
has proven elusive (Tyson, 2012). Grameen Bank founder, Muhammad Yunus, 
interviewed shortly after the 2007 initial public offering of Mexican microfinance giant 
Banco Compartamos — an institution known to charge poor clients triple digit lending 
rates — expressed dismay at this situation:  
‘”When you discuss microcredit, don't bring Compartamos into it”, he instructed. 
“Microcredit was created to fight the money lender, not to become the money 
lender”’ (Bloomberg, 2007). 
High interest rates in the microfinance context refer to rates that are considerably more 
than those charged by mainstream banks for lending. This incongruity is defended by 
two arguments. The supply side justification attributes expensive loans to 
administration, particularly operating expenses, as small loans cost more per dollar lent, 
to administer than larger loans (Rosenberg et. al, 2013). The demand side argument is 
the same noted by Morduch (2000: 617): microfinance providers are drawn to outreach 
rather than impact because of the assumption that ‘poor households demand access to 
credit, not “cheap” credit’.  
Interrogating the ethics of exorbitant interest rates on microloans, Sandberg 
(2015) takes a sympathetic view of this discrepancy, though stressing that it should not 
exist at all: he argues that the onus of lowering rates should fall not on microfinance 
providers but on other stakeholders such as governments and the international political 
community. This draws on Helms and Reille’s (2004) observation that investments in 
telecommunications, roads, and education are a more feasible approach — compared to 
subsidies and interest rate ceilings — for making lending fairer. A key reality touched 
upon earlier, in the context of education, is echoed here: many disparities originate 
when the state eschews a developmental role.   
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In addition to paying more for loans, the poor are also charged high amounts for 
payment services, such as for transferring money across different locations or paying 
bills. Such transactions have been made possible through financial inclusion initiatives 
based on digital technology or mobile money. But mobile money is expensive and this is 
noted even by CGAP (2017: 1): ‘If a movie were made about financial inclusion, chances 
are mobile money fees would be cast as the villain’.   
Costly transactions — often amounting to over 10 per cent of total value — may 
be attributed to pricing structures (Holloway et. al, 2017). Three types prevail: (1) slab 
based pricing, where transactions within a predefined range are charged a flat fee; (2) 
percentage based pricing, whereby the user pays a flat percentage of the amount sent, 
regardless of amount; and (3) free, with no transaction cost incurred by the user. The 
most widely used of these is slab based pricing; it facilitates transparency by evading the 
need to calculate fees based on variable amounts so is particularly useful for a clientele 
with limited literacy. But, slab based pricing also tends to be the most regressive 
structure as the smallest transactions become the most costly in percentage terms.  
Mobile money providers justify high rates on the basis of heavy investment 
costs. Scale in this industry may only be attained through massive investments in agent 
networks (Aron, 2017): these include the training and monitoring of the personnel that 
facilitate over the counter transactions. Despite this arrangement, there is a strong push 
from governments and international organisations to promote financial inclusion 
through mobile money to overcome the constraints on access to mainstream banks: 
‘Prohibitive distances to the nearest financial services point, high costs of account 
maintenance, and fees for effecting transactions all exclude the poor from the formal 
banking system’ (Logan, 2017). 
The poor struggle to transition from inclusive finance to 
mainstream finance 
Transitions from inclusive finance to mainstream finance have not been the subject of 
quantitative data; consequently it is difficult to comment on how frequently users of 
inclusive finance become users of mainstream finance. However, as documented in a 
cross country study by Shankar (2016), the presence of a ‘missing middle’ in Pakistan, 
India, and Bangladesh indicates that a lack of funding options might constrain 
borrowers seeking loans larger than those available from inclusive finance when ‘needs 
fall in between the typical loan sizes offered by MFIs and commercial banks’. This use of 
missing middle terminology to describe the lack of financing options for firms is 
relatively recent: in the past it has been used to refer to the ‘disproportionately small 
number of small and medium-sized enterprises as compared with the number of micro 
and large enterprises in many developing countries’ (Tybout, 2014; Hsieh and Olken, 
2014; Ayyagari et al. 2003). 
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As such, the missing middle appears to ensue from unavailability of an 
intermediate loan size; a problem that may be described as one of graduation or when 
microfinance clients ‘outgrow’ microfinance. 
‘With maturity of the microfinance sector, there are likely to be some “MFI 
graduates” who need to be serviced by another institution in the system. These 
borrowers are still too small to avail themselves of small and medium-sized 
enterprise (SME) credit from commercial banks, but their loan sizes are often far 
higher than the upper threshold of microcredit’ (Shankar, 2016). 
Loan sizes are a contentious issue because they are assumed to proxy household 
poverty: lenders that show a pattern of issuing larger loans are accused of ‘mission drift’ 
through a preference for less poor borrowers (Mader, 2015; Ashta and Hudon, 2012; 
Sinclair, 2012; Mersland and Strøm, 2010).19 This assumption has been questioned by 
some microfinance practitioners who contend that a pattern of rising loan sizes is not to 
be construed negatively, and indicative of borrowers who gradually improve in terms of 
repayment, and lenders who manage risk by initially lending small amounts (CGAP, 
2010). According to this argument, larger loans are reflective of mission success rather 
than mission drift.  
Even if a progressive shift is used to make the — potentially tautological — 
claim that borrowers enhance their opportunities by borrowing more, there are two 
realities that suggest a less promising situation.20 One of these is multiple borrowing — 
the tendency to borrow from multiple institutions — which is associated with over-
indebtedness and also systemic risk from deteriorating portfolio quality (Tilakaratna 
and Hulme, 2015; Schicks, 2013). This phenomenon was the source of alarm when a 
number of farmer suicides were reported in India’s Andhra Pradesh (Mia, 2017; Taylor, 
2011). Over-indebtedness is, to a large extent, found to arise from the practice of 
borrowing from one institution to repay another (Mia, 2017; Mader, 2015; Schicks, 2013; 
Sinclair, 2012).  
The other reality is loan limits; these tend to be imposed statutorily in a number 
of countries with tightly regulated microfinance sectors, including Pakistan (SBP, 2017c) 
and India (2015). Loan size limits have recently been increased in both countries and 
such measures are ostensibly a response to a consensus — evident in a burgeoning grey 
literature — from international organisations; particularly the World Bank and IFC. 
This sees small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) as the engine for GDP growth and 
employment and places a heavy emphasis on the role of finance in promoting these 
firms (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Nenova et al., 2009; IFC, 2017). This stance is 
also reflected in the efforts to introduce a separate category of ‘micro and small 
enterprise lending’ (MSEL) in Pakistan (Aslam, 2013); and also the Reserve Bank of 
_____________________________ 
19 The concept of mission drift is commonly used in the charitable or non-profit sector to describe a situation in which 
funding strategies shape or alter organisational objectives.  Bennett and Savani (2011) describe this in the context of 
reduced access to government support.  
20 A potential tautology exists because larger loans cause more consumption which is associated with a higher living 
standard.   
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India’s (RBI) introduction of a separate license for the category of ‘Small Finance Bank’ 
(RBI, 2014).  
Such measures to address the restriction of limits on borrowing are taken under 
the assumption that larger loans are for enterprise growth and not consumption growth, 
including home purchases. It is also noteworthy that the response to constraints on 
transitions from inclusive to mainstream finance, has not been to seek reform of either 
inclusive finance or mainstream finance but to introduce a new and separate layer of 
regulation.  
1.4 FINANCIAL CITIZENSHIP FROM INCLUSIVE FINANCE? 
The issue of poverty is a central feature of financial inclusion as discussed above. The 
attribution of financial exclusion — and of the presence of unbanked communities — to 
poverty or the circumstance of ‘being poor’ is not an innovative practice. For instance in 
their study of the impact of microfinance in Asia and Latin America, Montgomery and 
Weiss (2005: 5) describe lack of access of credit as ‘understandable in terms of the 
absence of collateral that the poor can offer’ as well the ‘ high costs involved in dealing 
with large numbers of small, often illiterate, borrowers’. This same position is 
articulated in the financial diaries tracked by the authors of ‘Portfolios of the Poor: How 
the World's Poor Live on $2 a Day’ in which a quasi-ethnographic approach is applied to 
study the poor, in the light of how they manage their finances (Collins et al., 2009).21   
This is an endogenous view of inclusive finance because the key assumption is 
that a demand for inclusive finance — and not mainstream finance — arises from the 
specific needs of the poor. The alternative to this is an exogenous view in which the 
demand for inclusive finance is an outcome of how the financial system is structured. 
This perspective is thus centred on the supply of mainstream financial services — or 
their absence — because it attributes financial exclusion to the structures and 
approaches of the mainstream banking industry.  
These structures and approaches are associated by Gary Dymski with financial 
globalisation: particularly in the 1990s this had homogenising effects on consumers as 
global financial institutions widened their reach and began offering traditional banking 
services— namely those that had already been available in the US for over a decade — 
in new markets (Dymski, 2005). But homogenisation of this nature is shown have a 
distinct class element as Dymski (2005: 443) observes that there is a difference between 
‘homogenization within class’ and ‘homogenization across classes’. This analysis draws 
on Philip Cerny’s suggestion that financial globalization may also be measured by 
organizational changes (Cerny, 1994) which is extended to note that the financial 
practices and products of globalised firms contribute to financial exclusion.  
_____________________________ 
21 Based on the analysis of personal diaries which track all the financial transactions of selected households in Bangladesh, 
India, and South Africa between 1999 and 2005; only 250 diaries are studied so the scope for quantitative analysis is 
limited.  
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For instance, the risk-management and information technology tools that were 
once used by banks for corporate clients were adapted for new models of consumer 
banking: as a result, relatively affluent customers are targeted by banks to ‘cross sell 
services and aim at nurturing brand loyalty and ‘one size fits all’ services for the 
customers of their ‘upscale retail banking’ activities’ (Dymski, 2005: 449). Additionally, 
cross subsidies have been impeded by the explosion of choice available to blue-chip 
clients, who can as a result no longer be made to implicitly support loans for smaller 
clients (Dymski, 2005). Cross subsidies continue to be offered across markets but within 
customer class for those whose business is sought for multiple products: those clients 
who have only the potential to consume a limited number of financial products are 
retained as customers but pay full price for a restricted set of services (Dymski, 2005).  
These observations draw on the literature associated with the British 
geographers, Andrew Leyshon and Nigel Thrift who attributed — in their seminal 
article on ‘Financial Abandonment in Britain and the United States’ — exclusionary 
banking practices to the response of financial institutions to a crisis of indebtedness and 
competition (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995). As a mode of resistance, they propose a notion 
of ‘financial citizenship’: 
‘...as a means of putting pressure on states to reform their financial systems so that 
they include rather than exclude and of putting pressure on financial systems to 
realize that they have some state-like responsibilities which reach beyond 
consumer sovereignty into basic human right’ (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995: 336). 
Thus, the onus of countering financial exclusion is placed on the state and on financial 
systems. This emphasis is distinct from the contemporary agenda of financial inclusion, 
particularly in the sense of what Anke Schwittay describes as ‘a global assemblage of 
subjects, technics, and rationalities that aim to develop poor-appropriate financial 
products and services’ (Schwittay, 2011: 381). A financial citizenship approach is thus an 
alternative to the narrative of inclusive finance in which the consumers of such products 
are impeded by poverty in accessing the mainstream financial system. In such a context 
it is a departure from the perspective that financial access is impeded by poverty. The 
same financial exclusion that has been characterised as a problem of more advanced 
capitalist economies exists in poor countries as well. 
The main premise of this research therefore, is that the concept of financial 
citizenship offers an apt tool to understand the grey area between access to mainstream 
financial services and financial exclusion: this indefinite space has tended to be 
overlooked in the existing literature on financial inclusion in poor countries. Financial 
citizenship is of course not a novel concept and many scholars, some mentioned above, 
and also others, have applied it to link uneven development and marginality (Kear, 2013) 
as well as subjectivity (Lai and Tan, 2015), with the politics of accessing and distributing 
finance. In the context of the Global South, except for recent work by Abdul Rahman et 
al. (2019), there has been limited engagement between the concepts of financial 
citizenship and uneven access to finance.  
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Figure 1: Bifurcated banking and the grey area between financial exclusion and access to mainstream 
finance22, 23 
 
Compiled by author 
1.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter presents a concise history of what emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
as the microcredit model and underwent various transformations. Contemporary 
inclusive finance is the outcome of these transformations.  Much has changed in 
policies which seek to enhance financial access to the poor, but the problem of financial 
exclusion is nevertheless consistently seen as emerging from poverty and the 
circumstances associated with it.  
_____________________________ 
22 See Klapper (2019) 
23 See https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/overview 
46 
 
To probe the nature of financial inclusion, this chapter draws on existing 
studies, including the grey literature on financial access for the poor. A comparison of 
inclusive finance in relation to mainstream banking highlights the uneven nature of 
financial access. The salient features of this unevenness include the: (1) informal 
economy orientation of inclusive finance, (2) inconsistent disadvantages of ‘know your 
customer’ requirements, (3) patterns of indignity and disrespect which shape financial 
access, (4) limited options for recourse, (5) lack of essential information about financial 
services, (6) relatively higher rates and fees, (6) constraints to transitioning from 
inclusive to mainstream finance and banking.  
Uneven financial access is expressed in the phenomenon of bifurcated banking. 
To query this further, there is a need for an appropriate conceptual framework that 
moves beyond an inclusion and exclusion binary and (1) seeks to identify the systemic 
facets of uneven financial access, and (2) to outline how the concept of financial 
citizenship is relevant for a poor country. An analysis of the exclusionary nature of the 
financial system is conducted over subsequent chapters to show how shadow banking 
— through inclusive finance — limits full financial citizenship. This impaired version of 
financial citizenship may be described as ‘shadow financial citizenship’ and is 
introduced in Chapter 3 as an analytical framework to discuss bifurcated banking.  
Before that, Chapter 2 describes the broader context of inclusive finance and its relation 
to the global financial system. 
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2. DEVELOPMENT AS INCLUSION AND DEVELOPMENT 
AS FINANCE  
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter notes how patterns of uneven access to formal financial services 
persist despite the traction gained by a market based model of inclusive finance. Such 
commercially oriented models are funded primarily by private capital. The implications 
of the role of private capital in inclusive finance are examined in this chapter.  
The growing role of private finance in development combined with a strategic 
emphasis by development policymakers on poverty, and consequently ‘inclusion’ has 
come to underlie how inclusive finance is distinct from mainstream finance. Inclusive 
finance is the outcome of shifting development paradigms, particularly the Post 
Washington Consensus, and the approaches that followed it.  These paradigmatic shifts 
underlie transformative processes. Through these, micro-credit, and then microfinance, 
subsequently financial inclusion, and eventually inclusive finance came to play a 
prominent role in contemporary development practice.  
Inclusive finance, as a development intervention, is a product of the changing 
relationship between development and poverty reduction in which the latter has gained 
prominence over the latter. This re-conceptualisation has entailed a shorter term view 
of targets and outcomes and is captured neatly in Alice Sindzingre’s remark that ‘to 
speak of poverty is to postpone speaking of development’ (Sindzingre, 2004: 176). This 
emphasis on poverty is troubled by the complexity of a concept which is at once 
economic, political, and sociological: it eventually resulted in a focus on inclusion. 
Initiatives that emphasise inclusive growth, inclusive development, and of course, 
financial inclusion reflect this focus.  
This fixation with inclusion is discussed here as a component of the Post 
Washington Consensus; this has been followed by strategies extricated from the NSE or 
New Structural Economics framework (Lin, 2012), which have come to overlap with 
what has recently been labelled a ‘Wall Street Consensus’ (Gabor, 2019). These three 
approaches are brought together through an emphasis on institutions, but the type of 
institution each approach emphasises is different: the Post Washington Consensus 
highlights the need for safety nets, the NSE framework is — at least superficially — 
centred on a rejuvenation of industrial policy, and the Wall Street Consensus seeks to 
enable development interventions funded by private capital.  
Private capital is probed in this chapter through a comparative discussion — on 
finance in general, and inclusive finance in particular — of heterodox and orthodox or 
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mainstream perspectives on the function of private capital in development. The idea 
that there is a sharp divide between orthodox and heterodox thought on inclusive 
finance is emphasised here to critique the role of inclusive finance in development. 
Inclusive finance as a form of financial deepening is a developmental tool because it is 
associated with higher GDP growth; but the use of a financialisation lens — in which 
inclusive finance is depicted as a financial innovation — uncovers what drives inclusive 
finance beyond the imperatives of economic growth and development. A core argument 
thus made here is that inclusive finance may be understood better as a financial 
innovation rather than a development intervention.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 discusses 
responses to the Washington Consensus which motivate the fixation of development 
interventions with ‘inclusion’, Section 2.3 examines the significance of inclusive finance 
in the ‘development discourse’, Section 2.4 is about the ‘financialisation of 
development’, particularly the idea that private capital is instrumental to contemporary 
development strategies, Section 2.4 draws attention to the how financialisation — 
expressed through financial innovation and subordinated financialisation — is a key 
issue for development, and Section 2.5 offers concluding remarks.  
2.2 DEVELOPMENT AS INCLUSION 
Preoccupied with income poverty, the Washington Consensus approach has been to 
resolve both poverty and inequality through economic growth (Saad-Filho, 2010; 
Mehrotra and Jolly, 2000).  Washington Consensus policies reflect principles of 
monetarism and new classical economics and between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s 
shifted development theory towards a ‘trickle down’ approach.24 
‘By the start of the 1990s, the apparent failure of this strategy, the rise of new 
institutional economics and growing pressure on the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) by several country Governments, international 
organizations (including some United Nations agencies), non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), universities and social movements compelled the 
mainstream and the international financial institutions (IFIs) to address the 
problems of inequality and poverty reduction explicitly once again’ (Saad-Filho, 
2010: 1). 
The Post Washington Consensus (Birdsall and Fukuyama, 2011; Stigltiz, 2008) — which 
is reflected in the incorporation of Joseph Stiglitz’s writings into the research 
publications of the World Bank — stresses on the need for institutions to address social 
_____________________________ 
24 Saad-Filho (2010) compares the Washington Consensus to a Cold War pre-Washington Consensus that guided 
development policy under the World Bank presidency of Robert McNamara and sought to promote the economic 
infrastructure required for private sector-led industrialization. Dependency theorists contested such approaches, and 
argued for socialism because development and underdevelopment constitute ‘two sides of the same coin’.  
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inequalities: however, market forces and economic growth are still considered the best 
strategy for poverty reduction (World Bank, 2000).25 
‘Development should no longer be a monopoly of economists. But the proposed 
post-Washington Consensus consensus can also be interpreted as simply a change 
to preserve the old order by making it more effective as well as more humane’ 
(Gore, 2000: 800). 
Despite an unwavering commitment by international organisations to market 
mechanisms, and growth, a consensus emerged among donors in the 1990s that poverty 
reduction was the overarching aim of development (Sindzingre, 2004). This was heavily 
inspired by the work of Amartya Sen, particularly his collaboration with Mahbub-ul-
Haque, which resulted in the Human Development Index or HDI. This summary 
composite index captures education, health, and wealth income, which are assumed to 
be elementary aspects of the ability to live a full and meaningful life (Haq, 1995). Sen’s 
work on ‘capabilities’ allows for poverty to be framed in a social justice context that 
augments Rawlsian concepts (Dean, 2009) and leads to the contention that poverty is 
not simply a problem of well-being but of an inability to pursue well-being because of 
deprivations. The capabilities approach is thus a powerful basis to argue that economic 
growth alone is insufficient for countries to attain a desirable position on the HDI. 
Access to finance may thus be seen as a tool to enhance capabilities to pursue well-
being (Michel and Holimalala, 2018; Tseng, 2011): this is an extension of strategies that 
see poverty reduction as a goal, rather than as a by-product of growth.  
The terminology of ‘inclusive growth’ and ‘inclusive development’ has roots in 
the idea of ‘pro-poor growth’: this latter term reveals the claim that not all growth is 
pro-poor (Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2010). The concept of pro-poor growth is somewhat 
complex and there are competing definitions of what it constitutes. Martin Ravallion 
(2004) identifies two definitions: pro-poor growth as growth in which poverty is 
reduced, and pro-poor growth as growth in which poverty is reduced more than it 
would have if all incomes had grown at the same rate. For Rauniyar and Kanbur (2010) 
the latter definition comes closer to a criterion of inclusive growth as measurable 
through the growth elasticity of poverty: this is done by converting poverty changes per 
unit of increase in per capita income into elasticity.  The conflation of pro-poor growth 
with inclusive growth, and inclusive development — particularly in the form of donor 
funded interventions — is articulated in the literatures of the World Bank (Commission 
on Growth and Development, 2008) and the Asian Development Bank (Ali and Yao, 
2004). 
What poverty is, and how it may be measured, are questions that underlie a 
disconnect between macroeconomic theory and development practice. This is evident, 
particularly since the late 1980s, from the repeated attacks on the discipline of 
development economics not just for lack of mathematical rigour, but also for misgivings 
_____________________________ 
25 Stiglitz was Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank between 1997 and 2000.  
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regarding the Washington Consensus (Reinert, 2011). Development economics struggled 
with the mathematics of modelling imperfect competition and by the 1960s had clearly 
begun to disengage with what was gradually becoming a mainstream (Krugman, 2012). 
Additionally as Pierre-Richard Agenor observes, mainstream macroeconomics too could 
not prioritise poverty; with the disintegration of the Neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis 
the question of distribution came to be a secondary issue (Agenor, 2005).26  
How does this ‘inclusive’ turn in development relate to inclusive finance? For 
Mader and Sabrow (2015) the rise of financial inclusion is a response — from 
stakeholders in the microfinance industry — to the failure of microenterprise lending 
and the related need to change the depiction of the microfinance industry as 
exploitative and ineffective.27 Microenterprise lending was until a certain point, the core 
product of microfinance, as described in Chapter 1, but became less prominent as 
microfinance was likened more to retail or household finance and less to enterprise 
finance (Cull and Morduch, 2017).  This shift reveals the growing distance between 
inclusive finance and the finance-led growth model associated with McKinnon (1973): 
that gained prominence in the 1980s with the endorsement of the World Bank (World 
Bank, 1989).28  
This shift in focus underlies the ‘strategic mission shift’ implemented by the 
microfinance industry in response to three trends: growing criticism from new research, 
an embrace of ‘financialisation and its new rationalised myths’, and also the immense 
influence of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor or CGAP, a think-
tank organisation housed within the World Bank (Mader and Sabrow, 2015).   A key 
action from the CGAP has been to align itself closely with the stance taken by Collins et 
al. (2009). This is discussed in Chapter 1 and contends that the poor need assistance not 
only in growing meagre incomes, as is already widely known, but also in managing 
irregular incomes: the gap between income received and income spent is the cause of 
consternation as well as impoverishment 
‘But over the past few decades we have also learned that poor households need 
access to the full range of financial services to generate income, build assets, 
smooth consumption, and manage risks—financial services that a more limited 
microcredit model cannot provide’ (CGAP, 2018a). 
The prominence of financial inclusion in the development discourse may also be 
attributed to two wider tendencies. One of these is the growing influence, which 
coincides with the launch of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, on the notion 
of ‘inclusion’.  Interventions such as financial inclusion are endorsed by private, public, 
_____________________________ 
26 Generally, other than approaches that emphasise causality from GDP growth to poverty reduction, there are four 
approaches to studying poverty as an economic phenomenon. These are; unemployment, which is viewed as causally 
linked to poverty; consumption, prices, and inflation, which are related to the living standards of the poor; fiscal policy, 
which discusses the issue of redistribution; and marginal productivity theory which seeks to explain income differentials 
(Schaller, 2014). 
27 Primarily the CGAP, Accion, and the ASA (Mader and Sabrow, 2015). 
28 The World Bank view is orthodox and holds that financial development promoted economic growth: the heterodox view 
is summarised in Joan Robinson’s claim that ‘where enterprise leads finance follows’ (Robinson, 1952: 86). 
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and nongovernmental organisations to facilitate the attainment of MDGs. The World 
Bank (World Bank, 2018) describes financial inclusion as an ‘enabler’ for seven of 
seventeen SDGs and also to ‘reduce extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity’.29 
The other is the process which Peck and Theodore (2015) describe as ‘fast policy’ to 
accomplish transformations of states and societies by mobilising policies across 
differing contexts, particularly from one economy to another. The concept of fast policy 
shines a light on how inclusive finance came to be embraced by development 
practitioners. But before the MDGs and fast policy can be discussed effectively, it is 
necessary to query the notion of development and of a development discourse.   
2.3 FROM MODERNISATION TO MDGS 
Financial inclusion as a development strategy is an example of ‘the making of 
development’ (A. Roy 2010).  The concept of development is in itself contested and the 
most serious challenge to it is perhaps offered by the PD or Post-Development school. 
The PD school is sceptical of development because it is a concept weighed down by 
Eurocentric, depoliticising and authoritarian overtones (Escobar, 1995; Sachs, 1992; cited 
in Ziai 2013). Additionally, given how diverse the research on the topic is it might be 
considered unreasonable to refer to it as a unified whole, given the vast and diverse 
scholarship it encompasses. This includes literature by modernisation theorists and also 
dependency writers, as well as debates on balanced or unbalanced growth, export 
orientation or import substitution, and also capitalist or socialist development (Ziai, 
2013).  
The making of development 
The concept of a development discourse emerges from a set of core and secondary 
assumptions — involving normative, practical, and methodological aspects of 
development — which underlie ‘nearly everything that is written and spoken on the 
topic’ (Ziai, 2013: 57).  Some assumptions in this list include: goal specification because 
the Global South needs development, process specification because the Global South 
needs economic growth, industrialisation, and modernisation in order to become 
developed, and also process legitimation because development interventions have the 
legitimate backing of expert knowledge to attain a good society to improve the lives of 
the people (Ziai, 2013).   
Ananya Roy notes that in recent times there is an ascendancy of a new global 
order of ‘millennial development’ which is distinct from the previously dominant 
approach of modernisation which assumed that all countries were at various stages of 
development with many in the process of ‘catching up’.   
_____________________________ 
29 Another intervention used as a policy tool for MDGs is conditional cash transfers or CCTs: this has been the subject of 
critiques similar to those directed at financial inclusion for a tacit acceptance of ‘the sexist, racist and capitalist structures 
and systems underlying poverty and exclusion’ (Cookson, 2016: 1201).  
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‘What is unusual about the present historical moment is that poverty has become 
visible as a global issue. The focus has shifted from the modernization of national 
economies to the alleviation of the poverty of the “bottom billion,” the 1.4 billion 
people such as Felicita living under the threshold of the international poverty line. 
There is also a rapid globalization of the responses to poverty—from the global 
campaigns that are being waged to “make poverty history,” to the global 
dissemination of poverty-alleviation “best practices,” to the radical critiques that 
link poverty to the global economy and thus insist that “another world is possible” 
and necessary’ (A. Roy, 2010: 6).   
This globalisation of responses described above is contained within what Phillip 
McMichael describes as a switch from ‘the development project’ to the ‘globalization 
project’ (McMichael, 2011: 149). The development project was informed heavily by the 
experience of Europe following the Marshall Plan in the aftermath of World War II, 
which is the basis for a modernisation theory which is both teleological and Western-
centric: the development project also relied on, and thus collapsed with, strategies 
reliant on the international economic arrangements of the Cold War (McMichael, 
2011).30 The globalisation project is portrayed as the successor to the development 
project and has replaced a focus on national economic growth with a focus on 
participation — or inclusion — in a global economy (McMichael, 2011). This is reflected 
in the manner in which development has become associated with the MDGs and SDGs 
and is evident in David Hulme’s commentary on these strategies which are led by the 
United Nations.  
‘The shift that had been occurring in development over the 1990s, and confirmed at 
Copenhagen, was now being institutionalised. Development was no longer about 
national development (nation building, economic growth and general 
improvements in welfare). Rather, it was synonymous with poverty eradication (or 
reduction)’ (Hulme, 2007: 8).   
The Millennium Development Goals and subsequent Sustainable Development Goals — 
known as MDGs and SDGs respectively — are approaches to development that operate 
by setting specific targets in what are considered focal points in global poverty and 
inequality (UNDP, 2005). The MDG/ SDG focus thus showcases the concept of inclusive 
development and marks a departure from previous approaches to development and 
poverty reduction that were questioned for their income or GDP centricism. This 
movement for a more socially conscious form of development is examined by Porter and 
Craig (2004: 387) as a ‘Polanyian turn within a wider liberal project, which seeks to re-
embed and legitimate a liberal social and economic order’: this is a response to policy 
neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s where discontent was fomented by the ‘lost decade 
of development’, debt and currency crises, recurring state failures, disintegrating social 
_____________________________ 
30 Sandra Halperin observes that the ‘notion of a division between a developed and a developing world emerged after 
1945 precisely because it was only then that this developmental divergence occurred’ (Halperin, 2013: 10) 
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services, persistent poverty in the Global South, violent anti-globalisation riots, as well 
as other occurrences. 31   
The MDGs were established in 2000 following the UN Millennium Summit held 
in New York: these committed nations to a series of time-bound targets including 
poverty reduction, with a deadline of 2015. In 2012 the UN Secretary General appointed a 
High-level Panel to advise on the global development agenda beyond 2015: this 
eventually resulted in the launch of the SDGs which called on countries to attain a series 
of seventeen targets by 2030. This emphasis on targets, set in quantitative terms, has 
been the subject of scepticism. Sindzingre (2004) sees MDGs as exemplifying the 
troublesome aspects of quantitative objectives, particularly the preclusion of scrutiny 
within the development discourse of poverty and inequality. For instance, a focus on 
halving global poverty within a time frame tends to avoid the discussion on underlying 
causalities — such as the impact of falling international prices on commodity exports — 
and where observations regarding causality are made, they tend to focus on association 
and thus circumvent analysis of  systemic and structural mechanisms (Sindzingre, 
2004).   
Within the development discourse, inclusive finance has a direct link to the 
SDGs. This framing may be attributed to the World Bank, given that this organisation 
describes financial inclusion as an ‘enabler’ for seven of seventeen SDGs and also to 
‘reduce extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity’ (World Bank, 2018: 1). Similarly, 
for the CGAP (2016) inclusive finance has a role as ‘a means to an end’ but also in 
facilitating the delivery of ‘other social benefits and innovative private-sector solutions’. 
The role of international organisations holds special relevance in a study of inclusive 
finance because it offers an avenue to consider isomorphic practices in policy 
formulation as well as implementation. Isomorphism refers to a similarity of the 
processes or structure of one organization to those of another (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983).32 Of particular relevance is the isomorphism between the policies around 
financial exclusion, as expressed in OECD countries, and financial inclusion, as a 
problem of poor countries. An analysis of how these concepts differ across geographies 
is a deficiency of the literature, on financial exclusion as well as on financial inclusion. 
This gap may be addressed by applying the literature on policy transfer, particularly 
relating to international organisations, to the notional relationship between financial 
exclusion and financial inclusion.  
 
 
_____________________________ 
31 This period refers to the 1980s, particularly in the context of Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa where debt crises 
had led to policies of fiscal austerity that were seen to have exorbitant social and economic costs: Hans Singer describes 
this event as ‘Development in Reverse’ (Singer, 1989).  
32 DiMaggio and Powell (1983) discuss isomorphic practices in their study of organisational change in which they observe 
that various processes, other than competition and efficiency, causes structural change that makes organisations more 
similar to each other but less efficient.  
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Inclusive finance as ‘fast policy’  
The literature on policy transfer through international organisations views them as 
‘centres of policy diffusion that drive normative change’ (Broome and Seabrooke, 2015). 
For instance, Bazbauers (2018) draws inspiration from Gramsci for a framework to study 
the tension between coercion and consent in international development assistance: 
particularly for the World Bank, the concept of technical assistance has evolved and 
engaged new labels such as technical cooperation and capacity building.33 Broome and 
Seabrooke (2015: 956) examine how international organisations integrate training with 
technical assistance to ensure that policy implementation is carried out by ‘sympathetic 
interlocuters’.  
The involvement of international organisations in strategies of poverty 
reduction and development interventions draws attention to the phenomena of ‘fast 
policy’ (Peck and Theodore, 2015; Peck, 2011 Peck; 2011a). Fast policy describes the 
processes and practices through which policies from one setting are applied to another, 
given ‘that the marketplace for social‐policy ideas and models is deeply structured by 
powerful institutional actors and enduring asymmetries’ (Peck, 2011a: 172). These 
dynamics are relevant here because they describe the political — rather than 
technocratic — nature of policy making. The presumption that policy making is 
overwhelmingly technocratic is expressed in what Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore 
describe as the orthodox view of policy transfer studies.  This relies on a rational actor 
framework in which ‘decision-makers more or less freely choose between policy models-
cum-options, albeit with varying degrees of knowledge and uncertainty’ (Peck and 
Theodore, 2015: 7). 
Among the limitations of such an approach is that it overlooks how ‘the 
definitions of problems or solutions are socially constructed’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 
1996: 357). In the literature on policy transfer there is a distinction between pluralist and 
structural perspectives. Pluralist perspectives, which reflect the dominant approach and 
rely on a rational actor framework, tend to focus on the decisions taken by individual 
actors: structural perspectives focus on the constraints from institutional and structural 
inequalities (Dolowitiz and Marsh, 1996). There is thus a need for an approach which 
resists the tendency to overemphasise the role of intentions and of politicians and 
bureaucrats: an alternative approach would account for structural and economic factors 
and view policy making as a messy and complex process (Peck and Theodore, 2015; 
Benson and Jordan, 2011; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).  
Peck and Theodore (2015) use such an approach to study two policy 
interventions which they describe as transnationally connected: conditional cash 
transfers and participatory budgeting. Both these policies have Global South roots but 
eventually came to be ‘hybridized or customized in locally specific ways’ (Peck and 
Theodore, 2015: 225) with conditional cash transfers becoming the policy choice of New 
_____________________________ 
33 Described so because of Antonio Gramsci’s contribution to political theory which expands on the view of the state 
through an analysis of politics as coercion and consent. 
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York City’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and participatory budgeting coming to be seen 
by the World Bank as a ‘corruption-resistant guarantor of transparency’ for auditors and 
accountants and also ‘as a model of good governance’ immune to macroeconomic 
turbulence (Peck and Theodore, 2015: 167). 
These examples demonstrate the aptitude of the policy transfer literature to see 
policy development and political decision-making as shaped by globalised markets and 
transnational interdependence. Of particular interest is the resistance such approaches 
present to the role of coercion. For Garrett et al. (2008), coercion — along with 
emulation, learning, and competition — is one of four causal mechanisms of 
international policy diffusion. Each of these mechanisms explains, to varying extents, 
how policy formations are not endogenous to nation states (Peck and Theodore, 2015).  
In this approach, emulation and competition are identified as two causal 
mechanisms with the strongest explanatory capacity. Emulation is revealed in ‘follow 
the leader’ models where policymakers imitate the strategies of successful and powerful 
actors and/ or institutions, or in the form of ‘expert theorization’ when epistemic 
communities express their support for policies and the transactions through which they 
are disseminated: competition in diffusion occurs because of pressures, in a market 
setting, to attract investment given limited and mobile resources, and is often manifest 
in ‘race to the bottom’ regulation pertaining to the environment or welfare  (Peck and 
Theodore, 2015: 21-23).  
The other two mechanisms are learning and coercion. Learning is described as a 
situated social construct because learning models assume that successful policies will be 
replicated and failed policies deliberately avoided: but the identification of successes 
and failures is not objective and thus contingent upon specific paradigms and belief 
systems (Peck and Theodore, 2015: 22). Coercion models account for power asymmetries 
and explain the diffusion of policy formed under pressure from powerful nation states 
or institutions, for instance the IMF or the EU (Maggetti and Gilardi, 2016): but because 
of the complexity of distinguishing cause from effect, it has been difficult not only to 
identify where coercion has occurred, but also to determine whether it has been 
effective (Peck and Theodore, 2015: 24).  
A key argument made by Peck and Theodore (2015) relates to the need for 
approaches to study policy diffusion in a geographical context. Because a study of fast 
policy is an endeavour to ‘follow the policy’, it responds to the need for a geographical 
lens, which Peck and Theodore (2015) utilise for two specific case studies: conditional 
cash transfers and participatory budgeting.  
Given development interventions, ‘spatial interconnectedness’ is central to 
Gillian Hart’s opposition to the view that policies — those described as neoliberal 
capitalist — were transmitted from ‘the ‘core’ and spread from there to the ‘periphery’ 
(Hart, 2010: 117). Ananya Roy draws upon these observations to interrogate the notion of 
an ‘Asian Century’ which entails the participation of global consulting forms and 
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conceptualisations of inclusive growth (A. Roy, 2016).34 In earlier work, ‘Poverty Capital’ 
A. Roy (2010) takes a ‘follow the policy’ approach to reveal how global financial markets 
are constructed. Particularly relevant is A. Roy’s coverage of knowledge production — 
which is portrayed as a public good — and its control by the World Bank and its 
subsidiary, the CGAP. The CGAP, it is noted, is engaged through its knowledge products 
in transforming the microfinance model associated with Bangladesh and the Grameen 
Bank, to one that is a component of a global financial industry: 
‘What is at stake here is a crucial shift from the idea of development as social 
services and the improvement of human capital to development as integration into 
global financial markets’ (A. Roy, 2010: 47).   
There are, as yet, no studies that examine the geographical mobility of policies related 
to financial exclusion and inclusion. While it is outside the scope of this dissertation to 
address this gap, the transnational connectivity between these policies highlights the 
contested nature of inclusive finance as a development intervention.  Policies designed 
around financial exclusion and financial inclusion seek to address similar problems but 
a key distinction between the two terms is this: financial exclusion is used mostly for 
advanced capitalist countries and financial inclusion is used mostly for poor countries.  
The earliest description of financial exclusion is attributed to Andrew Leyshon 
and Nigel Thrift, who in their seminal article use the term to refer to those ‘processes 
that prevent poor and disadvantaged social groups from gaining access to the financial 
system’ (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995: 312). Devlin (2005: 75) uses a description in which 
financial exclusion is ‘a situation where a proportion of the population have limited 
access to mainstream financial services’. The contrast between these two descriptions of 
financial exclusion is noteworthy because in one it is attributed to processes and in 
another it is a situation. These approaches often overlap. Thus, a consistent theme in 
the academic research — based on Britain as well as the United States — is the 
relationship between the situation of financial exclusion and processes such as financial 
infrastructure withdrawal (Dymski and Veitch, 1992; Leyshon and Thrift, 1994), ‘the 
mismatch between domestic financial regulation and the requirements of competition 
in retail markets’ (Pollard, 1995: 1209) and ‘the global homogenization and stratification 
of financial practices’ (Dymski, 2005: 439). The debate on financial exclusion in the early 
1990s was mostly about physical access to banks — or the geography of financial 
services provision — but eventually it became broader, drawing attention to the 
dimensions of financial exclusion, the people who experience it, and the ways in which 
it occurs (Lowe et al, 2016; Kempson et al., 2000).  
In Europe and particularly in Britain, the concept of financial exclusion is 
closely linked to that of social exclusion: what Naila Kabeer describes as ‘northern social 
policy discourses’ (Kabeer, 2000). Social exclusion, given its multi-dimensionality, is 
_____________________________ 
34 The Asian Century refers to projected ascendancy of some Asian countries in the 21st century because of economic 
prowess and an influential middle class. See ADB (2011) 
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offered as an alternative to the of concept poverty. This substitution is problematised by 
the Norwegian scholar of poverty, Else Øyen:  
‘Let me start by saying that neither social exclusion, nor social inclusion, are 
analytical concepts. They are political concepts, and they have been introduced for 
political reasons. The original concept launched by the European Union's Targeted 
Socio-Economic Research (TSER) programme was poverty. Apparently the 
politicians found this concept too loaded, so they asked for another concept and 
were satisfied with social exclusion/inclusion’ (Øyen, 1997:  63). 
In the policy discourse then, financial exclusion is presented as one of the dimensions of 
social exclusion. This is so even though the concept of financial exclusion pre-dates the 
concept of social exclusion (Kempson et al., 2000). When the Labour Party came to 
power in the United Kingdom in 1997, the eradication of various exclusions — derived 
from ethnicity, gender, sexuality, disability etc. — was central to their vision of social 
justice and government prerogative (Finlayson, 2009). The eradication of financial 
exclusion had a special role to play in the provision of an ‘asset based welfare model’ 
associated with the retrenchment of welfare (Finlayson, 2009; Berry, 2015).35  
‘From the early twentieth century onwards, the welfare state offered novel 
protections to individuals against socioeconomic risks, propelled by the notion of 
social citizenship. But in recent decades, citizenship has become ‘responsibilised’ 
as the state inculcates into everyday life the need for greater self-reliance’ (Berry, 
2015: 522).   
This ‘responsibilisation’ imperative is replicated in the inclusive finance strategies of the 
Global South, where loans for poor individuals and households are framed as social 
policy: instances of this are noted by Mader (2015) for India, and by Lavinas (2018) for 
Brazil, and are a recurring theme in CGAP publications, particularly those preceding the 
various microfinance repayment crises that occurred between 2009 and 2011: 
‘Microfinance—or formal financial services for the poor—helps people fight 
poverty on their own terms, in a sustainable way. Poor people use loans, deposits, 
and other financial services to reduce their vulnerability, seize opportunities, and 
increase their earnings. Indirectly, microfinance improves schooling, health, and 
women’s empowerment’ (CGAP, 2006: 1). 
Another instance of where policies related to financial exclusion and inclusive finance 
overlap is in the growing influence of the financial sector on poverty reduction 
strategies. Various scholars observe that in the United Kingdom, steps taken to counter 
financial exclusion by the government under Tony Blair, are directly linked to the ‘wider 
financialisation process—the inclusion of ever more people in the financial markets 
from sub-prime lending to the creation of savings accounts for those otherwise 
_____________________________ 
35 As such, Tony Blair’s fixation with ‘human potential’ is a reflection of what Alan Finlayson calls ‘a utilitarian justification 
for the pursuit of social justice’, in which individuals are enabled to contribute more in terms of productivity and thus use 
up less of the common resource and welfare (Finalyson, 2009: 405). 
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detached from the industry’ (Finlayson, 2009: 414): this is characterised by the increased 
financial participation of individuals, and also by a state which abdicates its role in 
shaping macroeconomic structures through welfare (Berry, 2015). The influence of the 
financial sector in poverty reduction efforts in the Global South is captured in Heloise 
Weber’s argument that microcredit facilitates financial sector liberalisation and the 
expansion of global finance (Weber, 2002: 537), and also in Ananya Roy’s exposition of 
the construction of global finance markets (A. Roy, 2010). This finance and development 
nexus came to be institutionalised in the FfD or Finance for Development agenda, 
largely due to the backing of the United Nations in the early 2000s.  
2.4 FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND THE FFD AGENDA 
The Finance for Development or ‘FfD’ agenda is closely tied to the Millennium 
Development Goals or MDGs and the notion that development goals can be attained by 
providing poor countries with monetary assistance to enable private investment to 
thrive. The American economist Jeffrey Sachs — the architect of deregulation policies 
for Latin America and transition policies for Eastern Europe in the 1980s — is among 
the best known proponents of this approach, which is detailed in his 2005 book ‘The 
End of Poverty’.  
‘Extreme poverty is a trap that can be released through targeted investments if the 
needed investments are tested and proved and the investment program can be 
implemented as part of a global compact between rich and poor countries, 
centered on a Millennium Development Goals based poverty reduction strategy’ 
(Sachs, 2005: 286).  
This stance is a partial reflection of the United Nations International Conference on 
Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002. The ensuing Monterrey 
Consensus was a response to the concern that the MDGs required immense financial 
resources: several studies attempted to place a cost on the MDGs, with USD 50 billion 
per annum offered as a commonly cited figure (Clemens et al., 2007). The Monterrey 
Consensus made FDI one of the six pillars of development finance, underscoring the 
role of private finance in an FfD or Financing for Development agenda. In the 16 years 
since its inception, FfD has been subject to shifts: initially designed for MDGs with a 
target date of 2015, a revised plan was presented in the July of that year at the Third 
International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa, to 
accommodate the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015).  
FfD, NSE, and the Wall Street Consensus 
In the period between the Monterrey Consensus and the Addis Ababa Conference, 
Justin Lin of the World Bank inaugurated what became the NSE paradigm: this is 
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detailed in the 2012 publication ‘New Structural Economics: A Framework for 
Rethinking Development and Policy’. 36  As Fine and Van Waeyenberge (2013) note, NSE 
is offered by Lin as a ‘third wave’ of development thinking, preceded by the Post 
Washington Consensus, which is in turn preceded by ‘old structural economics’ (e.g. 
Chang 1949; Lewis 1954; Myrdal 1957; Hirschman 1958, cited in Lin, 2012). NSE is centred 
on a state led industrial policy executed through efficient markets, and guided by the 
reality of a nation’s comparative advantage in the global economy: Lin (2012) thus 
argues for a structural transformation strategy that acknowledges the position — in 
terms of factor endowments — of developing countries with scarce capital and plentiful 
labour and/or resources.  
The critique of Lin’s NSE framework is that it relies overwhelmingly on the idea 
of comparative advantage; in doing so — and despite pronouncing a role for industrial 
policy — NSE is committed to the neoclassical economic compulsion for state 
minimalism (Fine and Van Waeyenberge, 2012). As such the NSE, and also the literature 
around it, reflects the deep seated antagonism — a recurrent theme in World Bank 
scholarship — to the developmental state paradigm:  
‘And, over a wider range of literature, there would appear to be the equivalent of a 
conspiracy to forge analytical principles, postures and their application allowing 
for the possibility of interventionism in principle but containing it in practice’ 
(Fine and Van Waeyenberge, 2013: 368). 
This potential for posturing and containment, as described above, is revealed in the 
observations of Kate Bayliss and Elisa Van Waeyenberge on the resurgence of the PPP or 
public-private-partnership approach to provide infrastructure in developing countries; 
led by the World Bank, the renewed exuberance for such policies has also been 
expressed by other multilateral development institutions, bilateral donors, national 
governments and various other organisations (Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge, 2017). 
Under these initiatives donor and government funds are used to leverage private finance 
— in the form of debt as well as equity — for infrastructure: such financing 
arrangements are often described as ‘blended finance’.37 
‘While earlier drives for privatisation in donor advocacy formally highlighted the 
potential efficiency gains deriving from increased private sector involvement in 
public service provision, the more recent wave of PPP advocacy is anchored almost 
entirely in arguments seeking to match a glut in global savings with the need to 
upscale public service provision in developing countries. This has created an 
increasingly financialised approach to infrastructure, as policy is framed in terms of 
investment opportunities for financial investors and institutional arrangements 
bearing on infrastructure provision are reconfigured to facilitate their entry into 
the sector’ (Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge, 2017: 578). 
_____________________________ 
36 Justin Yifu Lin is a University of Chicago trained Chinese academic who served as chief economist to the World Bank in 
2008-2012.  
37 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
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Further advances in this ‘financialised’ approach are expressed in the Wall Street 
Consensus described by Daniela Gabor: the salient features of this include a shift from 
growing foreign financial inflows to the development of domestic bond markets, 
primarily to address environmental and social challenges: 
‘The ambition, clearly spelled out, is that institutional investors and their asset 
managers could redirect their investment efforts towards assets with potentially 
positive social or environmental aspects, such as: green bonds, development 
impact bonds, and infrastructure bonds’ (Gabor, 2018: 4). 
Gabor’s appraisal draws on policy reports such as the European Commission’s 
Sustainable Finance initiative and the Maximising Finance for Development agenda of 
the World Bank.38 These bolster the principles of the FfD agenda by calling for them to 
be funded through innovative financial instruments for social as well as environmental 
aims. For such financial instruments to be transacted proficiently there is a need for 
efficient local bond markets: Gabor (2019) observes how in this context, the ideal type of 
market is articulated as the American or Wall Street template.   
The newer version of the consensus thus places a heavy emphasis on the 
corporate sector through blended finance and public-private partnerships (PPPs). 
Additionally a direct relationship with inclusive finance is emphasised by the United 
Nations Capital Development Fund which seeks to mobilise private and public funds for 
targets oriented around the SDGs: 
‘UNCDF’s financing models work through two channels: financial inclusion that 
expands the opportunities for individuals, households, and small businesses to 
participate in the local economy, providing them with the tools they need to climb 
out of poverty and manage their financial lives; and localized investments that 
show how fiscal decentralization, innovative municipal finance, and structured 
project finance can drive public and private funding that underpins local economic 
expansion and sustainable development’ (UNCDF, 2019). 
Moreover, there is the incorporation of a philanthropic component to FfD. This is the 
outcome of the rise of blended finance strategies and may be attributed to initiatives led 
by the OECD. For instance, the joint ReDesigning Development Finance Initiative, from 
the World Economic Forum and OECD, describes blended finance as the ‘strategic use 
of development finance and philanthropic funds to mobilize private capital for 
development’ (World Economic Forum, 2015: 3):  
‘There is a huge, and largely untapped, potential for public, philanthropic and 
private actors to work together towards win-win-win solutions: wins for private 
investors, as they make an attractive return on their capital; wins for public and 
philanthropic providers, as they make their limited dollars go further; and most 
importantly, wins for people in developing countries as more funds are channelled 
_____________________________ 
38 These reports are accessible from the respective websites of the European Investment Bank, 
https://www.eib.org/en/efsi/  and the World Bank http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/partners/maximizing-finance-for-
development 
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to emerging and frontier markets, in the right way, to help transform economies, 
societies, and lives’ (World Economic Forum, 2015: 3). 
The role of finance in a global economy? 
The FfD view sees financial resources as ‘a necessary catalyst to kick-start the process of 
development’ (Hudson, 2014: 1). This is the ascendant view of global finance and 
development in which the relationship between rich and poor countries is one in which 
the former provide capital which the latter may utilise to overcome poverty traps 
characterised by low savings rates, weak infrastructure, and high population growth 
(Sachs, 2005).  
‘Success is measured in dollars and failure to meet pledges and perceived 
backsliding are the focus for criticism. Hence the subsequent debates are about the 
provision of these resources, the lack of these resources, the reasons for shortfalls, 
and to whom and how money should be given to maximise their effectiveness’ 
(Hudson, 2014: 11). 
This reflects the dominant view on the role envisioned for finance in development 
strategies.40 This view has been met with opposition by critical political economists who 
find the FfD approach simplistic at best and destructive at worst.41  The simplicity of FfD 
is critiqued on the grounds that it places undue emphasis on what development 
countries are lacking, instead of questioning the political and social nature of financial 
and economic systems (Hudson, 2014). More specifically, the critical political economy 
approach seeks to highlight the asymmetries, between rich and poor countries, that are 
a feature of capitalist financial systems. This view emerges from the work of Susan 
Strange in which finance is one of the four principal structural spheres of global 
capitalism42: 
‘The power to create credit implies the power to allow or deny other people the 
possibility of spending today and paying back tomorrow, the power to let them 
exercise purchasing power and thus influence markets for production, and also the 
power to manage or mismanage the currency in which credit is denominated, thus 
affecting rates of exchange with credit denominated in other currencies’ (Strange, 
1994: 90).  
The destructive capacity of asymmetrical relations lies in the coercive power of finance. 
This is exemplified in the capacity of international organisations such as the IMF to 
_____________________________ 
40 Aside from being endorsed by the United Nations, the FfD view is also central to the interventions of other international 
organisations including the World Bank, the IMF, and the International Finance Corporation or IFC: this is reflected in the 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda (United Nations, 2015).  The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor or CGAP, a specialist think 
tank for financial inclusion, also takes an FfD approach which is reflected in their extensive list of publications of donors and 
private funding, for instance in Tomilova and Dashi (2017).  
41 Scepticism about the FfD agenda has also been expressed by UNCTAD (Ghosh, 2012 cited in Fine and Van Waeyenberge, 
2013) 
42 An in depth discussion of Susan Strange’s concept of structural power, as applied to financial innovation, is available in 
Nesvetailova (2014).  
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impose Washington Consensus policies (Soederberg, 2004) and structural adjustment 
programmes which compromise national sovereignty (Killick, 1998). Less obvious 
examples lie in the hierarchy of currencies through which poorer countries find 
themselves consistently subordinated (Bortz and Kaltenbrunner, 2018). The clearest 
example of this perhaps lies in the dominance of the US dollar as an international 
currency. This underlies the position of the issuing country, the United States, as a 
global superpower and its capacity to fund both domestic and foreign policies (Hudson, 
2014).  
The respective positions of FfD and the critical political economy of finance and 
development thus echo the broad debates on the role of finance in a global economy 
characterised by asymmetries or uneven development.43 Hudson (2014) expands on this 
separation by noting how there are distinct positions within these debates, which are 
essentially clashes between orthodox and heterodox perspectives.  The orthodoxy of the 
FfD is captured in two assumptions of this approach:  one is that markets are self-
regulating and the other is that the state should have a minimal, or at least limited, 
degree of involvement in the economy. The alternative view builds on the heterodox 
economic response to such assumptions: that the market does not regulate itself or tend 
towards equilibrium, and that the state should replace the market, or more radically, 
commit itself to the project of ‘delinking from global circuits of capital’ (Hudson, 2014: 
49).  
These positions may be placed on a left to right spectrum: the respective 
positions on the extremes are radicalism and neoliberalism and the corresponding 
positions in the centre are described as critical reformism and liberal institutionalism 
(Hudson, 2014). Critical reformism and liberal institutionalism share concerns about the 
shortcomings of market based approaches to development but also agree that 
development can occur in a system with markets: there is thus a consensus on the need 
to ‘civilise capitalism’ (Hudson, 2014: 50). This consensus and the differing stances — 
regarding the role of the state — on which it is based, is according to Hudson (2014), 
demonstrated quite neatly in the DPR Debate between World Bank Chief Economist 
Justin Lin and heterodox economist Ha Joon Chang. Both economists agree that 
‘climbing up the ladder’ is arduous and complex work that involves more than ‘getting 
the prices right’ (Lin and Chang, 2009: 501), but they disagree about the suitability of 
neoclassical economic models for making decisions about government intervention.  
Heterodoxy and inclusive finance  
_____________________________ 
43 The concept of uneven development is commonly used in the economic geography literature to describe the ‘... unequal 
distribution of people, resources, and wealth that is a fundamental characteristic of human 
geography. Uneven development is evident at the global, regional, national, and urban scales. Concern 
with uneven development stems from the fact that vast differences in human well-being exist at each of these scales.’ 
(Crump, 2006: p 508). The phenomenon is closely linked to the simultaneous existence of the equalising and differentiating 
tendencies of capital; whereas capital can equalise production levels and conditions across geographies but also retreat to 
seek higher profits (e.g French et al, 2011; Harvey, 1982).  
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How do these positions relate to inclusive finance, and how mainstream/ orthodox and 
heterodox positions in inclusive finance vary? A heterodox lens for inclusive finance 
may be demonstrated through a consideration of different stances — neoliberal, liberal 
institutionalist, critical reformist, and radical — on a vital and enduring issue of 
financial inclusion: high lending rates.44 
‘MFIs that claim to be helping poor people nevertheless charge them interest rates 
that are substantially higher than the rates richer borrowers pay at banks’ (CGAP, 
2009). 
A neoliberal stance would be that the setting of lending rates should be market based 
because to do so otherwise would limit the supply of credit: this is based on the 
financial repression argument of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis where interest rate 
ceilings impede efficient credit allocation (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Montiel, 1995). 
Additionally, the contention that diminishing marginal returns cause smaller 
entrepreneurs to see higher growth rates relative to larger entrepreneurs with more 
capitalised firms has also been used to justify higher rates (Hudon, 2007).  
A liberal institutionalist stance would not see high interest rates as a problem to 
be addressed directly but would acknowledge how it undermines goals of poverty 
reduction and the wellbeing of poor people. The specific response to expensive lending 
— for instance, of the Consultative Group for Action on Poverty (CGAP), and thus the 
World Bank — has been to recommend consumer protection laws and loan cost 
disclosure requirements (Duval, 2004). The World Bank’s ‘institutional’ drift is notable: 
this organisation has an enormous role in the production of knowledge on development 
(Mehta, 2001), and thus has in the past, been described as an ‘active component in the 
construction of a neo-liberal global architecture’ (Harrison, 2005: 242). Cameron (2004) 
notes that the body of work known as new institutional economics became central to 
the World Bank’s policy prescriptions in the 1990s: these incorporated an activist and 
efficient government in sharp contrast to earlier policies which fixated on a minimal 
state.45 Hence the understanding that interest rates should be decided by market forces 
and not regulated, but their undesirable effects are to be addressed through institutions.  
A critical reformist stance would see high interest rates as a problem of 
excessively liberalised and insufficiently regulated financial markets where pressures to 
attract global capital drive up rates. Aitken (2010: 234) comments how such a system 
positions ‘microfinance as a financial object itself, an object capable of generating and 
sustaining forms of financial profit and accumulation’. This is a crucial view of critical 
reformists on finance: that it needs to ‘be seriously reined and returned to the role of 
servant of the economic system, not the master’ (Hudson, 2014: 87). This stance is 
_____________________________ 
44 This exercise is inspired by David Hudson (2014) who uses a historical example of  global financial crises in the 1980s and 
1990s, and the responses it elicited, to exemplify various perspectives on the political economy of finance and 
development. 
45 New institutional economics, or NIE, as applied to the context of development is largely based on the work of Ronald 
Coase, Douglass North, and Oliver Williamson: the embrace of their approaches by the World Bank is examined in Hammer 
(2013).  
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heavily informed by the work of heterodox economists who take, as their starting point, 
‘The general theory of employment, interest, and money’ by John Maynard Keynes 
(1936), and are thus described as ‘Post-Keynesian’.46  Finance is at the core of Post-
Keynesian responses to supply side economic thinking, which is rooted in Keynes’ 
challenge to the orthodox view that markets fail to clear because of supply side issues, 
for instance, regulation. In the heterodox position, this view is flawed because it does 
not account for the money that does not flow freely across the market and the economy 
because it is held as a store of value or a form of wealth (Keynes, 1936). This is expressed 
in saving and hoarding tendencies which have negative effects on aggregate demand 
and consumer confidence: they thus increase uncertainty and advance the need for 
liquidity. Because the failure of effective demand is a problem of uncertainty, money, 
and liquidity preference, there is a need for regulatory interventions to support 
investment: there also a need to curb what Keynes (1936) calls ‘animal spirits’ or the 
confidence of individuals and firms in the market (Dow and Dow, 2011). Because animal 
spirits have the potential to overheat the economy and impel speculative finance, the 
role of the regulator is to control liquidity, innovation, and speculation (Nesvetailova, 
2007).  
In a radical stance, high interest rates would be perceived as a tool of extraction 
that reproduces inequalities. Radical perspectives encompass a number of approaches 
and include Marxist, world systems, dependency theories, and theories of imperialism, 
as well as theories of underdevelopment, and also post-development approaches 
(Hudson, 2014): the latter are discussed in this chapter. At the core of the radical stance 
is the view that development interventions, as externally executed strategies, reinforce 
hierarchies: as such, radical theorists agree that the relationship between development 
and finance is imperialistic and negative (Harvey, 1982; Prebisch, 1981; Amin, 1974; Dos 
Santos, 1970; Frank, 1969). Of particular interest, given the context of inclusive finance, 
is the Marxian contention about the limits of capital: these are reached when capitalists 
impoverish the consumers who are also the labourers from who surplus value is 
extracted (Harvey, 1982).  The capitalist response to this is what David Harvey describes 
as spatial and temporal fixes: the spatial fix is what pushes capital into new markets to 
extract more value and the temporal fix entails creating ‘fictitious capital’ in the form of 
debt (Harvey, 1982).  
While the discussion above is an instance of how orthodox and heterodox 
approaches to inclusive finance differ, it is simplistic given that (1) there is more to 
inclusive finance than credit, and (2) it evades the topic of what determines interest 
rates. These are drawbacks which may be overcome by recognising that inclusive 
finance is a financial innovation. As a financial innovation, inclusive finance is 
associated with the phenomena of financialisation: as a development intervention it is a 
tool of financial deepening.  
_____________________________ 
46 Sheila Dow (2002) mentions that Joan Robinson, who collaborated with John Maynard Keynes at Cambridge, probably 
coined this term.  
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Given such a framing, the discussion about financialisation in relation to 
financial deepening might come across as one about regulation, in which 
financialisation perspectives emphasise the need to curb ‘animal spirits’ and control 
speculative finance, whereas financial deepening perspectives emphasise deregulation 
and liberalisation so that market forces determine the supply of and demand for 
finance. The following section shows how the objectives of financial deepening and 
financialisation are incompatible, not only because financialisation causes instability, 
but also because poor countries, owing to their ‘subordinate position’, are at a relative 
disadvantage when they encounter financialisation  
2.5 INCLUSIVE FINANCE EITHER AS FINANCIAL DEEPENING OR 
FINANCIALISATION? 
Inclusive finance is presented as a development intervention because it assists financial 
deepening: this stance reflects the assumptions of orthodox or mainstream economics 
that financial markets are efficient and individual agents rational. The argument that 
financial deepening results in higher growth builds on the Efficient Markets Theory or 
EMT which exerted enormous influence on policymakers in the 1970s: the EMT is the 
lifeblood of contemporary financial theory (Nesvetailova, 2013) and rests on two core 
assumptions. One of these assumptions is that the role of financial markets is to 
mobilise and allocate capital — a scarce resource — to meet the needs of the economy; 
the other assumption is that decisions in financial markets are made by rational agents.  
Inclusive finance and efficient markets 
Drawing upon the recent history of financial liberalisation, deregulation, and deepening 
— outside of advanced capitalist countries — Karwowski and Stockhammer (2017) 
identify two streams of research on financial development.  The earlier stream is based 
on the financial repression hypothesis of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). This 
attacked the choice of many governments, in the aftermath of World War II, to use 
controls to suppress interest rates. Applied to financial markets to promote credit-
financed investment and trade for capital accumulation, interest rate controls were 
described as financial repression: because interest rates in liberalised and deregulated 
financial markets are higher they promote saving among the domestic population and 
subsequently lead to investment. So for developing countries the mainstream economic 
prescription — particularly of the 1980s — was financial sector reform primarily to get 
‘interest rates right’ (Karwowski and Stockhammer, 2017). The shortcomings of this 
approach include the weak sensitivity of saving to interest rates in poor countries which 
is so because ‘consumption choices are heavily influenced by subsistence considerations’ 
(Ostry and Reinhart, 1995: 16); also, recent quantitative analyses from Africa indicate 
that financial liberalisation and financial development have a possible negative 
correlation (Rashid, 2013).  
66 
 
A second stream of research thus emerged in the 1990s in which liberalisation 
was a means — and not in end in itself — for attaining financial development or 
financial deepening which was positively associated with economic growth. For 
instance, Robert King and Ross Levine build on the Schumpeterian view that the search 
for monopoly profits spurs innovation in contending that: 
‘Better financial systems improve the probability of successful innovation and 
thereby accelerate economic growth. Similarly, financial sector distortions reduce 
the rate of economic growth by reducing the rate of innovation’ (King and Levine, 
1993: 513). 
Based on this, it was inferred that the expansion of the financial sector and private 
credit offtake would result in higher growth rates. But this view was the subject of 
scepticism following global financial crises in 2008. For instance Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi (2012) find that growth from financial development faces a U-shaped curve 
because after a certain stage financial sector growth is a drag on productivity growth. 
Additionally, Sahay et. al (2015) observe that while emerging market economies face 
twin challenges related to growth and stability as their financial systems expand, these 
are still well below the size of financial systems in advanced economies.  
Insofar that inclusive finance is presented as a development intervention its role 
in a financial deepening agenda is straightforward. In several studies (Christen et al., 
2004; Richter, 2004 cited in Vanroose and D’Espallier, 2013), and also Barr (2004), 
microfinance institutions are described as a form of financial development, and as a part 
of the financial system. More recently, as highlighted by Mader (2017) there is increased 
emphasis on the ‘micro’ rather than the ‘macro’ dimension of financial inclusion; given 
that financial inclusion is an extension of microfinance. Whereas the ‘macro’ dimension 
relied on a financial development perspective of entrepreneurship and firm growth, the 
‘micro’ dimension focuses on how financial inclusion can enhance investment and 
consumption choices for the poor.  
‘Financial inclusion proponents generally argue that it brings poor people 
significant, tangible, direct benefits, and their argument rests on the intertemporal 
intermediation theory of change: that financial services are crucial because they 
allow poor people to move money over time and mitigate shocks, in order to 
enhance their economic opportunities, gain access to goods and services, and 
manage and allocate their resources better’ (Mader, 2017: 469). 
In such a context, where the impetus behind inclusive finance is no longer based on 
mainstream economic theory and econometric models, the relevance of financial 
innovation —which is mentioned in both mainstream and heterodox literatures — 
becomes explicit. As observed by Nesvetailova (2013: 69), for mainstream economists 
financial innovation is a ‘functional reality’ whereas for heterodox economists financial 
innovation underlies the advance of financialisation. To understand inclusive finance 
then, outside of a mainstream economic perspective, it is necessary to consider the 
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heterodox perspectives which are contained in the two major approaches to 
financialisation.  
The most cited definition of financialisation is attributed to Gerald Epstein 
(Sawyer, 2014; Bonizzi, 2013):  
‘...the increasing importance of financial markets, financial motives, financial 
institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing 
institutions, both at the national and international levels’ (Epstein, 2005:  1). 
Taken on its own, this definition lacks an analytical framework and also a specific 
temporal or geographical context: the key questions that ensue from this gap are about 
where and when financialisation initially emerged (Sawyer, 2014). These may be 
addressed by emphasising — as scholars such as Malcolm Sawyer (2014) and Anastasia 
Nesvetailova (2013) have done — that there are two major approaches or analytical 
frameworks for understanding financialisation. One of these may be described as either 
a historical or a structural approach, informed by Marxist political economy, in which 
the present era is a new epoch or stage of capitalism characterised by the dominance of 
finance. The other may be described as either a contemporary or an evolutionary 
approach which reflects post-Keynesian thought on the relation between non-financial 
business and financial markets. Despite a consensus between these two approaches on 
the growing influence of finance, there is disagreement on whether this ascendancy 
indicates a disjuncture between finance and the real economy or alternatively a ‘growing 
embeddedness of daily life in the global financial system’ (Nesvetailova, 2013: 68).47 
A comprehensive synopsis of the heterogeneous perspectives and approaches to 
financialisation is offered by Shaun French, Andrew Leyshon, and Thomas Wainwright, 
who present a case for more thorough analyses of the spatial element of financialisation:  
‘We contend that this literature has, for the most part, focused on processes and 
effects at three particular spatial scales: the nation state; the firm or corporation; 
and the household and individual. As a consequence, the financialization literature 
has been insufficiently attentive of other spaces, such as the region and the 
international financial system, and of geographical registers other than scale’ 
(French et al., 2011: 814).  
Later sections of this thesis, which draw linkages between inclusive finance in Pakistan 
and the international financial system, speak to the gap highlighted above. In the 
existing scholarship, time and space in the context of financialisation are consistent 
with the contemporary approach which offers micro-level analyses and consequently 
focuses on various settings in which financialisation manifests itself: qualitative and 
quantitative techniques may thus be applied to test hypothesis on when and where this 
occurs. In the structural approach, the focus has tended to be on the latter part of the 
_____________________________ 
47 This is also framed in the literature as a split between the sphere of production and sphere of circulation (Nesvetailova, 
2013).  
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twentieth century as well as the present one in which macro-level analyses problematise 
capitalist structures in advanced economies.48 This is so particularly in the light of 
distributive justice in varying contexts or ‘accumulation regimes’ including those 
highlighted by Boyer (2000) as ‘finance-led’ in the UK and US since the 1990s, 
‘competition-led’ in most of the OECD, and ‘export-led’ in East Asia until the crisis of 
the late 1990s (Hein et al., 2014). 49  
Financial innovation 
The role of financial innovation in driving financialisation is acknowledged in both 
approaches: structural and contemporary. This is discussed in a broad range of contexts, 
including those on expanding capital markets, and the liberalisation and deregulation of 
banking; particularly as these relate to information technology and the politics of 
Anglo-American governments (Nesvetailova, 2013). In macro-level analytical 
frameworks there is an emphasis on how products of human activity, as well as risk and 
the probability of change, can be priced and traded (Nesvetailova, 2013). For micro-level 
analyses the focus is on the mechanics of this process, especially the practices of 
‘identifying, parcelling, marketing and relocating risks’ (Nesvetailova, 2013: 70) and also 
on linkages with the rise of financial profits and financial incomes (Bonizzi, 2013). 
The processes that underlie financial change may be described as either 
exogenous or endogenous (e.g. Polillo, 2011). This distinction allows for financial 
innovation to be presented as the outcome of forces endogenous to financial markets, 
rather than as the result of exogenous pressures such as diminishing profitability 
elsewhere in the economy, or from political influence. The exogenous view is associated 
with the Marxist tools used, for instance, by Arrighi (1994) and Krippner (2005) to 
attribute rising financial wealth to declining industrial investment and production.50 An 
exogenous view is also adopted by Joseph Schumpeter who acknowledges that the 
process of creative destruction — central to innovation and entrepreneurship — could 
be compromised when bankers are not sufficiently detached from the projects that they 
fund and also from politics (Schumpeter, 1962). In this light, financial innovation is 
associated with — drawing on Schumpterian terminology — with ‘wildcat’ or deviant 
bankers (Polillo, 2011).   
The motivations of such wildcat bankers are heterogeneous, particularly when 
viewed through a sociological lens. While some of them seek to expand the freedom of 
the market, others seek to challenge the authority of entrenched financial elites (Polillo, 
2011). The endogenous view of financial change is based on the challenge presented by 
_____________________________ 
48 According to Sawyer (2014) this period coincides with the neoliberalism of the Thatcher and Reagan regimes in the UK 
and USA respectively: ‘the dominant capitalist economies’. 
49 Such perspectives are also associated with theories of regulation, which Bonizzi (2013) identifies as a third theoretical 
framework additional to Marxist IPE, and post-Keynesian economics. Regulation approaches will be considered here in 
Chapter 3 in the discussion on shadow banking in the Global South.  
50 For Marx the credit system is used to overcome the limits to production that are reached when capitalists rely only the 
capital that they own: credit allows those who do not own capital to access it nevertheless (Polillo, 2011).  
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the latter group to the former group: this is expressed through financial innovation 
(Polillo, 2011). There is an overlap between such a perspective and the Minsky (1986) 
hypothesis on financial instability. As noted by Nesvetailova (2013), Hyman Minsky’s 
observations on American capitalism described financial fragility not as the outcome of 
macroeconomic shocks or political events, but of financial innovation in economic 
cycles: because of which ‘no equilibrium or equilibrium path is likely to exist’ (Minsky, 
1986: 34).  
These perspectives build on the post-Keynesian stream of heterodox thought on 
financialisation. This analysis of contemporary capitalism is through the lens of 
financial relationships: particularly the role of money and finance in macroeconomic 
stability. For Minsky, the primary conflict between the financial system and the real 
economy is ‘centred on the process of financial innovation and the ability of private 
financial firms to raise and emit debt as their major form of financing’ (Nesvetailova, 
2013: 64). 51 Debt or credit thus plays a pivotal role in how financial markets function: 
this has become more widely understood since the last global financial crises and has 
thus presented a challenge to the contentions of the EMT (Nesvetailova, 2013). In 
undermining the contentions of the EMT then this heterodox view also calls into 
question the expediency of financial deepening.  
External vulnerability and subordinate financialisation 
The argument made above may be summarised as follows: because financial deepening 
is prone to advancing itself through financial innovation, it leaves the economies in 
which it occurs more vulnerable to crises. The imposition of this external vulnerability is 
a key concern around financialisation in the Global South and is articulated 
academically through the prism of ‘subordinate financialisation’ which notes how, for 
emerging and developing economies ‘the encounter with financialization is from a 
subordinate position’ (Bonizzi et al., 2019). This literature highlights how 
financialisation in poor countries is a problem not only because it drives economic 
instability and vulnerability to financial crises, but also because it induces 
disadvantageous shifts in global patterns of capital accumulation. As such, there is a 
nascent literature on how the subordinate positions of emerging and developing 
countries shape domestic financialisation processes.  
The roots of this subordination are in the dramatic growth of the external assets 
and liabilities held by emerging and developing countries; this has transpired as the 
‘traditional’ institutional investors in these economies — mainly banks and specialised 
funds — have been joined by others such as pension funds, mutual funds, insurance 
funds etc. (Bonizzi et al., 2019). As a result, emerging and developing country 
governments are increasingly exposed to volatility from exogenous factors: 
_____________________________ 
51 Associated with economic stability and full employment (Nesvetailova, 2013).  
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‘First, in line with the expansion of global finance, ECEs’ external assets and 
liabilities rose from under 33 per cent to more than 130 per cent of their GDP 
between 1970 and 2013. Capital inflows and outflows rose from 3.52 per cent and 
2.22 per cent of GDP in 1976–85 to more than 6 per cent and nearly 8 per cent 
respectively in 2006–15’ (Bortz and Kaltenbrunner, 2017, cited in Bonizzi et al., 
2019: 8). 
For example, to manage their vulnerability, governments in poor countries are 
compelled to accumulate foreign exchange reserves by constraining billions of US 
dollars from making their way into the economy: this is done as a safeguard against 
sudden and large foreign capital outflows, and also to manage currency volatility against 
outflows as well as inflows (Bonizzi et al., 2019).  Additionally, and as summed up in 
Kaltenbrunner and Painceira (2018), such economies are also beset by monetary 
subordination, the salient features of which are: (1) heightened external vulnerability, 
(2) the inability to borrow in domestic currency, (3) a dominance of short term portfolio 
flows, and (4) structural balance of payments crisis.  
The consequences of the above for inclusive finance, and for the Pakistani 
financial system are highlighted in Chapter 8. This is an important discussion because it 
highlights the relevance of inclusive finance not only to the broader financial system but 
also the macro economy; it thus connects two literatures by asking, how does inclusive 
finance relate to subordinated financialisation? This is done by drawing on the work of 
Susanne Soederberg on the debtfare state, particularly her analyses on Mexico 
(Soederberg, 2012). These examples draw attention to the similarities of the Pakistan 
case, particularly as they relate to fragile export and capital markets, troublesome 
current account and public budget deficits, and high socio-economic inequality arising 
from a policy fixation on economic growth through expanding the private sector. Such 
an environment is one in which the need for inclusive finance is fed through policies 
that enhance vulnerabilities in the poorest members of society, but also one in which 
there is limited policy space to do otherwise.  
2.6 SUMMARY  
This chapter examines the role of private capital in inclusive finance through two 
streams of scholarship on finance and development. One of these streams is comprised 
of the research on development strategies and examines how paradigms have shifted 
since the Post Washington Consensus of the 1990s. It is as a result of these shifts that 
‘inclusion’ and eventually by extension ‘inclusive finance’ gained immense traction with 
the development community that had repeatedly sought ‘development with a human 
face’. Subsequent approaches centred on the principles of New Structural Economics 
emphasised structural weaknesses in the economies of poor countries as issues of factor 
endowments lacking capital: this opened up space in the policies of international 
institutions and multilateral organisations for an endorsement of private and external 
capital. Consequently, there is an emergent Wall Street Consensus that seeks to attract 
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private capital through innovative financial instruments and the establishment of 
American style bond markets.  
The second stream of scholarship examined in this chapter is that on 
financialisation. The financialisation literature counters arguments made in favour of 
financial deepening. Financial deepening strategies advance financialisation and this 
undermines growth and development when financial innovation causes economies to 
become crisis prone.  Additionally, because of their subordinate position in the global 
financial structure, poor countries are likely to face additional disadvantages from 
financialisation. Inclusive finance is presented in this thesis as an example of how 
financialisation carries disadvantages for such countries.   
Financial innovation is also articulated in the form of shadow banking. The 
connection between shadow banking and inclusive finance is discussed further in 
Chapter 3. The next chapter restores the focus on bifurcated banking by expanding on 
the shadow banking – inclusive finance nexus identified here. This allows for the 
assembly of a new conceptual framework: shadow financial citizenship.  
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3. SHADOW FINANCIAL CITIZENSHIP: A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK TO STUDY BIFURCATED BANKING  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A framework of shadow financial citizenship is assembled in this chapter to analyse the 
relationship between inclusive finance and bifurcated banking. Previous chapters show 
that inclusive finance, notwithstanding critiques from scholars of financialisation, 
continues to be used as a key development policy tool in various countries of the Global 
South.  The advance of inclusive finance has imposed formal financial mechanisms, 
including pricing, banking, risk management, and credit onto new previously, unbanked 
or excluded layers of the population.  This process has created a bifurcated financial 
system in which inclusive finance is offered separately from mainstream or commercial 
finance. Under this arrangement, inclusive finance is offered to counter exclusion but 
does not provide access to mainstream finance. As a result there is a grey area between 
being financially excluded and being included in the mainstream financial system.  
How might this grey area be conceptualised? Chapters 1 and 2 show, that this 
grey area is an outcome of respectively (1) a bifurcated system of banking and financial 
services, and (2) the financialisation of development strategy expressed as shadow 
banking. Shadow financial citizenship is used here as the analytical tool to understand 
the grey area which lies between financial exclusion and full financial citizenship.  
As mentioned earlier, the phenomenon of bifurcated banking is one that 
emerges because of exclusionary practices when inclusive finance is presented as a 
remedy to financial exclusion, or to the circumstance of being ‘unbanked’ or even 
‘underserved’. The exclusionary practices that obstruct financial citizenship are 
embedded in the financial landscapes of poor countries. These practices arise from the 
shadow banking and inclusive finance nexus that is a core theme of this dissertation. 
Given this nexus, inclusive finance, as a form of shadow banking, is used here as an 
independent variable to ‘explain’ bifurcated banking. This is done through an analysis of 
the literatures on these themes. Two observations are thus highlighted: (1) that financial 
systems have an inside and an outside, and (2) that recent transformations in banking 
structures limit access to this ‘inside’. The concept of financial citizenship is used for (1). 
The concept of shadow banking is used for (2).  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes 
bifurcated banking through a lens of financial citizenship, drawing attention to the 
inequities that emerge from inclusive finance and limit financial citizenship. Section 3.3 
examines shadow banking in terms of its evolution, geographical variation, and politics. 
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Section 3.4 discusses the case for shadow financial citizenship, showing how shadow 
banking and financial inclusion creates bifurcated financial systems that contain grey 
areas, or spaces in between formal and informal finance. Section 3.5 queries why and 
how notions of citizenship are relevant to financial access; this exercise draws on the 
work of geographers who affix spatial patterns of financial exclusion in advanced 
capitalist economies, to shifting models of banking and finance. Section 3.6 
problematises bifurcated banking by drawing attention to earlier, advanced capitalist 
contexts, in which it is exemplified. Section 3.7 concludes and offers a road map for 
answering some of the questions raised within this chapter.  
Figure 2: Shadow financial citizenship: a conceptual framework based on three literatures  
 
Compiled by author 
3.2 BIFURCATED BANKING AS AN ISSUE OF FINANCIAL 
CITIZENSHIP 
Bifurcated financial systems have uneven extractive capacities. Whereas all financial 
systems, which advance monetary forms of capitalist accumulation, may be described as 
extractive, contemporary financial institutions, in particular, are known for positioning 
themselves as essential for households and individuals to meet their housing, education, 
health and transport requirements (Roberts, 2016; Lapavitsas, 2013; Aalbers, 2008). 
Consequently, households and individuals that are poor are more prone to dependence 
on financial institutions: this is a symptom as well as a cause of inequality.  
The literature on financial citizenship is central to this analysis because of its 
capacity to acknowledge that the problem of financial abandonment or financial 
exclusion — studied with geographical tools — in Britain and the United States in the 
1990s, is similar to the one that development practitioners and policymakers in poor 
countries target through inclusive finance.  The concept of financial citizenship then is 
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no less relevant for poor countries than for advanced capitalist countries. But this 
concept must be altered to fully capture the specifics of financial landscapes in the 
Global South. These are bifurcated because of shadow banking institutions, activities, 
and practices, that operate in the form of inclusive finance.  The augmented notion of 
shadow financial citizenship emerges from these modifications 
The principal objective of the shadow financial citizenship framework for 
describing bifurcated banking is that it provides a systematic means of engaging with 
uneven financial access. It thus provides a way to conceptualize the variation and 
complexity of this phenomenon. In this analytical approach, shadow financial 
citizenship is constituted by a set of inequities, which are shown to be intrinsic to 
contemporary financial systems. 
Sections that appear later in this chapter discuss how this framework captures 
earlier problematisations of financial access that are found in the respective literatures 
of shadow banking, and financial citizenship. The shadow banking literature shows how 
inequities emerge from regulatory constraints imposed by national and international 
institutions on domestic financial institutions. Additionally, they are anchored in the 
dependence of inclusive finance on disintermediated models of funding, which seek to 
create new asset streams and extract value by expanding the frontiers of the global 
financial system. The financial citizenship literature is an avenue to engage with the 
normative component of bifurcated banking; this research offers tools to reject the idea 
that uneven financial access is (1) the depoliticised condition of poverty and life in the 
informal economy, and (2) the outcome of a risk-return calculus that is an essential 
feature of capital markets. The next section offers a brief summary of the constitutive 
qualities of shadow financial citizenship 
Inequities in rates 
The observation that inclusive finance is more expensive relative to mainstream finance 
is not a novel one and is centred overwhelmingly on how microcredit is expensive in 
relation to loans made by mainstream commercial banks. Such comparisons are 
premised upon inclusive finance as a lending product, and there is now growing 
attention directed at the high amounts users of mobile money and digital payments 
services pay relative to their more affluent counterparts who use their accounts at 
mainstream banks for similar transactions.  From a shadow banking perspective, these 
practices emanate from a search for yield, either from existing financial instruments 
which are repackaged to incorporate poor borrowers as a source of return of financial 
return. 
Inequities in requirements 
As mentioned earlier, KYC and other documentary requirements complicate financial 
access, particularly because the poor have a close relationship with the informal 
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economy. Steps to overcome this have entailed the collateralisation of everyday life such 
as through the use of gold jewellery and livestock to procure credit. These inequities in 
requirements arise because shadow banks seek to unlock what Hernando de Soto 
describes as ‘dead capital’ (de Soto, 2000). But the burden of ‘unlocking’ such capital is 
borne exclusively by the inclusive finance industry, with those using mainstream banks 
able to access finance through credit cards, and personal loans, without the need for any 
collateral. Through such approaches, shadow banks are able to expand the boundaries 
of the financial system.  
Inequities in surveillance  
Another set of inequities arises from recent advances in technology, particularly fintech. 
These are particularly exemplified by alternative credit scoring techniques which rely on 
personal data. Because there is often limited data to ascertain the creditworthiness of 
the poor, technological innovation is now increasingly used to analyse the social and 
behavioural patterns of the poor to determine whether or not they might be worth 
lending to. Shadow banking networks endorses such techniques because they identify 
and subsequently extract invisible financial value, under the assumption that ‘all data is 
credit data’ (see Aitken, 2017).   
Figure 3: Shadow financial citizenship: drivers and features 
 
Compiled by author 
3.3 SHADOW BANKING 
Shadow banking refers to practices of maturity, credit and liquidity transformation that 
occur outside the traditional banking system (Adrian et. al, 2016). The term ‘shadow 
banking’ is typically associated with the 2007-9 financial crisis and attributed to Paul 
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McCulley of PIMCO in 2007 (McCulley, 2009 cited in Nesvetailova, 2017a).52 The 
conceptual chronology of shadow banking is disputed, based on whether or not it is a 
recent phenomenon.53  The literature on shadow banking first appeared just one decade 
ago with articles by Poszar (2008) and Adrian and Shin (2009) using the concept to 
accentuate the need for reforming how financial systems are regulated.  
Shadow banking is, however, more than just a phenomenon associated with 
recent financial crises and instability: it manifests numerous shifts that have occurred in 
banking and finance over several decades, including that from originate-to-hold to 
originate-to-distribute (Guttman, 2017; Toporowski, 2017). These shifts continue to 
shape banking and finance in advanced capitalist economies as well as in the Global 
South.  
Shadow banking as an evolving concept 
The ramifications of originate-to-distribute (OTD) as an alternative to originate-to-hold 
(OTH) models is the central theme for the first of the three waves of scholarship 
identified by Nesvetailova (2017) on financial innovation: subsequent waves respectively 
seek to account for this OTD rise and question the limits of global finance. The figure 
above illustrates the differences between traditional and modern models of banking.  
Each set of literature on shadow banking has contentions as well as critiques of 
the scholarship on shadow banking, as shown in the table above. This ‘third wave’ is 
particularly noteworthy because it has bolstered perspectives which acknowledge that 
‘the global financial system, while elastic, is now defined by fragmentation, over-
specialisation and hierarchies, rather than shaped by single cohesive force’ 
(Nesvetailova, 2017a: 12). Such observations speak directly to questions about financial 
citizenship because they reflect concerns that have been raised about segmentation, for 
instance, in lending: 
‘In some nations, financial exclusion is a transhistorical component of social life, 
which persists even as market relations are transformed in real time: only elites 
operate in formal financial markets, now and in the past. In other nations, financial 
exclusion for some households results from the process of financial stratification 
and homogenization: the division of customers into ever-more-precisely defined 
segments, which are internally homogeneous but subject to vastly different terms 
and conditions in the loan market’ (Dymski, 2005: 454).  
Although the emphasis on fragmentation is a key contribution of the most recent wave 
of studies on shadow banking, earlier work on regulatory arbitrage is of importance as 
well.  These differing perspectives on the drivers of shadow banking are described as 
supply side and demand side respectively (Nesvetailova, 2017; Lysandrou and 
Nesvetailova, 2015). The former perspective relies on the opportunities presented by 
_____________________________ 
52 PIMCO is the Pacific Investment Management Company, LLC, an American investment management firm.  
53 See Battisti (2014) for sources on shadow banking in the 17th century.  
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regulatory arbitrage and avoidance to explain the creation of new financial markets, 
products, techniques, and institutions: the latter perspective contends that because 
demand for investables outstrips supply, new financial markets, products, techniques, 
and institutions are created as a response.  
Figure 4:  Models of banking (OTH vs. OTD) 
Source: Battisti (2014) 
Table 3.1: Shadow banking perspectives 
 Waves Inferences Debates 
First:  
Financial 
innovation as 
shadow banking  
Shadow banking is a 
recent phenomenon.  
And 
Shadow banking may be 
addressed by reforming 
the financial system 
through international and 
national regulation. 
 
The response to the unstable tendencies of shadow 
banking should be better regulation (Adrian and Shin, 
2009; Poszar, 2008). vs. The unstable tendencies of 
shadow banking are inherent to global financial capital 
and cannot be addressed simply through regulation 
(Guttman, 2017; Toporowski, 2017). 
  
Second :  
The origins and 
operation of 
financial 
innovation 
Shadow banking has a 
‘supply side’ explanation 
as it is caused by market 
players seeking 
regulatory arbitrage and 
regulatory avoidance. 
 
Shadow banks emerge because regulation is stifling 
(Tett, 2009; Chick, 2008).  vs. Shadow banks emerge 
because of the political influence of ‘greedy’ financiers 
(Pagliari, 2013; Erturk and Solari, 2007). 
 
Shadow banking creates new money (Moe, 2017). vs. 
Shadow banking simply redistributes wealth among 
existing parties (Guttman, 2017; Kaurova, 2017). 
  
Third :  
The structural 
problems of 
finance 
 Shadow banking as a 
‘demand side’ 
explanation because the 
global financial system 
has reached the limits of 
natural growth so 
financial innovation is 
Shadow banks are the outcome of financialisation: a 
single cohesive force with homogenising tendencies 
(Cerny, 1991). vs. Shadow banks are the outcome of 
hierarchical and fragmented systems (Palan and Wigan, 
2017).  
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employed to allow 
continued expansion.  
 
Based on Nesvetailova (2017) 
Shadow banking in the Global South 
These themes are related to the exclusionary practices of financial institutions and the 
overall financial system as well. But in the context of inclusive finance in the Global 
South — which is a form of financial innovation — the missing discussion is about how 
mainstream finance in relation to inclusive finance. Is inclusive finance a stepping stone 
for access to mainstream finance? Or do mainstream and inclusive finance serve 
clienteles that are so different from each other that they obviate any need for 
convergence? 
The idea that financial systems in poor countries are bifurcated — and hence a 
context for discussing shadow banking or financial citizenship — comes across as 
unexceptional given the historical prevalence of informal finance and its linkages with 
colonial formal finance in the global South (e.g., Bouman and Hospes, 1994). Informal 
finance is an essential feature of dual economies (Lewis, 1954) where there is a 
separation between economic sectors: depending on the specific regional context, this 
may be a rural-urban separation or even a subsistence-capitalist separation.  Such views 
apply a dualist lens, attributed to the seminal work of Sir Arthur Lewis ‘Economic 
development with unlimited supplies of labour’ in which the formal sector eventually 
grows large enough to subsume the informal sector (Lewis, 1954): here, the corollary 
assumption is that eventually informal finance is absorbed into formal finance.   
Informal finance is defined as contracts or agreements conducted without 
reference or recourse to the legal system to exchange cash in the present for promises of 
cash in the future (Schreiner, 2000). In many studies on poor countries, this is percevied 
as a temporary phenomenon, eventually to be replaced by formal finance. In an analysis 
of informal finance in the Global South, Fischer (1996) expresses scepticism over the use 
of this dualist lens — which he finds, underestimates the substance of contemporary 
informality — as empirical evidence shows informality to be persistent and resilient.  
The transient nature of informal finance has been the subject of studies by numerous 
economic anthropologists including Geertz (1962) and Drake (1980), Kurtz (1973), and 
Chandavarkar (1985). The logic of such scholarship is that informal finance is a residual 
category, created from the marginalisation that occurs because of formal finance’s 
penchant for mainstream economic activity. As Andrew Fischer notes:   
‘In the 1950s, when theories of growth were popular and colonialism was still 
kicking, informal finance was considered by most academics and policy makers to 
be a manifestation of traditional (indigenous) economic attitudes. The attention 
towards basic needs in the 1970s led many to interpret informal finance as an 
adaptation by the third world poor to their marginalisation from formal economic 
activities. And of course, the drift towards neoclassicism in the late 1970s and 1980s 
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generated a focus on informal finance as a mutant yet liberal response to overly 
interventionist governments’ (Fischer, 1996: 6).    
Similar opinions are expressed in Thomas (1992) who noted that while rural credit has 
tended to receive considerable policy attention; the same could not be said about 
informal finance: he attributed this to the struggle many policymakers faced to 
overcome seeing a well-established rural-urban dichotomy as analogous to the informal 
and formal financial sectors.  Because of the reluctance of formal financial institutions 
to lend to rural clients, informal finance, and to a smaller extent government and 
cooperative credit, came to function as a parallel system: this expanded in the 1980s and 
1990s, when NGOs shifted their policies to prioritize income generation over welfare 
and relief (Bouman and Hospes, 1994).  
The formal-informal divide in finance may also be seen as an artefact of 
colonialism. This perspective is based on the position that T. Roy (2016) describes as 
‘new institutional economic history’ approach: it is the same lens used by Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) in their ‘Why Nations Fail’ hypothesis.   A key feature of colonial 
financial development was a duplicitous stance, by imperial governments, on 
monopolies. While these were restricted at home, in the colonies they were propped up 
for extractive reasons and thus benefited from local production and trade (Fischer, 
1996). The outcomes of this were; first, a heavy concentration in colonial finance that 
was anomalous relative to the banking system at home; and second, an overt preference 
for the formal which allowed informal financial institutions and practices to thrive as 
colonial finance was absent in the local economy (Fischer, 1996).   Some examples of 
these institutions and practices are in the table below. 
  Table 3.2: Fischer’s typology of informal financial firms   
Motive    Individual focus    Group focus   
Collective   Personal loans   RoSCA, ReSCA   
 
Associative       Village association, insurance association   
 
Commercial    Moneylenders pawn 
brokers, interlinked 
credit   
Finance Corporations,   Pawnbrokers, 
Chit Fund Companies, Interlinked Credit      
Indigenous Bankers and Brokers, Mobile Bankers 
 
Source: Fischer (1996)   
For instance, in British India, credit rationing practices led to a trade-off between 
financing agriculture and financing industry: informal financiers were ill-equipped to 
fund industrialisation because they did not know how to manage ‘slack season surplus’ 
(T. Roy, 2016). These constraints are discussed in Chapter 4 and pertain to a lack of 
investment options, partially due to the state not offering an instrument that ‘would be 
liquid enough to meet seasonal fluctuations’;  and also to the politics of formal 
institutional development against the backdrop of a pro-peasant but anti money-lender 
ideology (T. Roy, 2016).    
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Because the recent popularity of a financial inclusion agenda has coincided with 
two key shifts in the global financial landscape, inclusive finance has come to be not 
only very much like shadow banking, but also an extension of the same shadow banking 
industry associated with the volatility and fragility of the global financial crises of 2007-
9. One of these shifts is the commercialisation of inclusive finance, which has resulted 
in the dependence of the microfinance industry on wholesale sources of funds. These 
are often provided by international institutions attracted by high rates of returns and 
the profitability of microfinance banks and also relate to earlier concerns expressed by 
scholars about the financialisation of development (Mawdsley, 2018; A. Roy, 2010). More 
recent concerns about the role of global finance in development relate to initiatives 
such as From Billions to Trillions and Maximizing Finance for Development (Financial 
Times, 2018a). Initiatives such as these have amplified concerns that shadow banking is 
not only occurring, but is also poised to expand in the Global South.54 This is a 
departure from earlier thought about shadow banking which was engrossed in the 
context of the 2007-9 financial crises. For instance, Gabor (2018) comments that in the 
past, the closest the Financial Stability Board came to considering countries that were 
not advanced capitalist economies was when it included South Korea in its first 
monitoring exercise. Even then, unease about shadow banking in emerging economies 
only became prominent when FSB head, Mark Carney issued warnings about systemic 
risk and financial instability.  
At present, there is a small but growing literature on shadow banking outside of 
advanced capitalist economies. There are two prominent features of this literature. One 
of these features is that the research is oriented to the supply side view. A recurring 
contention is thus that non-bank financial intermediaries expand because mainstream 
banks are constrained by regulation. Another feature is that the focus of the research is 
on emerging rather than developing economies. The perception that there is a 
meaningful difference between emerging and developing economies is one heavily 
endorsed by the financial community — for instance Goldman Sachs invention of the 
BRICs  label — but also questioned by scholars of development (Desai, 2007).55 
Nevertheless, the narrative of investment appeal is central to the demand side view of 
shadow banking: it may be argued then that it is not just regulatory constraints but also 
a search for yield from global investors that has resulted in the rapid growth of 
alternatives to mainstream banking.  
For instance, Acharya et. al (2013) claim that the activities of non-bank financial 
corporations, or NBFCs, in India — which tend to be well capitalised — is a form of 
shadow banking, despite eliciting very different macro and micro prudential 
considerations. Mainstream banks lend to NBFCs in India because they see such 
practices as a substitute for direct lending in non-urban areas: this is corroborated by 
_____________________________ 
54 These concerns are articulated in an open letter circulated through the Critical Finance blog. See: 
https://criticalfinance.org/2018/10/10/the-world-banks-new-maximizing-finance-for-development-agenda-brings-shadow-
banking-into-international-development-open-letter/  
55 BRICs is the acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China, which Jim O’Neill of the investment bank, Goldman Sachs coined in 
2001 to highlight the economic potential of these nations as ‘emerging markets’ (O’Neill, 2001).  
81 
 
the finding that banks without rural branch networks are more likely to lend to NBFCs 
(Acharya et. al, 2013). Interestingly, the potential for such an arrangement to provide a 
complete spectrum of credit in non-urban areas of the economy appears to be 
constrained by asymmetries in government support for different banks and also by 
restrictions on the number of branches a bank may have (Acharya et. al, 2013). These 
gaps in the credit spectrum appear to create a need for inclusive finance. Given that it is 
government policy that underlies this gap, this Indian example extends the view that 
inclusive finance is driven by suppliers of credit seeking to circumvent regulatory 
constraints.  
Other examples of shadow banking outside advanced capitalist economies 
include a study of Russia (Kaurova, 2017) which offers a survey of the various linkages 
and innovations between financial institutions. These linkages connect what is 
described as ‘the de facto two shadow banking systems in Russia’ (Kaurova, 2017: 87): 
these transpired from the economic transitions in the 1990s and refer to a one, a grey 
credit and payment network associated with an underground economy, and two, 
another system with origins in financial liberalisation policies and the eventual 
expansion of bank and non-bank financial intermediation. Here too, the deepening and 
widening of shadow banking practices comes across as a response to regulatory 
constraints which have created a chasm between the financial economy and the ‘real’ 
economy: in particular domestic capital markets offer only weak access to corporations 
which have to seek alternative funding and risk insurance mechanisms (Kaurova, 2017).  
Recent shadow banking examples in China further enhance the scholarship on 
regulatory arbitrage and avoidance by drawing upon the political economy of global 
financial regulatory governance (Knaack and Gruin, 2017). The prerogative taken by 
regulators from advanced economies to define shadow banking overwhelmingly in 
terms of systemic risk potential has created a fixation with tight monitoring and control: 
the outcome of this is a setting in which the Financial Stability Board (FSB) — ‘the G20’s 
handmaiden in global financial regulatory reform’ (Knaack and Gruin, 2017: 2) —
allegedly curbs the financial development capacity of nonbank financial institutions 
(NBFIs). The response of Chinese authorities to such constraints has been to frame 
shadow banking as financial inclusion, particularly internet finance: this strategy has 
allowed for ‘greater policy space and legitimacy to promote non-traditional financial 
services’ (Knaack and Gruin, 2017: 15). Daniela Gabor’s study of China is a departure 
from a regulatory arbitrage focus and thus the supply side approach, which she labels 
the ‘viable credit alternative’ view given the argument that nonbank finance is a 
substitute for mainstream finance  (Gabor, 2018: 395). She draws attention to the 
shortcomings of existing literature which overlooks not only the influence of the global 
financial market in domestic shadow banking, but also overlooks the trend of market 
based finance which reflects a ‘renewed global push, led by Germany in the G20, to 
extend the reach of financialized globalization’ (Gabor, 2018:  398).  
Shadow banking and its politics 
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Such insights augment the shadow banking literature as well as that on financial 
development: financialised globalisation may thus be cast as the shadow banking-
financial development nexus. This is an opportunity to question the extent to which the 
goals of financial development and the imperatives of shadow banking are concurrent 
and also contradictory. Gabor’s (2018) commentary on the role of the German state and 
G20, and Knaack and Gruin’s (2017) on the FSB are of particular value because they 
highlight how activities that resist or embrace financialised globalisation acquire 
diplomatic overtones: this echoes Nesvetailova’s (2017: 11) contention that ‘non-
pecuniary motivations and objectives’ may drive shadow banking. There is thus more to 
shadow banking than the economics of financial mobility and regulation. Helgadóttir 
elaborates on this assertion through the use of political science frameworks to ‘suggest a 
distinctly political reading of the trajectory of shadow banking’ (Helgadóttir, 2016: 918).  
Three frameworks are thus employed: rent-seeking, institutional adaptation, and 
inequality.   
To expand on the notion that inclusive finance is shadow 
banking, Helgadottir’s (2016) concept of ‘banking upside down’ is useful: in 
demonstrating how ‘economic’ features of shadow banking may be viewed through a 
political lens, it draws attention to how traditional banking and shadow banking 
differ.    
‘Rather than using short term liabilities (deposits) to fund long-term assets (loans) 
like traditional banks do, shadow banking uses securitization and financial 
engineering to turn individuals’ and corporations’ long-term liabilities (mortgages 
and other kinds of debt) into short-term instruments (securities and derivatives 
based in such debt)’ (Helgadottir, 2016: 921).  
The distinction between an economics approach vis-a-vis a politics approach is apparent 
through the economics literature that describes shadow banks as ‘bank-like’ because 
they carry out maturity transformation (Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012; Pozsar et al., 2010, 
cited in Helgadottir, 2016). This description underpins the claim that troubled shadow 
banks are an economic reality and thus entitled to public support: ‘if shadow banking is 
understood as an intrinsic part of the current financial landscape, government 
institutions, too, must adapt to this new reality.’ (Helgadottir, 2016: 918).   
But such an understanding obviates the political nature of shadow banking 
because it does not explicitly mention (1) the rent-seeking tendency of shadow banks, 
(2) the logic to the institutional adaptation underlying bailouts and safety nets for 
shadow banks, and (3) the role of wealth inequality in the growth of shadow banking 
(Helgadottir, 2016). So, while the discussion in the previous chapter, on 
the respective supply and demand views of shadow banking, pertains to the drivers of 
shadow banking, the discussion here highlights the context in which these drivers 
operate.   
For instance, the rent-seeking tendency of shadow banks, as well as institutional 
adaptation practices are described by Helgadottir (2016) in two contexts: the use of 
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public backstops and the ‘symbiotic’ relationship between shadow banks and traditional 
banks through which traditional banks can avail of the regulatory privileges of shadow 
banks such as through securitised assets.  While Helgadottir’s (2016) examples pertain 
to Anglo-American financial institutions beset by the 2007-9 global financial crisis 
(GFC), they can be tweaked to apply to shadow banking in poor — or emerging market 
— countries as well.  Rent-seeking is an example of a term imported by political 
scientists from economics: its usage has been extended through the use of concepts 
such as ‘moral hazard’, ‘too-big-to-fail’ and ‘regulatory arbitrage’ (Helgadóttir, 2016: 
923). Such concepts illustrate the clear link between rent-seeking and financial 
innovation, as exemplified by banks relying on public bailouts, and corporations using 
tax havens. Helgadóttir (2016) also draws attention to a less obvious aspect of rent-
seeking, which is the symbiotic relationship between traditional banks and shadow 
banks. Securitisation is one feature of this two-way relationship: its disadvantages, in 
the light of the 2007-9 financial crisis, are well-documented (Mian and Sufi, 2015; 
Nesvetailova and Palan, 2008).  The other feature of this symbiotic relationship is that 
traditional banks have gained many advantages through the regulatory dexterity of 
shadow banks: it is thus unsurprising that shadow banking entities — such as special 
purpose vehicles that engage in securitisation — are often subsidiaries of mainstream 
banks (IMF, 2014). 
Institutional adaptation is a feature of the extensive institutionalist political 
science literature (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Hacker and Pierson, 2010; Hall and 
Taylor, 1996).56 Economists have used this to justify safety nets for shadow banks 
(Helgadóttir, 2016). So, just as the Federal Reserve was a response to the collapse of the 
call loan market in 1913, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was a response 
to the volatility associated with Great Crash of 1929, safety nets for shadow banks are a 
response to the most recent financial crisis (Helgadóttir, 2016). This parallel offers 
precedents to understand the use of public backstops; it also underscores the perceived 
importance, to the state, of the shadow banking system. Gabor and Ban’s (2015: 632) 
study of repo markets in the European Union is relevant here; they find that the 
‘standing of a sovereign in financial markets now hinges on the collateral quality of its 
debt, which in turn depends on (shadow) banks’ expansion strategies’. Shadow banks 
thus have not only economic but also, political importance. The contemporary setting 
of ‘giant pools of money seeking returns and a growing number of borrowers’ 
(Helgadóttir, 2016: 915) is itself a site for institutional adaptation, and thus brings to 
light the connection between inequality and shadow banking. In particular, the use of 
public backstops during the GFC demonstrates how shadow banks can take advantage 
of government policy.  
The symbiotic relationship between shadow banks and traditional banks also 
facilitates both rent-seeking and institutional adaptation. Helgadottir (2016) finds this 
to be the case when traditional banks use securitisation and thus opt for a strategy 
_____________________________ 
56 Interestingly, the concept of institutional adaptation has been embraced by the World Bank, particularly in the context 
of how institutional change can be externally directed and offer lessons for aid donors (Islam, 2018).  
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based on ‘slicing and dicing’ to lower credit risk rather than the traditional strategy of 
originating loans to hold and fund them up until maturity. This arrangement is 
mutually beneficial because traditional banks circumvent regulation and make loans 
with less capital, and because shadow banks gain the protection of government backed 
safety nets: this relationship is explicated in Pozsar et al’s (2010) ‘shadow banking 
maps’.57 And more simply, in Mehrling et. al’s (2013) description of shadow banks as 
parasites.   
Inequality, as it relates to economic growth, the concentration of wealth, and 
the accumulation of capital, has been a preoccupation of political economists including 
Adam Smith (Rasmussen, 2016) for, at least, centuries: it has been placed in the context 
of advanced capitalism in recent work by Piketty (2014). The shadow banking literature 
builds on this by highlighting how skewed patterns of capital accumulation and wealth 
concentration drive a growing reliance on debt.  In doing so, this literature speaks to 
both the demand and the supply side perspectives of shadow banking: concentrated 
wealth creates a demand for debt and securitisation responds to this by creating a 
supply of debt (Helgadóttir, 2016).  Inequality is central to this relationship because the 
demand for debt exceeds supply: this is evidenced by the predatory lending practices 
that characterised sub-prime mortgages in the United States (Adrian and Ashcraft, 2012; 
Gorton, 2008).  
These observations highlight how shadow banking is part of a larger political 
transformation of central banks and bond markets’, the vulnerabilities of which became 
exposed during the GFC (Helgadottir, 2016: 929). A specific problematisation of shadow 
banking is revealed here: why are governments loath to regulate shadow banking 
activity and to refuse shadow banks safety nets? Or: ‘does shadow banking play a 
societal and economic role that justifies such extensive public support?’ (Helgadottir, 
2016: 929). But as mentioned above, this problematisation is shaky for cases when 
shadow banking is regulated tightly enough so that institutions are not systematically 
important or when no institution may be deemed ‘too big to fail’: this is discussed above 
for Indian NBFCs and also applies to Pakistani microfinance.  
For such cases an alternative problematisation may be as follows: are shadow 
banks needed to fulfil the credit needs of an economy? Or worded differently: is the 
economic and societal role of shadow banking important enough to justify regulatory 
facilitation? Helgadottir discusses this in the context of wealth inequality by noting how 
the relation between inequality and shadow banking is captured by the respective 
concepts of debt and wealth. Debt is at the core of shadow banking, particularly given 
how it is generated through securitisation. Wealth, particularly in a concentrated form, 
underlies the impetus to invest, and thus the need for investments. These concepts 
represent the ‘supply side’ and ‘demand side’ views of shadow banking respectively: 
these underpinned, in the GFC, the unstable relationship between immense cash 
holdings and demand for credit, including from those tagged as ‘subprime’.   
_____________________________ 
57 These maps are  presented in (Pozsar et al.,2010) to schematically represent the funding flows of the shadow banking 
system  
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Given a general context of inclusive finance, the connection between inequality 
and shadow banking is important enough to be reiterated: large pools of cash and the 
opportunity to create asset streams through the consumption needs of the poor have 
driven what Mader (2015) describes as the financialisation of poverty. Here, a distinction 
may be made between the patterns of commercialisation and financialisation as they 
apply inclusive finance. Commercialisation reflects a shift from a model funded by 
charity and altruism to one that is funded by financial capital whereas financialisation 
reflects a shift from a model in which the poor are viable clients for financial 
institutions, to one in which activities of the poor are ‘converted into financial asset 
streams’ (Aitken, 2013: 474).  
3.4 THE CASE FOR SHADOW FINANCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
This rendering of shadow banks as prone to rent-seeking, institutional adaptation and a 
reliance on inequality, demonstrates the overlap between financial exclusion and 
financial innovation. For poor countries, the provision of financial services under the 
guise of inclusive finance is a specific feature of the shadow banking system. The 
argument that inclusive finance is a form of shadow banking has so far received very 
limited coverage in the existing literature: this chapter demonstrates how such a 
portrayal can enhance an understanding of financial access.  
Shadow banking, particularly in poor countries, has causes as well as symptoms. 
The causes, as discussed earlier are reflected in the two respective views of shadow 
banking: the supply side view captures the regulatory and macroeconomic constraints, 
and the demand side view captures the search for yield from global institutional 
investors. These views represent the drivers or causes of shadow banking: the outcomes 
or symptoms may be seen as a response to  (1) the need to identify and determine 
sources of yield in the form of interest, (2) the imperative to unlock what is sometimes 
described as ‘dead capital’ (Zulfiqar, 2018; World Bank, 2010; de Soto, 2000), and (3) the 
imperative to ‘constitute and extract financial value from the places where it is invisible’ 
(Aitken, 2017: 275). It is from these practices and activities that shadow financial 
citizenship emerges as an arrangement that is disadvantageous for the poor as it entails: 
inequality in rates, inequality in requirements for eligibility, and inequality in 
surveillance.  These are illustrated in figure 4, above.  
Shadow financial citizenship is distinct from similar, overlapping concepts 
which have drawn attention to how changing approaches to banking drive uneven 
financial access. This is so because (1) shadow financial citizenship attributes gaps in 
financial citizenship, explicitly, to shadow banking practices and networks, and (2) in 
doing so, it operates as an analytical toolkit equipped to draw causal linkages between 
private capital and exclusionary trends in finance. Related concepts have sought to 
make similar claims in the past — and these related concepts are outlined in Table 3.2, 
later in this chapter — but the focus has tended to be on Anglo-American geographies 
and on specific trend of financial infrastructure withdrawal. In contrast, the conceptual 
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framework of shadow financial citizenship captures how unevenness takes the form of 
inequities which emerge because of shadow banking practices.  
 Shadow financial citizenship, and the exclusion which it seeks to describe and 
account for, emerges from two sets of scholarship: the geographies of money and 
finance and also financial innovation. The geographical literature stresses the need for a 
concept of financial citizenship given that policies on inclusion overlook the reality that 
financial exclusion and financial citizenship lie on a continuum: the space between 
financial exclusion and citizenship is not only a grey area, but also an impediment to 
financial citizenship. The literature on financial innovation differentiates financial 
deepening — and financial development — from financial innovation, and thus offers a 
basis to question the role and nature of finance in poor countries.  
As a conceptual framework, shadow financial citizenship can enhance two sets 
of scholarship on the political economy of finance. One of these is the scholarship on 
banking and finance in poor countries as shadow financial citizenship draws attention 
to the manner in which shadow banking exists and operates in the Global South: it can 
thus enhance scholarship on the role of finance in development. Additionally, and 
perhaps most importantly in the context of this dissertation, shadow financial 
citizenship may be employed as a tool to study the phenomenon of bifurcated banking 
in financial markets in poor countries: this is done by highlighting the gap between 
financial inclusion and financial citizenship. The next section considers the value that a 
financial citizenship lens brings to an analysis of bifurcated banking.  
3.5 FINANCIAL CITIZENSHIP  
Scholarship on the concept of citizenship may be described as either a normative type 
or an empirical type: respectively, these are ‘normative theories that try to set out the 
rights and duties citizens ought to have, and empirical theories that aim to describe and 
explain how citizens came to possesses those rights and duties’ (Bellamy, 2008).  The 
financial citizenship literature, particularly the context in which it is employed and 
invoked in this dissertation, falls firmly in the empirical category. Here, the primary 
purpose of applying a financial citizenship lens is not to evaluate what form of financial 
access should people have. Rather the purpose is to describe and explain the nature and 
origins of uneven financial access; specifically, how rights and responsibilities around 
finance came to be possessed and also dispossessed. A normative argument may of 
course be extracted even from this empirical approach, — that access to finance should 
be even across the banking system — and this is considered through the discussion in 
this chapter on credit as a right, and the role of the state in facilitating financial access.  
As an emerging concept, financial citizenship entered the vocabulary of political 
economists through the work of economic geographers interrogating spatial patterns of 
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financial exclusion.58 Sarah Hall finds that 'a distinctly economic-geographical 
imagination in relation to money and finance' developed, mostly, in the 1990s: this was 
spurred by research on regulatory and informal norms of international and offshore 
finance, post Bretton Woods, amidst floating exchange rates (Hall, 2012: 93). The decade 
described by Mervyn King as 'nice' for non-inflationary consistently expansionary (King, 
2010), and the ensuing expansion of the financial services sector offered rich materials 
for economic geographers and numerous opportunities to engage with the phenomenon 
of financialisation, and also to expand upon institutional approaches to finance (Hall, 
2012)59 Financialisation as an analytical concept was thus embraced by geographers, as it 
was by scholars in other disciplines.60 
‘One the great strengths of the concept of financialization is that it has proved a 
rallying point for researchers interested in money and finance across a number of 
cognate social science disciplines’ (French et al. 2011: 814). 
This exuberance is questioned by Brett Christophers who finds that the usage of the 
term financialisation is excessive and careless, lacking novelty in an historical as well as 
theoretical sense: for Christophers (2015), these reflect inherent analytical limitations of 
this term, severe enough to justify abandonment, at least by geographers. Manuel 
Aalbers argues that much of this critique is unwarranted and comments on the 
'potential for financialization to conjoin real-world processes and practices that are 
conceptually treated as discrete entities', underscoring that financialisation is an' 
inherently spatial phenomenon that should be much more central to economic-
geographic analysis' (Aalbers, 2015: 5). This perspective echoes French et al.’s (2011) call 
for more awareness of the geographic unevenness of financialisation processes. The 
issue of unevenness is a core theme in the literature on financial infrastructure 
withdrawal and expressed through the concept of financial citizenship. Berry and Serra’s 
(2012: 4) remark that 'if we are not financial citizens, then arguably we are not citizens 
at all' is an extension of Leyshon and Thrift’s (1995) commentary on ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’. These exist in relation to the financial system, just as they do in relation to 
the state: hence the need for a lens of citizenship to examine exclusion, or in other 
words, an ‘outside’ vis-a-vis an ‘inside’ (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995).  
Why citizenship? 
_____________________________ 
58The transfer of ideas from economic geography to political economy has been a two-way process of importation and 
economic geographers have in recent decades drawn heavily on concepts from political economy literatures: several 
examples are available in Hall (2012).  
59 The literature with a focus on institutions differs from that on financialisation in seeking to answer questions about the 
ascendancy and the reproduction of financial economics and financial theory which is studied as a ' negotiated process, 
involving institutions such as regulators, policymakers, and academics' (Hall, 2012; p 95).  In contrast, the literature on 
financialisation emphasises its tendency to be 'an uneven process' (Froud and Johal, 2008) and thus seeks to answer 
questions about structural change in geographies and in economies. 
60 For more detailed discussion of this term see Chapter 2 . 
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There are disadvantages and advantages to using a citizenship lens to study exclusion.  
The concept of citizenship carries limitations because it is largely — unlike for instance 
‘democratic theory’ or ‘state theory’ — without a great body of systematic theory: 
numerous typologies and classifications nevertheless do exist (Turner, 1993a: viii). 
Within this vast literature on citizenship there is a recurring emphasis on the Western 
European baggage carried by his concept (Fahrmeir, 2008; Hoffman, 2004; Smith, 2002; 
Turner, 1993).  
‘There can be little question that citizenship has functioned primarily as an 
expression of Enlightenment culture and its heir, Political Liberalism. It supports 
familiar liberal concepts such as the primacy of the individual and the autonomy of 
the moral will. This, so critics argue, has encouraged a general weakening of any 
strong idea of community as partially constitutive of our moral identity, 
community, that is, as something more than a mere collection of sovereign 
individuals’ (Curtin, 2002: 293). 
The idea that — and the extent to which — citizenship can be applied to societies that 
are either not Western or not modern is contested (Hoffman, 2004; Turner, 1993).61 
Even within a Western and modern context, there have been structural changes 
resulting in the demise of full employment and of the nuclear family, the emergence of 
new norms of flexible labour, poverty and unemployment, as well as exclusion on the 
basis of gender and ethnicity: these have drawn attention to ideas of social obligation 
and duty, as well as rights and entitlements (Turner, 1993).  
The most obvious advantage of using the concept of citizenship is that it is 
relatively easy to define. Additionally, two sets of concerns deserve special attention. 
One of these is that market-centric policies, and more recently austerity, have attacked 
the welfare state and impeded it in resolving social and political problems. The other is 
the globalisation of financial capital, which has constrained the economic sovereignty of 
nation states.  For Turner (1993), these precise occurrences raise questions about the 
validity of citizenship as a notion: the case presented thus for retaining this concept 
offers compelling groundwork for a study of financial exclusion. Citizenship is a 
necessary component of thought on social rights and identity, political membership and 
welfare issue: it also illuminates the discussion about poverty, social commitment, 
benefits, and welfare.  
Given that the objective of this dissertation is to enhance the understanding of 
financial exclusion in poor countries — settings where the welfare state is largely absent 
— there is perhaps a need for caution when examining citizenship in the context of 
welfare. The justification for persisting with such an approach is that the constrained 
and austere welfare state offers an opportunity to study financial exclusion as directly 
related to the expansion of the market and the contraction of the state.  
_____________________________ 
61 In this context, ‘modern’ is associated with industrial production and a market economy: this may be contrasted with 
the notion of ‘traditional’, a binary conceptualisation that is problematised as ‘an obsolete dichotomy’ by Germond-Duret 
(2016).  
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This in contrast to the view discussed in Chapter 1, that financial exclusion is 
symptomatic of the need for bespoke products for the poor (Collins et al., 2009), in 
which there is a tacit acceptance of the depoliticised circumstance of poverty and life in 
the informal economy. Another justification for using the concept of citizenship, with a 
welfare orientation, is to consider how policies that seek to counter financial exclusion 
are formed, transferred, and diffused. This refers particularly to what Jamie Peck and 
Nik Theodore call ‘fast policy’ to describe the: 
‘…social practices and infrastructures that enable and sustain policy “mobility”, 
which enable the complex folding of policy lessons derived from one place into 
reformed and transformed arrangements elsewhere’  (Peck and Theodore, 2015: 
xvii). 
Fast policy is relevant here because its practices underlie how financial exclusion and 
inclusion policies are shaped. It affects the capacity of the state to influence citizenship 
and its forms, such as financial citizenship. As such, it speaks to the concerns 
mentioned earlier about the economic sovereignty of nation states, particularly given 
the dominance of global capital which is exerted through the expansion of financial 
markets.  
Forms of citizenship and the vocabulary of rights 
Financial citizenship is a form of citizenship: other forms include sexual citizenship and 
ecological citizenship. A fairly recent tendency, of social and political movements to use 
a vocabulary of rights and recognition to frame struggles, is reflected in the 
materialisation of various forms of citizenship. Sexual citizenship, for instance, is a 
claim to a set of rights and also the articulation of a notion of sexual rights: these may 
be understood as ‘a set of rights to sexual expression and consumption’ (Richardson, 
2000: 107, in Lister, 2002). Ecological citizenship takes a somewhat different approach 
because of its calls to encompass the ‘more-than-human community’ (Curtin, 2002: 
302): this imparts resistance to the idea that people are the beneficiaries of citizenship 
and that natural resources are extrinsic goods to advance such benefits for current and 
future generations.  
Aside from forms, citizenship may be seen in the light of approaches, including 
liberal and republican citizenship and also in the light of histories including ancient and 
modern (Isin and Turner, 2002). Modern citizenship is the outcome of these approaches 
and their histories, and has a focal point in the idea of political freedom. This reflects an 
aspiration to protect individual rights and also to create a system of self-governance. 
Liberal ideas of citizenship privilege self-protection, whereas republican ideas focus 
more on self-rule: political freedom remains the central tenet nevertheless (Seubert, 
2014).  
Of exceptional influence in the literature on modern citizenship is the typology 
offered by the British sociologist T.H Marshall who noted that civil rights to property 
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and protection were gained through political pressures exerted by the middle and, 
eventually by, the working classes; these were followed by near-universal rights of 
political participation and eventually by social rights to income, housing, healthcare, 
and education (Marshall, 1950).62   
This is a valuable typology for a conceptualisation of financial citizenship 
because a social right to finance may be likened to those claimed in the past, for 
instance, for housing and education. Similar claims are made in the discussion on 
microfinance and financial inclusion in poor countries. Muhammad Yunus, the founder 
of the Grameen Bank, has on various occasions asserted that credit should be a right, 
much like basic human rights to food, shelter, and health; because access to credit is so 
potent for poverty reduction, it should be a right itself (Gershman and Morduch, 2015; 
Financial Times, 2008).  
Such a viewpoint is an extension of the Right to Development, which became a 
part of the 1948 Universal Declaration when it was adopted by the United Nations in 
1986.63  The Right to Development sought to facilitate cooperation at the national and 
international level to achieve the ‘purposes of the United Nations’ (Sengupta, 2000: 
558). Alston (1984), however, expresses scepticism about the push for the United 
Nations to recognise more rights because these would undermine existing human rights 
without necessarily expanding on what is already covered.64  
The claim that credit is a right thus has merits but also deficiencies. For 
instance, Gershman and Morduch (2015: 16) are wary of the deleterious nature of ‘rights 
creep’ as it devalues more direct approaches to poverty reduction such as: 
‘...access to public hand-outs, facilitating transfers between family members, being 
permitted unfettered migration, reducing inflation, and promoting GDP growth 
that generates better jobs’ (Gershman and Morduch, 2015: 16).  
Additionally, as mentioned earlier, not only is there sparse empirical evidence showing 
that access to credit is indeed transformative, there is also a substantial literature 
professing the opposite. Particularly, that access to credit can constrain poverty 
reduction, particularly through indebtedness and the inability to efficiently utilise 
secondary loans.65   
_____________________________ 
62 A key moment in this context is the American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt Sr.’s 1944 address, in which he details 
the economic rights, including to, food, clothing, housing, health, education, and employment as comprising economic 
security (Sengupta, 2000). 
63 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was adopted in 1948 and the Right to Development was adopted in 1986: 
the historical processes underlying these events are discussed in Alston (2005) and Sengupta (2000).  
64 In subsequent research Alston (2005) is more optimistic about the Right to Development noting that the Millennium 
Development Goals offer an opportunity for the human rights community to engage extensively with the development 
agenda.  
65 ‘Harm need not be caused by over-indebtedness. It may simply occur when borrowers prove unable to reap positive 
financial returns on their investments.’ (Gershman and Morduch, 2015: 17).  
 
91 
 
These are major deficiencies of course, but there are merits too when access to 
credit is likened to a right. One of these is the prominence given to the state to 
administer and enforce such rights. Another related advantage is the attention drawn to 
structural obstacles, both formal and informal, that block access to credit for large 
segments of the population.  
Financial access and the state  
The role of the state in promoting access to credit, or microfinance, or policies of 
financial inclusion, is largely absent from the literature, with the exception of some 
contributions from scholars of political economy. Their analyses observe that financial 
inclusion —a movement that commenced with rural microcredit initiatives and 
included the push for microfinance — seeks to meet needs created by state failure in 
areas such as a health, education, infrastructure and safety nets (Sandberg, 2015; 
Soederberg, 2012; Mader, 2011; Campbell, 2010; Weber, 2002). This literature is mindful 
of the neoliberal credentials of financial inclusion and sees the poverty reduction 
agenda of financial inclusion as a feeble substitute for state directed social spending.  An 
alternative perspective on the state takes its weaknesses as given, a view shared by 
Muhammad Yunus.  For instance, discussing microfinance in the United States:  
‘Welfare law doesn’t exist in Bangladesh, because most poor and developing 
countries don’t have welfare … but once you do it in the United States, it applies to 
Europe. Europe has lots of problems with welfare and so on, and historically 
they’re supposed to protect the people at the very bottom, the safety net kind of 
thing, but you have to realise that it is not in the best interest of the people to keep 
them imprisoned in welfare’ (Yunus,  cited in Financial Times, 2008). 
This view is an extension of the one which stresses that corruption and bad governance 
are salient features of state directed development strategies. Alice Sindzingre and 
Howard Stein observe how institutional approaches to development, which focus on 
institutional transformations, particularly related to international organisations, tend to 
highlight notions of ‘bad governance’ and the ‘rediscovery’ of corruption’ (Sindzingre 
and Stein, 2002: 5) as a way of pinning the blame for disastrous policies in the Global 
South. As a result, the responsibility for ineffective reform and aid is pinned on the 
recipient country rather than the donor organisation or its conditionalities.  What then 
might be the role of the state in upholding the right to credit? A possible answer —
based on examples of other rights — is as a provider of credit: 
‘Declaring healthcare to be a human right imposes on government the 
responsibility to provide public hospitals when private markets and charities fail to 
fill gaps. When it comes to credit, the government, it follows, should become the 
lender of last resort for the poor’ (Gershman and Morduch, 2015: 24). 
The idea of the government as a lender is contested. Antagonism towards state 
subsidised loans to poor households was a response to the rural credit programmes run 
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by Global South governments in the 1970s. Acknowledging the high transaction costs 
faced by banks, such programmes sought to provide assistance and to weaken the hold 
of moneylenders on local economies (Hudson, 2014). But these programmes were 
severely criticised for defaults owing to a lack of collateral, and also because interest 
rates were too low to incentivise deposit mobilisation (Adams et al., 1984); additionally 
many of the subsidised loans went to politically connected or non-poor and hence low 
risk borrowers resulting in a regressive redistribution of incomes (Adam and Von 
Pischke, 1992).  The problem of high transaction costs is discussed in the economic 
literature as one of asymmetrical information: this concept is studied in the light of 
microfinance by Haldar and Stiglitz (2013) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1991).  High costs are 
attributed to what economists describe as moral hazard and adverse selection, 
respectively. Moral hazard occurs here when borrowers take risks knowing that they are 
protected against the risk because another person will bear the cost. Adverse selection 
in this context is when borrowers have information that lenders do not have about 
repayment capacity. The invention of the joint liability microcredit model seemingly 
overcame the problem of high transaction costs and also those that arose because of 
government loans: it thus appeared to obliterate the need for subsidised credit from the 
state.66 
Given such claims that state directed lending is both ineffective and 
unnecessary, could other actors, namely the international community, NGOs, and even 
private institutions, be tasked with the responsibility of providing credit? The example 
of the Grameen Bank might suggest that this is possible, but this draws the argument 
into the complex territory of the relationship between human rights and non-state 
actors.  This is the subject of an extensive literature: some examples include Clapham’s 
(2006) exposition of the human rights obligations of non-state actors, O’Neill’s (2000) 
argument about the need to assign obligations to an explicit duty bearer, and also 
Alston’s (2005) concerns about the operational implications of upholding rights.  
Aside from the provision of credit there is another role for the state: eliminating 
the structural obstacles, both formal and informal, to credit access. Such a role is 
partially captured in the financial repression argument (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973) in 
which weak financial development is caused by crony capitalism, explicit or implicit 
caps on interest rates, and other forms of government involvement that limit the supply 
of funds for lending.  On the position that financial repression is not ‘best practice’ there 
is widespread institutional agreement.67 This consensus is attributed to the rise of the 
central banking model which Gerald Epstein (2006; 1) calls the ‘neo-liberal policy 
_____________________________ 
66 This is no longer the dominant model of inclusive finance as it has largely been replaced by commercialised approaches: 
this shift is discussed in the context of Grameen II by Hume (2008) and Dowla and Barua (2006).   
67 Much of this is captured in the literature on central bank independence, for instance Fernández-Albertos (2015) and 
Eijffinger and de Haan (1996).  
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package’.68 As a result, there is on the part of these financial institutions at least, a 
formal commitment, to eschew policies that might limit access to credit.69  
Outside of the financial sector however, there is room for governments to 
uphold the proposed right to credit by removing legal barriers such as those that require 
women to have the signature of her husband on paperwork, or that prevent her from 
owning property; furthermore, requirements to present documentation that is hard to 
obtain may also be done away with (Gershman and Morduch, 2015). 
Additionally, the state may play an active role in addressing issues of 
discrimination, particularly those that arise from cultural norms. Here, the right to 
credit might be asserted through the right to not be discriminated against: this shows a 
clear connection with the existing principles of human rights as they pertain to equality 
and justice. Gershman and Morduch (2015) thus take the view that though it is doubtful 
that a rights based approach to microcredit is an effective one for poverty reduction, 
there is still substantial merit in enforcing the right to non-discrimination in financial 
access.  
Financial citizenship as a response to exclusionary finance 
If credit is not a right, then what is financial citizenship? Or worded differently, is the 
notion of financial citizenship a useful one if it is not viable to endorse and enforce 
credit as a right? In concise form, the answer is yes: financial citizenship does indeed 
exist, even in the absence of credit as a right, so the puzzle is how financial citizenship 
can be offered to those who do not have it. Also noteworthy is that the discussion on 
financial exclusion — both in rich and poor countries — extends beyond credit and 
emphasises financial access as central to activities such as the receipt of welfare 
payments and remittances.  
Financial citizenship is, within national settings, a relative concept. Leyshon and 
Thrift (1996) for instance, contrast the financial excluded with the ‘super included’, who 
are the target market for a wide variety of products designed specifically for them.  So, 
the problem of financial citizenship is not whether or not it exists, but what can be done 
to reduce the contrasts between the super included and the financially excluded. These 
contrasts exist because of structural obstacles, some which have to do with the 
exclusionary nature of contemporary finance. These structural obstacles, which are 
discussed in the table below, may partially be tackled directly by the state, whereas 
others require financial systems to acknowledge that ‘they have some ‘state-like 
responsibilities which reach beyond consumer sovereignty into basic human rights’ 
(Leyshon and Thrift, 1995: 336).  
_____________________________ 
68 Epstein (2006) questions this ‘package’ because central banks such as the BoE, and the Federal Reserve have historically 
implemented policies that would today be called financial repressive .   
69 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) find that financial repression has, after the financial crisis of 2008, again become a concern: 
national governments are preoccupied with the reduction and management of debt, and the need to keep debt servicing 
costs low.    
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Elaine Kempson and Claire Whyley’s very important study of the various forms 
of exclusion is based on secondary as well as primary data on households in the United 
Kingdom: in particular, there is an analysis of ‘self-exclusion’ as it is unclear ‘whether 
the people who lack financial products are excluded from access or whether they self-
exclude’ (Kempson and Whyley, 1999: 1). Based on this, and on their insights on the 
variegated nature of financial exclusion, three premises now inform policies to address 
financial exclusion, not just in the United Kingdom, but in countries of the Global South 
as well. These three premises are: (1) that people currently on the margins of financial 
services should be integrated into mainstream provision, (2) that the private sector 
should be encouraged to develop new products and services to meet unmet needs, and, 
(3) that public-private partnerships should be used to create new markets, address 
regulatory issues, offer subsidies where needed, and involve non-profit and local bodies 
in delivering financial services to the excluded (Kempson and Whyley, 1999).  
Kempson and Whyley’s (1999) report shines a light on the close connection 
between financial exclusion and social exclusion. As shown in the table below, those 
most likely to be marginalised are from low income households, often the poorest in the 
country, and containing single parents, the elderly, or those from migrant backgrounds. 
These observations echo, and also expand upon, the concerns articulated in the mid 
1990s by geographers (Leyshon and Thrift, 1996; Dymski and Veitch, 1996; Pollard, 1996; 
Dymski, 1995).70 These same concerns also appear in the financial inclusion policies of 
New Labour: the introduction of simple and accessible products such as basic bank 
accounts (BBAs) and Post Office Card Accounts (POCAs) — which allowed certain 
benefit payments to be deposited automatically — was the result of the Tony Blair 
Labour government’s early financial inclusion agenda (Berry and Serra, 2012).  
Table 3.3: Types of financial exclusion 
Type of 
Exclusion 
Description 
Access 
Exclusion 
Physical absence of bank branches at certain locations prevents customers from using 
services.  
Condition 
Exclusion 
Potential customers excluded for failing to conform to defined product preconditions, 
such as failing a credit scoring test.  
Price Exclusion Products priced out of the reach of some consumers. 
Marketing 
Exclusion 
Undesirable customers avoided by aiming marketing campaigns at potentially 
profitable socio-demographic groups 
Self Exclusion Customers do not even apply for certain financial products, either because they have 
been refused in the past, they assume that they will be denied, or they are unaware 
of products that they might apply for. 
Sources: Kempson and Whyley (1999) in Leyshon et. al (2008) 
_____________________________ 
70 Primarily the claim that discriminatory practices of ‘redlining’ in large cities of the United States are the outcome, at 
least partly, of insufficient financial investment.   
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Such initiatives have been problematised on various grounds. For instance, though 
BBAs appeared to flourish immediately after being introduced — with over 6 million 
accounts opened in two years (Berry and Serra, 2012) — this success coincided with the 
closure of bank, building society and Post Office branch closures, and a rise in the 
numbers of fee-charging cash machines (Collard, 2007). Also troublesome is the 
underlying opinion — the view of the Labour government — reflected in products such 
as BBAs and POCAs:   
‘…the financially excluded are to some extent legitimately excluded by providers, 
given their higher risk profiles, meaning that less risky (although less functional) 
products will encourage providers to offer a more limited form of financial 
inclusion’ (Berry and Serra, 2012: 9).  
This view is the foundation for a ‘particularistic’ form of inclusion, which has social and 
gendered implications because it perpetuates assumptions that the individuals using 
such products have lower financial abilities and are different (Midgely, 2005): the post 
office as a primary location for the financial activities of such individuals implies that 
products such as POCAs, instead of those from mainstream institutions, will be used by 
the elderly, the disabled, and single parents, all of whom are more likely to be women.  
Critiques such as these are directed at symptomatic responses to financial 
exclusion. They emphasise that alternatives to mainstream provision carry 
marginalising tendencies. While such alternatives are inclusive in design they do not 
offer financial citizenship. The crucial question, which has not yet been addressed here, 
is: what causes financial exclusion? Gary Dymski presents a straightforward answer, 
which pins the blame squarely on the financial system: 
‘Social exclusion in the financial realm—that is, ‘financial exclusion’—refers to the 
failure of the formal banking system to offer a full range of depository and credit 
services, at competitive prices, to all households and/or businesses’ (Dymski, 2005: 
440).  
This is the basis for the literature that applies the notion of financial citizenship to 
explore how individuals — and also households and communities — encounter the 
financial system and its discriminatory tendencies. Within this scholarship, there are 
broadly two streams that occasionally overlap. One of these examines financial 
subjectivity as the outcome of the growing influence of finance on day to day 
interactions; the other stream probes the discriminatory nature of the financial system 
in the light of the principles and processes upon which it is based.  
The former subset of the literature is sceptical about financial citizenship 
because the financial citizen is as a constructed product of governmentality. The 
literature on governmentality and its manifestations is, of course, vast, but in this 
context, it refers to ‘indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals without 
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at the same time being responsible for them’ (Foucalt, 1979, cited in Lemke, 2001).71 
Initiatives such as financial coaching, education, and literacy are relevant here (Loomis, 
2018; Langley, 2007). In a similar light the notion of ‘homo subprimicus’ — which is an 
extension of the Foucaldian concept of homo economicus — is offered to view financial 
citizenship as ‘a subjectivizing force’ (Kear, 2013: 937). Associated with this is the 
observation that ‘the failure to adopt desired financial practices is framed as a deficit of 
ethical behaviour’ (Pathak, 2014: 97); this relates to critiques of ‘responsibilisation’ 
which indicates a reversal of citizenship: 
‘Responsibilisation essentially reverses the basic logic of how citizenship has 
developed for centuries, that is, the granting of new rights in return for 
responsibilities that we already had – in recent years, new responsibilities have 
been created to reflect the rights we already have’ (Berry and Serra, 2012: 18). 
Within this subset are also a number of studies that examine how households engage 
with personal finance and debt given structural changes in the financial landscape: 
particularly those driven by policies of austerity. Some of this research builds on earlier 
work on the nature of subjectivity (Lai and Tan, 2015); otherwise, there is a focus on the 
implications of specific practices of financial institutions (Appleyard et. al, 2016; 
Coppock 2013; Appleyard, 2012).   
Financial infrastructural withdrawal — as in widespread bank branch closures 
— is a direct consequence of disintermediation, associated with the diminishing need 
for banks to rely on depositors (French and Leyshon, 2010).  Additionally, stratification 
practices that segment markets exploit the inability of lower income clientele to find 
competitive alternatives and hence complicate access to financial services (Dymski, 
2005). And, not only has data technology facilitated financial institutions in 
circumnavigating intermediaries (French and Leyshon, 2010) it has also eased clientele 
segmentation based on credit-scores issued by private agencies (Leyshon and Thrift, 
1999). The exclusionary nature of such practices hardens the lines between financial 
inclusion and financial citizenship (Dymski, 2005). These practices, as is shown later in 
this thesis, manifest themselves in poor countries as well.   
Table 3.4: Conceptualising bifurcated banking structures 
Concept Context 
 
Exploitative greenlining 
(Newman and Wyly, 2004)  
To problematise the ways in which ‘market completion’ advanced 
by processes such as the expansion of the sub-prime for mortgage 
markets, is not egalitarian. 
 
Exploitative inclusion 
(Sokol, 2013) 
Mortgages, credit cards and other credit–debt instruments are at 
the centre of debt-based circuits of value: these rely on a logic of 
the extraction of value from debtors by creditors. 
 
Precarious inclusion Financial stratification processes in doorstep lending lead to 
_____________________________ 
71 Lemke (2001) has provided a detailed account of governmentality as presented through Foucault’s analysis of two forms 
of neoliberalism in his lecture of 1979 at the Collège de France.  
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(Appleyard et al., 2016) access to credit which can lead to debt problems. 
 
Adverse incorporation 
(Aitken, 2015) 
Fringe finance directed at vulnerable populations can deepen 
forms of economic disenfranchisement.  
 
 Compiled by author 
The context of poor countries has received some attention from scholars of shadow 
banking but almost none from scholars of financial citizenship. This gap is addressed in 
this thesis through two assertions: that inclusive finance impedes financial citizenship, 
and that inclusive finance is a form of shadow banking. The first assertion is drawn 
directly from the various objections to a binary conceptualization of inclusion-
exclusion: these are summed up in Henry et al (2017) and include Newman and Wyly’s 
(2004) ‘exploitative greenlining’ Sokol’s (2013) ‘exploitative inclusion’, Appleyard et al’s 
(2016) ‘precarious inclusion’ and also Aitken’s (2015) ‘adverse incorporation’. This 
chapter complements such conceptualisations by accounting for the role of shadow 
banking in impeding full financial citizenship: the financial citizenship lens is thus 
augmented and applicable also to poor countries.  These conceptualisations are 
summarised in Table 3.2.  
This research on the practices of financial institutions has a direct connection 
with another subset of research on financial citizenship: that on the principles and 
processes that direct how financial institutions operate. For instance, Gabor and Brooks 
(2017) outline how new technologies — particularly those that evaluate potential 
customers in the Global South through the use of digital data — have transformed the 
nature of inclusive finance.  Berry (2015), sees the financial inclusion agenda advanced 
by successive UK governments as an extension of the financialisation of the state and an 
instance of when ‘the state has sought to abdicate its role in shaping economic 
structures’. This builds on earlier work by Berry and Serra (2012) which discusses how 
public policy on financial inclusion has been oriented to changing financial behaviour in 
individuals, presumably as an alternative to welfare policies. Other studies draw 
attention to how processes such as globalisation and financial crises have driven shifts, 
in the business models of financial institutions, which have changed how they seek 
clientele (French et al. 2011; Dymski, 2005; Leyshon et. al, 2008; Leyshon and Thrift, 
1995).72 Of particular relevance is the decline of traditional models of intermediation: 
the idea that this trend has implications for financial citizenship because of its fixation 
with segmented markets is discussed by Dymski (2005) in the context of financial 
globalisation.  
As shown above, the decline of intermediation has caused a rupture in the social 
contract of banking.  A colossal shift has thus occurred in the way that the financial 
system operates 
_____________________________ 
72 Chapter 2 of this dissertation discusses the respective banking models of OTH and OTD. 
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3.6 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND BIFURCATED BANKING FOR 
THE POOR  
Segregated or bifurcated monetary systems motivate substantially different monetary 
experiences for the poor (Baradaran, 2017) and these disparities point to a need to revisit 
the relationship — or the social contract — between banks, society, and the state.  As 
Rethel and Sinclair (2012) note in ‘The Problem with Banks’, an idealised form of 
financial institution may be described as a ‘Jimmy Stewart’ bank; after the actor’s role in 
the 1946 Frank Capra film.73  Such a bank is one in which customer deposits fund the 
homes and businesses of their neighbours: the bank thus serves an altruistic purpose 
which arises from a configuration in which such institutions function as ‘self conscious 
market authorities’ and in which ‘long-term business relations trump short-term profit 
maximization’ (Rethel and Sinclair, 2012: 26). This is one of four possible configurations 
which vary, depending on (1) whether institutions see themselves as market players or 
market authorities, and (2) the temporal horizons — long term or short term — on 
which they choose to operate. Rethel and Sinclair (2012) emphasise the role of ‘rules of 
purposes’ which constitute new identities and ideas: these are called constitutive rules 
and exemplified in the shifting self-identification of banks from market authorities to 
market players.  
Related scholarship on contemporary practices in banking locates this shift in 
self-identification, in the breakdown of a social contract in banking (Baradaran, 2017; 
Ricks, 2010; Dymski, 1993). The work of the American legal scholar Mehrsa Baradaran is 
particularly valuable here, as it includes commentaries on the social contract of 
banking, as well as on the phenomena of segregated banking in the United States. The 
confluence of these approaches provides useful tools to study the phenomenon of 
bifurcated banking. 
The social contract of banking describes an implicit arrangement in which the 
government or state offers banks a safety net in the form of protection from runs, 
liquidity shortages, and investor irrationality: in exchange, banks commit to operating 
safely and meeting the collective and individual borrowing needs of the communities 
for economic expansion (Baradaran, 2011). In a heterodox economic depiction of this 
arrangement — which acknowledges the role of banks in money creation — the two 
functions of banks are: (1) money creation for the functioning of the economy and (2) 
lending to productive enterprises to support economic activity (Chick et al., 2013).  
In a context that pre-dates the 2007-9 global financial crises (GFC), Dymski 
(1993) observes how in the United States, especially in the 1980s, debt and speculative 
finance was increasingly used for leveraged buy-outs and commercial real estate; this 
exacerbated socio-economic inequality, especially as banks, were incentivised to 
_____________________________ 
73 The film, ‘It's a Wonderful Life’ is based on the short story and booklet ‘The Greatest Gift’ authored by Philip Van Doren 
Stern. 
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‘redline’ some communities, particularly black Americans.74 This is a violation of the 
social contract because when banks shift their emphasis to speculation and to servicing 
institutional clients, they eschew their primary function of lending to productive 
enterprises that are unable to access non-bank finance from securities markets and 
other institutions.   
The role of the shadow banking industry in the global financial crises reveals 
another instance of a rupture in the social contract (Ricks, 2010). In this case, the safety 
net extended by the authorities, in the form of access to central bank liquidity and 
federal deposit insurance, was used not only by the depository institutions for which it 
was intended but also by shadow banks, which are characterised here by practices of 
maturity transformation.  The solution to instability arising from shadow banking is 
not, as has been suggested, in (1) extending the safety net to or (2) placing stronger 
constraints on shadow banks, but to ‘disallow financial firms outside the banking social 
contract from engaging in maturity transformation’ (Ricks, 2010: 14). Put differently, this 
is an argument for ending shadow banking insofar as the practice relies on money 
market funding. Related steps to strengthen the social contract include mechanisms 
such as term funding arrangements — financing arranged to meet specific needs over a 
period — through which cash parking becomes a utility rather than an investment 
vehicle, and the imposition of fees to raise costs for the issuers of funds (Ricks, 2010).  
To revisit the social contract, ‘the proper end is ensuring that the nation's banks 
do what the public needs them to do and not the other way around’ (Baradaran, 2013: 
1284). For the regulators, this entails giving concerns about profitability a secondary 
role, and seeing ‘public benefit’ as comprised of safety and soundness, consumer 
protection, and access to credit, instead of efficiency and competition. These features of 
public benefit are pillars of a social contract. Baradaran (2011) describes the period 
between 1933 and the mid-1970s as one of growth and stability. Fresh regulations 
associated with the New Deal ensured that the banks stayed away from riskier activities, 
such as underwriting and proprietary trading.75 And, the government actively fostered 
an institutional architecture to assist poor and middle class households in buying homes 
and accessing low-cost credit.76  But all of this changed drastically, beginning in the 
1980s when increased competition from foreign banks and technological advances 
caused banks to lose market share and profitability. The ‘New Deal social contract’ was 
thus undermined and legislators proceeded to steadily deregulate banks, and make 
them more powerful and profitable.   
‘Ultimately, this period of deregulation resulted in an asymmetrical erosion of the 
social contract with banks. The revisions abrogated many of the safety and 
soundness regulations and public-serving obligations imposed on banks but did 
_____________________________ 
74 This term refers to practices that link access to capital and financial services to neighbourhood characteristics such as 
race and ethnicity. A more detailed explanation is offered in section 3.4 of this Chapter.  
75 For instance the Glass-Steagall legislation of 1933 
76 For instance the Federal Home Loan Bank System and Congressional Acts such as the Federal Credit Union Act and 
National Housing Act, as well as a government charter for Fannie Mae. 
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not take away the government safety net, such as FDIC insurance and access to the 
Federal Reserve discount window’ (Baradaran, 2011: 1309). 
Deregulation resulted in a massive and rapid expansion of the financial sector but is 
notable also for an abandonment of ‘the conceptual vision of banks as inextricably 
bound to the state’ as banks successfully sought to be treated more like private 
corporations and less like public utilities (Baradaran, 2011: 1310). Under this 
configuration, banks effectively deserted less profitable low-income customers in favour 
of wealthier clients and high-yield investments: the ensuing vacuum attracted fringe 
finance in the form of payday lenders and check-cashing services.  
Bifurcation as discrimination 
These trends are examined in Baradaran’s (2017; 2015) more recent work, on black banks 
and segregated banking in America. This presents an opportunity to connect the notion 
of the banking social contract with bifurcated banking. To a considerable extent, this 
echoes the concerns of Gary Dymski, as well as others who examine the geography of 
urban American cities to study racial discrimination in credit markets and housing 
markets (e.g, Dymski, 2006; Dymski and Veitch, 1995). Of particular importance is the 
incidence of ‘disparate impact’ when commercial practices disproportionately harm a 
racial minority with no justification through a legitimate business need (Marsden, 1994 
cited in Dymski, 2006) or ‘situations in which procedures that are racially neutral on 
their face lead to ex-post racial disparities unrelated to economic fundamentals’ 
(Dymski, 2006: 218). 77 
Loan and housing markets exert disparate impact through several mechanisms. 
The process of redlining, as lenders and real estate agents deem certain areas unsuitable 
or undesirable for transactions on the basis on perceived risks, is at the very core of 
institutionalised disparate impact. For instance, as Dymski (2006) observes, the loan 
underwriting practices over the 1950s and 1960s of the Federal Housing Administration 
used explicitly racial criteria.  
‘So redlining was not a phantasm of overzealous activists: it had been official 
government policy. The relation between racial discrimination and redlining was 
then as follows: the former disadvantages an agent independent of her location; 
the latter disadvantages agents in a location independent of their individual 
characteristics’ (Dymski, 2006: 218). 
Behavioural economic models used to study the phenomenon of disparate impact offer 
commentaries on the persistence and resilience of redlining practices. Many of these 
take as a starting point a study by Gary Becker (1957; 1971) which claims that 
_____________________________ 
77 Marsden (1994) lists this as a form of racial discrimination along with ‘overt impact’ and ‘disparate treatment’: the 
former refers to an intentional behaviour from an identifiable ‘perpetrator’ with an explicit intention whereas the latter 
refers to behaviour without an explicit intent but which has non-neutral outcomes and an identifiable perpetrator. These 
forms of racial discrimination may be contrasted with ‘disparate impact’ which does not involve an identifiable perpetrator.  
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discrimination in the market place by any group reduces not only their own real 
incomes also those of the minority. Racial bigots inevitably pay more because of their 
preferences, they will eventually tire of these preferences when the market pricing 
mechanism makes it clear that bigotry entails a premium. 78   
But Dymski (2006) counters this view on the basis that it assumes that only 
some lenders and agents are bigoted: in a situation where all lenders and agents are 
bigoted, racial minorities must compete for lower-quality homes and thus pay a higher 
price for them. Additionally, the use of an informational asymmetry framework (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1991) shows that housing discrimination can exist even when the racial 
bigots of Becker’s model do not exist: when banks cannot make decisions about 
individual creditworthiness they might redline an entire community to reduce risk.   
Is there an economic rationale for associating higher risk with a racial minority 
community? Suggested explanations are based on assumptions of neighbourhood 
externalities and information costs (Guttentag and Wachter, 1981; Lang and Nakamura, 
1993 cited in Dymski, 2006). Because the feasibility of lending depends on the total 
volume of loans being made in a geographical area, lenders will be drawn to areas where 
others are already operating, and also when the race and economic fundamentals of 
borrowers are correlated, lenders can ‘rationally’ use the racial composition of an area as 
a low-cost proxy for creditworthiness.  
For the black community in the United States, one response to this form of 
discrimination has been black banks. In her expansive study of black banks and the 
racial wealth gap, Baradaran (2017), notes how banks established specifically for the 
black community faced persistent failure: not only did they tend to be financially 
unstable but they were also incapable of resolving the economic problems underlying 
racial wealth inequality.  
Black banking has its origins in the small military banks which had been formed 
during the Civil War in the 1860s to hold the wages of black soldiers. A particularly 
important example in this regard is that of the Freedmen’s Bank which was seen by the 
public as trustworthy because it was backed by Abraham Lincoln’s government: but it 
was actually run as a private investment bank with management personnel actively 
engaged in speculation. This strategy was facilitated by the black community’s 
willingness to use the institution as a ‘piggy bank’ whilst the management sought to 
inculcate the values of thrift and capitalism. As Baradaran (2017) emphasises, the most 
salient feature of capitalism is in the ability of capital to proliferate through credit; but 
the Freedmen’s Bank did not allow the black community to avail this feature as it did 
not lend to depositors. Eventually, the bank collapsed after incurring massive losses 
because its management used customer deposits to finance the westward expansion of 
the railroad or what has been called the ‘first postwar asset bubble’ (Baradaran, 2017: 
27). For many in the black community, the collapse of this institution caused financial 
_____________________________ 
78 ‘The Economics of Discrimination’ was the subject of Becker’s doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago and was 
published as a book in 1957 with a second edition in 1971. 
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ruin and led to a deep mistrust of state institutions as well as banks in general. But the 
case for black banking prevailed not only because many black leaders — some who had 
worked in the bank as tellers, clerks and bookkeepers — saw the potential for success, 
but also because the legitimisation of Jim Crow laws and segregation effectively 
eliminated the black community from public life in America. 79   
Baradaran (2017: 87) observes that in this racially segregated setting ‘not only 
was it impossible for black banking to be separate and equal, they could not even be 
separate and profitable’.  There were many structural reasons for this: for instance, even 
though the number of black businesses increased exponentially between 1917 and 1930, 
because these were almost always individually owned and closed down when the 
founder died, they offered only a weak infrastructure for the production and 
accumulation of capital. Also, because the black community could not receive credit or 
insurance from a white bank or purchase a home from a white realtor, the cost of 
accumulating capital was always higher for them. And prohibitions made it necessary 
for black businesses to find black customers whereas white businesses could sell their 
goods to anyone: as a result, black businesses competed with other black businesses as 
well as white businesses and thus struggled to achieve economies of scale.  
Of particular interest is the disadvantage blacks faced in home ownership. 
White banks did not generally lend to blacks, and even when they did the interest rate 
was much higher than usual. The portfolios of black banks came to be engorged by 
home loans: this placed the banks in a precarious situation because the nature of 
segregation was such that when blacks purchased property its value fell and thus 
compromised loan collateral. This curious phenomenon added an economic impetus — 
in addition to a racist one — to the vociferous efforts of whites to keep blacks out of 
their neighbourhoods, as the fear of a neighbourhood declining and being ‘swallowed 
up by the ghetto’ (Baradaran, 2017: 91) was a pressing concern.  
The successes of the Civil Rights movement which gained enormous traction in 
the 1960s meant that the black community was granted equality in the form of legal and 
political rights; economic equality, however, remained elusive. When President Nixon 
took office in 1969, a radical black movement faced a strong white backlash: Nixon’s 
political savvy response included ‘opposing all forms of legal race discrimination while 
rejecting any government efforts at integration’ (Baradaran, 2017: 165). Black banking 
thus came to be a crucial feature of ‘black capitalism’: this was presented as a 
programme of the government to address the black community’s demands.  
But black capitalism could not resolve the problem of capital for black banks. 
The circular linkage between capital and bank profitability means that the more 
profitable a bank, the more capital it can attract to become even more profitable. 
Because black banks had no choice other than to make riskier loans, they had higher 
costs, lower profits and could not attract capital for investment. Additional constraints 
were regulatory: for instance, in order to be classified as a black bank, the majority of 
_____________________________ 
79 The relevant court rulings are: Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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shareholders had to be black. This limited the opportunity to raise capital as the 
potential pool of investors for black banks was relatively small. Another problem was 
deposit volatility because black banks tended to see deposit withdrawals at a higher and 
frequent rate relative to white banks: to offset risks, volatile deposits needed to be 
backed by government securities which offered a low return and cut profitability. And 
initiatives such as a government programme to channel government deposits to black 
banks were unhelpful because these deposits had to be fully matched by investments in 
United States government securities.  
The problem of capital in a segregated banking system is, as Baradaran (2017) 
demonstrates, particularly one of circulation: funds deposited in a black bank eventually 
leave the black banking system: 
‘Black banks were still exporting funds from the ghetto. Their over-investment in 
government securities meant that they were using their customer deposits to 
finance mortgages outside their communities. During the era of secondary 
mortgage markets, the outflow of deposit funds into other people’s mortgages was 
accelerated by the mortgage-backed security. Now, banks anywhere were investing 
the mortgages everywhere. For black banks, this process was a newer and less 
obvious way for them to serve as financial sieves — dispersing funds from the 
ghetto to the broader economy’ (Baradaran, 2017: 245). 
Black borrowers had, for generations, been allowed only limited access to loan markets, 
so it is unsurprising that this community became the worst victims of the subprime era: 
according to some estimates over 53 per cent of total black wealth was destroyed 
because of the financial crisis in 2008 (Baradaran, 2017: p 249) . Since the crisis, black 
banking has with some exceptions, been in a state of decline. 80  
The story of black banking reveals gaping fissures in the social contract of 
banking. The need for black banks, especially in a post Civil Rights context, was created 
because mainstream banks chose not to lend to the black community. In doing so, they 
violated the contract by refusing to fill their collective and individual borrowing needs 
for economic growth and productivity. And then subsequently, by exploiting structural 
inequalities to sell sub-prime loans, banks destroyed already scarce capital and broke 
their commitment to operating safely.   
Segregation, inclusion, and predation 
Do the examples presented above have wider applicability? An example of this is in the 
resemblance between black or segregated banking in the United States, and inclusive 
finance in Pakistan. Perhaps an obvious commonality is the emphasis on self-help and 
entrepreneurship.  Two similarities stand out in particular: one of these is the 
asymmetrical capacity of segregated or bifurcated systems to create wealth, and other is 
_____________________________ 
80 These are a result of the ‘#BankBlack’ or ‘Black Money Matters’ movement which has been endorsed by several 
prominent celebrities (Christian Science Monitor, 2016).  
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the extractive nature of parallel systems. These are illustrated below through the 
example of housing finance which demonstrates how uneven processes of wealth 
accumulation occur because of the propensity of the financial system to multiply 
capital.  
In modern banking systems, as Baradaran (2017) contends, this multiplication is 
from the practice of fractional reserve banking in which banks may lend out more than 
they hold in deposits. 81  
‘This is the “magic” of fractional reserve banking. Every time a loan is made, a 
deposit is created. To repeat, banks create money, or bank deposits, by making 
loans. This money multiplier effect is what makes banks the engines at the center 
of the economy — the new money is “created literally out of thin air’ (Baradaran, 
2017: 94). 
Despite being equipped to create money, black banks were nevertheless unable to 
become meaningful wealth generators for the black community. In a segregated system, 
deposits placed in black banks would quickly — through the mechanisms of loan 
creation — find themselves in white or mainstream banks. This had much to do with 
the structure of an economy in which sellers, particularly of property, were almost 
invariably white; additionally, particularly when segregation was strict, white banks did 
not lend to black individuals or enterprises, and white individuals and enterprises did 
not make deposits in black banks (Baradaran, 2017).  So while black banks contributed 
to wealth creation in the broader economy, this was done in a manner which 
reproduced the inequalities of the overall structure.  
In Pakistan, mortgage finance has not yet become an important vehicle for 
wealth accumulation: data on housing finance is available from Findex.82 This measures 
housing loan penetration or the percentage of the adult population with an outstanding 
loan to purchase a home.83 For Pakistan, this is a meagre 2.3 per cent relative to 36.7 per 
cent for the United States, and 34.3 per cent for the United Kingdom; for India and 
Bangladesh the corresponding figures are 2.5 and 2.9 per cent respectively (Badev et al., 
2014). Weak access to housing finance is commonplace in poor countries: this is 
attributed to various tendencies such as regulatory restrictions on bank lending for real 
estate (Badev et al., 2014) and the paucity of long term fixed rate funding instruments 
(Nenova, 2010). Housing finance in Pakistan also faces the broader limitations of the 
property market including the lax enforcement of foreclosure laws, lack of 
standardisation in land titling, heavy stamp duties, and shortages of affordable housing 
(Nenova, 2010).  
_____________________________ 
81 Baradaran (2017) places some emphasis on the role of the money multiplier in wealth creation: this comes across as 
inconsistent with her view on the production of money which she ascribes to banks when they create deposits by making 
loans and thus sees as endogenous. In such an arrangement the money multiplier has a residual and not a causal role in 
wealth creation (see Palley, 2015; Lavoie, 1984). This confusion does not undermine her key argument that the lending 
activities of black banks benefitted the broader economy more than the black economy: the inability of black banks to grow 
may be attributed the limited opportunities their clients had to engage in production or economic activity.  
82 The Global Financial Inclusion Index: this is constructed with survey data gathered across 148 countries.  
83 The standard measure for this is mortgage debt as a percentage of GDP but data for this is available only for a limited 
number of countries.  
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All of these reasons are relevant for mainstream as well as microfinance banks, 
but for the latter, housing finance is a particularly elusive product because of mandatory 
loan limits. The State Bank of Pakistan’s prudential regulations (SBP, 2014) cap loan size 
at PKR 1,000,000.84 This is a very small amount and because of this limit, house 
financing products, even when offered, tend to be for home improvement —for 
example, through the installation of solar panels — rather than for home purchase or 
construction.85    
An interesting parallel may be drawn here between the United States and 
Pakistan: in both countries, bifurcated banking intensifies inequalities through the 
market for housing finance. Whereas in the United States much of this occurs because 
skewed ownership patterns deplete the money creation potential of black banks, in 
Pakistan, the lack of access to housing finance disproportionately affects the poor too 
(World Bank, 2017). A symptom of this is the proliferation of katchi abadis or slum 
dwellings which are structurally deficient, lack access to basic infrastructure including 
piped water and a sewerage network, and also lack titles or permits. Data for 2009 
shows that katchi abadis are the home for 46.6 per cent of the urban population in 
Pakistan (World Bank, 2017). The lack of access to housing finance not only limits who 
can purchase property, it also creates shortages in the stock of affordable housing and 
leaves those without access to mainstream finance with no option other than the slum 
(World Bank, 2017).  
Inclusive finance in Pakistan is thus unsuited to resolve the problem of 
affordable housing and its emphasis has tended to be on enterprise and consumer 
lending: this is the standard approach for lending through inclusive finance. But this 
focus has been, and continues to be, troubled again by loan limits — which are too 
small to create firms that operate formally and seek economies of scale— and by high 
interest rates that can lead to worrying levels of indebtedness (Bateman and Chang, 
2012). These asymmetries reflect the uneven nature of wealth creation and capital 
accumulation when financial systems are segregated or bifurcated. 
 
 
3.7 SUMMARY 
The objective of this chapter has been to introduce a conceptual tool for the study of: (1) 
bifurcated banking and financial services, as highlighted in Chapter 1, and (2) the 
financialisation of development strategy, as explicated in Chapter 2. The conceptual tool 
of shadow financial citizenship describes the grey area in what is presented here as a 
continuum between financial exclusion and full financial citizenship. When inclusive 
finance is presented as a remedy to financial exclusion or to the circumstance of being 
_____________________________ 
84 Prior to 2017 the loan size limit was PKR 500,000 but this was amended  through the AC&MFD Circular No. 03 0f 2017 
85 The equivalent of less than USD 7000 based on average PKR-USD conversion rates in 2018, and even less in 2019 
because of sharp rupee devaluation.   
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‘unbanked’ or even ‘underserved’, shadow financial citizenship emerges because of 
exclusionary practices. This is so because these exclusionary practices that obstruct 
financial citizenship are embedded in the financial landscapes of poor countries. These 
practices arise from the shadow banking and inclusive finance nexus that is a focal point 
of this thesis. 
 The next section applies a shadow financial citizenship lens to banking in 
Pakistan to examine inclusive finance as shadow banking.  This is done by first 
presenting the institutional context for inclusive finance in Pakistan (Chapter 4), and 
then highlighting how the two explanations offered for shadow banking — the supply 
side (Chapter 5) and demand side (Chapter 6) view respectively — are relevant in the 
Pakistani context of inclusive finance, this discussion is followed by a comparative study 
of two microfinance banks in Pakistan to draw attention to how the specific practices 
and processes of institutions advance shadow financial citizenship.  
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4. BIFURCATED BANKING IN PAKISTAN: ORIGINS AND 
STRUCTURES  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, inclusive finance as shadow banking plays a 
causal role in advancing bifurcated banking. Inclusive finance, as contended earlier, has 
been entrapped by shadow banks and encumbered with shadow banking practices: so 
when used to counter financial exclusion or the circumstance of being ‘unbanked’ or 
‘underserved’, shadow financial citizenship emerges. This is so because the exclusionary 
practices that obstruct financial citizenship are embedded in the financial landscapes of 
poor countries. This claim may be reworded: the financial landscapes of poor countries 
are shaped by shadow banking networks and practices, in the form of inclusive finance, 
these drive exclusionary practices, and result in a bifurcated banking system.  The 
remainder of this thesis will, through the use of a case study examples, examine the 
setting in which these networks and practices establish themselves.  
The common objective of the Chapters 4 - 8 then is to empirically study this 
setting by identifying it within the financial topography of Pakistan and the institutions 
— national and international — that shape how inclusive finance is offered. The present 
chapter draws attention to the nature of commercialised inclusive finance in Pakistan. 
The next chapter, Chapter 5, highlights the features of bifurcated banking which are 
driven by shadow banking networks and practices, and characterise shadow financial 
citizenship. Chapter 6 draws linkages between these practices and the strategies of two 
large microfinance banks in Pakistan. Chapter 7 is a discussion on how shadow financial 
citizenship is shaped by recent development approaches that emphasise the need for 
both private capital and patient finance.  
The remainder of the present chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 contains 
an overview of Pakistan’s banking sector, particularly the role of financial deregulation, 
liberalisation, and privatisation in the current state of inclusive finance. Section 4.3 
describes the institutional architecture of commercialised inclusive finance in Pakistan. 
Section 4.4 offers concluding remarks.  
4.2 DUALISTIC FINANCE IN PAKISTAN 
An empirical setting for this discussion is the financial sector of Pakistan.  Bifurcated 
banking here — and also in other poor countries — is the outcome of a separation of 
mainstream and inclusive finance. The role of the regulators offers a context for 
examining two key trends that have occurred in Pakistan’s microfinance market. One of 
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these is the transition from informal finance to formal finance; another is the 
commercialisation of microfinance under the umbrella of a state backed financial 
inclusion programme. Nevertheless, even in a formal, commercial iteration, inclusive 
finance tends to be closer — both in terms of clientele and lending strategy — to 
informal finance than to formal finance. This is unsurprising given that the origins of 
financial inclusion are in the Grameen model which was designed with the explicit 
purpose of providing an alternative to existing systems of finance: formal and informal.  
‘Founded by Muhammad Yunus in 1983, the Grameen Bank pioneered a simple 
model of credit whereby small groups of poor women are able to secure small loans 
at reasonable rates of interest. The model is meant to serve as an alternative to 
both formal systems of banking that demand collateral and exclude the poor and 
informal systems of finance that prey on the poor’ (A. Roy, 2010: 3). 
The closeness of inclusive finance to informal finance is not coincidental: many of the 
issues associated with inclusive finance which are discussed in Chapter 1, are attributed 
to informality, which is itself associated with poverty. The following sections draw 
attention to how inclusive finance was — in the form of its antecedents — designed 
explicitly for those who live and work in the informal economy.  A crucial outcome of 
this formulation has been to reinforce the separation between formal and alternative 
forms of finance.  
Phases of development and colonial legacies 
The banking sector in Pakistan, which became independent from British colonial rule in 
1947, has passed through a number of distinct phases. A focus on informal finance and 
its perception as a ‘competitor’ to formal banking is relatively recent, and is an outcome 
of the microfinance movement that existed in the 1980s, but gained considerable 
traction when financial liberalisation commenced in Pakistan.  
T. Roy (2016) observes how the policymaker’s unease, in the late-colonial period, 
around informal finance and related local phenomena obliged them to conduct a large 
scale banking enquiry in 1929-30. However, following independence from British rule in 
1947, the state took steps to outlaw indigenous banking in India completely (T. Roy, 
2016). In Pakistan, simultaneously and newly independent, the situation appears to have 
been slightly different. Indian policymakers had managed to bring down the share of 
informal financiers — who tended to be professional moneylenders — in rural credit to 
less than 36 per cent, from 80 per cent over the 1951 and 1971 period (Binswanger and 
Khandker, 1992). For Pakistan, Manig (1996) shows that in 1972, 89 per cent of credit 
was drawn from informal sources, who were principally friends and family.  This 
divergence in informal credit use was in all likelihood, the outcome of multiple factors, 
including the shape of government policy.  
A comparative analysis is outside the scope of this chapter but it is likely that 
the rate at which interest tended to be charged for such informal transactions in South 
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Asian economies is of relevance. Manig (1996) noted that most informal credit in 
Pakistan — owing to Islamic practices combined with the embedding of credit relations 
in other economic and social interactions — was being offered without interest. This is 
corroborated by data which indicates that formal lenders charge an interest rate of 19 
per cent while informal lenders charge 23 per cent (Irfan et. al, 1996): it is telling that 
money lenders, which are included in the calculation for informal rates, drag up the 
average considerably as they charge interest ranging from 48 per cent to 120 per cent.  
Relatively low informal rates in Pakistan could explain why a supply-led approach, one 
in which the state actively promotes formal finance in order to replace informal finance, 
was more likely to be efficacious in India than in Pakistan.    
In Pakistan, the stance of the government is also reflected in its early 
involvement in key initiatives such as the OPP and AKRSP, which have pioneered the 
microfinance movement; respectively in the urban and rural context. The OPP (Orangi 
Pilot Project) and the AKRSP (Aga Khan Rural Support Programme) share 
commonalities with the original Grameen vision of Dr. Muhammad Yunus. This is so 
because of their mutual roots in the Comilla Model, associated with the Dhaka — and 
subsequently Karachi— based social scientist, Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan. Originally 
developed at the Bangladesh (formerly Pakistan) Academy of Rural Development, the 
Comilla Model sought to integrate several public and private resources to build an 
institutional base for various development programs.107  The OPP was thus initiated as a 
grassroots development project, emphasising ‘self-help’ as the primary means of 
developing the ‘katchi abadis’ — informal sector settlements — of urban Karachi (Zaidi, 
2001). Similarly, the AKRSP was established in 1982 by the Aga Khan Foundation with a 
specific geographical focus: development interventions in the Northern Areas of 
Pakistan (Khan, 2010). For both of these initiatives, microcredit was one component of 
the development interventions the organisation sought to deliver; other components 
included health, education, and sanitation.  Interestingly, the microcredit component 
was eventually absorbed by the financial sector, on the pretext of financial liberalisation.   
The regulation of liberalisation  
When colonial rule ceased in the Subcontinent, the Reserve Bank of India was the de 
facto central bank for both newly independent countries. The Pakistan banking industry 
felt disadvantaged by this arrangement so a separate central bank, the State Bank of 
Pakistan, was formed in 1948 (SBP, 2016). Shortly thereafter, in 1949, a publicly owned 
commercial bank, the National Bank of Pakistan, was formed as well. The State Bank of 
Pakistan Act was introduced in 1956 and the Banking Companies Ordinance in 1962. 
These would undergo amendments decades later to facilitate the liberalisation of the 
banking industry, following rounds of nationalisation in the 1970s and then privatisation 
in the 1990s (Burki and Ahmad, 2010).   
_____________________________ 
107 This followed the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation state in 1971.  
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Studies on Pakistani banking and finance tend to make a sharp distinction 
between the pre-1990s and post-1990s financial system given the upheaval associated 
with the IMF structural adjustment program that commenced in 1988 (Naqvi, 2018; 
Zaidi, 2015; Sayeed and Abbasi, 2015). Pre-1990s Pakistan had the financial system of a 
developmental state, in which nationalised financial institutions were directed to 
allocate credit to designated sectors (Naqvi, 2018). The Bank Nationalisation Act of 1974 
allowed the government to merge all domestic banks into five state owned commercial 
banks. Under this arrangement, the banking sector became instrumental to a state-led 
development policy based on channelling credit to specific economic sectors (Khalid 
and Nadeem, 2017; Burki and Ahmad, 2010).  Measures such as credit ceilings were used 
to impose separate credit limits for public sector and private sector enterprises. These 
limits were based on weights in the economy, their investments targets, and anticipated 
value-addition as projected in the Annual Development Plan. The state thus sought to 
direct banking activities towards broader socio-economic objectives and also to protect 
depositor funds. To this end, the central bank set annual targets for commercial banks, 
for production loans, tobacco marketing, and production and development loans for 
small farmers. There were also targets for fixed investments and loan refinancing for 
activities relating to locally manufactured machinery and agricultural.  
Such interventions caused banks to lose on efficiency grounds (Khalid and 
Nadeem, 2017). This is reflected in patterns of excessive bank funding of budgetary 
deficits; suboptimal governance structures in predominantly state owned banks; weak 
loan recovery because of political motivated lending; heavy financial sector taxation; 
and excessively high lending rates and low deposit rates. Nevertheless, private credit in 
relation to GDP ratio grew continually and investment growth was strong because of 
directed lending approaches.108  
Particularly over the 1980s, widespread corruption in staffing and loan 
disbursements led to the nationalised banks becoming bloated and inefficient with poor 
asset quality (Burki and Ahmad, 2010). Reports of this, combined with growing disdain 
in policy circles for interventionist state models, set the tone for market based 
approaches to financial development.109  
Financial liberalisation in Pakistan commenced in 1994 when the Bank 
Nationalisation Act was amended.110  A Privatisation Commission was also established in 
the same year. A number of domestic and foreign banks were given permission to 
operate and preparations were made for the government to divest ownership in the 
_____________________________ 
108 The direct lending approach used as part of interventionist strategies reflects a wider trend in the developing world 
including across the border, in India. Its appeal is linked to the successes of the East Asian economies, particularly South 
Korea, Japan, and Taiwan (Kohli, 1997). 
109 Kohli (1997: 2667) observes: ‘The clearest policy statement on the future of these programmes, which is to be found in 
the World Bank (1989), dismisses directed credit programmes as an ineffective policy measure for achieving growth and 
redistributive objectives. It argues instead for financial reform by moving towards a market-based allocation of resources so 
that investments with high rates of return are financed, leading to an increase in the average productivity of investment 
and rate of economic growth’. 
110 Zaidi (2015) notes that the Pakistani economy was radically transformed after 1988: he attributes this largely to the 
Structural Adjustment Programme that was implemented in the same year but also to geopolitical events such as the end 
of the Cold War.  
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nationalised banks. In 1997, backed by a USD 300 million World Bank loan, these 
institutions launched voluntary golden handshake schemes to eventually release 21,966 
employees over a 2 year period (Burki and Ahmad, 2010) Other important features of 
the reforms included the removal of interest rate ceilings and efforts to create a 
mechanism for determining a market rate of interest (Hanif, 2002) as well as the closure 
of over 2000 bank branches over a 6 year period (Burki and Ahmad, 2010).  The thrust of 
these reforms — a component of structural adjustment — was on what was 
characterised as a repressed financial system: the main criticisms of this were that 
excessive, inefficient, and corrupt lending practices were draining government finances 
and causing high percentages of non-performing loans (Naqvi, 2018).111 As a result of 
liberalization, numerous domestic and foreign banks began operations in Pakistan and 
the government divested ownership in publicly owned banks.  
Figure 5: Private sector credit off take as percentage of GDP since the 1960s 
 
Source: data.worldbank.org  
The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) became an independent central bank in 1994 and in 
subsequent years, through various parliamentary amendments, was given full authority 
to regulate the banking sector, conduct an autonomous monetary policy, and also to 
curtail government borrowing. 112  The SBP’s adoption of the Basel Accord may be seen 
as a corollary of the privatisation process (Butt, 2017) but also as a response to the risks 
from a mushrooming of small, privately owned banks in a newly liberal and open 
_____________________________ 
111 This terminology of financial repression is associated with the same work of McKinnon (1973) that is discussed earlier 
in this thesis. 
112 The concept and history of central bank independence, as an approach to enhance financial stability, is detailed in 
Walsh (2010).  
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financial sector (Abbas and Malik, 2008).113 Table 4.1 describes the implementation of 
Basel Accord regulations in Pakistan: in particular, the SBP’s emphasis on raising 
minimum capital requirements has shaped the financial landscape by compelling young 
banks to merge or to be acquired by foreign institutions.114  The adoption of Basel III — 
which responds to the deficiencies identified in financial regulations during the 2007-9 
global financial crises — is currently underway in Pakistan and introduces new 
regulatory requirements on liquidity and leverage. This additional stringency has raised 
concerns about access to financial services for those not currently within the 
mainstream banking network: tighter requirements for financial institutions to 
provision reserves constrain resources made available to groups outside the formal 
financial system (de Sousa, 2015).  
Table 4.1: Implementation of the Basel Accord in Pakistan 
 Overview Commentary 
Basel 
I 
Implemented by SBP in two stages: 1994 covered 
credit risk whereas a subsequent version in 1997 
included criteria for the calculation of risk 
weighted assets for market risk as well. 
Flurry of new private banks launches 
create need for effective and 
stringent regulatory environment to 
manage risk taking appetite of the 
banking sector.  
 
Basel 
II 
SBP raises minimum capital requirements for 
banks in 2005 in anticipation of Basel II. New 
guidelines focus on risk based capital (CAR) 
against credit, market and operational risks.  
Mergers and acquisitions occur to 
meet requirements of MCR and CAR 
which can be achieved either by fresh 
capital injection or retention of 
profits.  
 
Basel 
III 
SBP implements Basel III in phased manner 
staring from December 31, 2013 to December 
31, 2019 wherein CAR (capital at risk) + CCB 
(capital conservation buffer) requirements are to 
be increased from 10 per cent to 12.50 per cent 
in a gradual manner.  
 
Concerns about financial inclusion as 
updated framework specifically 
implies that such initiatives are 
threatened by the credit risk coming 
from small lenders.   
Sources: SBP (2017), Butt (2017)  
At present there are thirty commercial banks operating in Pakistan. The majority of 
these, twenty or so, are classified by the SBP as local private banks and this category 
includes a handful of Islamic banks. The other categories are foreign banks and publicly 
owned commercial banks: five institutions fall into each category respectively. The SBP 
also regulates the separate category of institution known as ‘specialized banks’ which 
perform variegated functions including industrial development, agricultural lending, 
_____________________________ 
113 A concise overview of the Basel framework, initially described as a ‘multinational accord to strengthen the stability of 
the international banking system and to remove a source of competitive inequality arising from differences in national 
capital requirements’ is available from the BIS:  https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm. Originally intended for advanced 
capitalist states and later extended to developing countries, the suitability of such an approach in the context of Pakistan, 
to manage banking stability is questioned by Butt (2017).   
114 This pattern reflects the groundwork for Basel II which was formally implemented in 2007 to overcome the issue of 
regulatory capital arbitrage having become common under Basel I. The role of securitisation was central to such practices 
and  noted as early as 1999 by the BIS: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp1.pdf  
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and small and medium enterprise lending. Microfinance banks are also a separate 
category regulated by the central bank: they are also not classified as commercial banks 
by the SBP. 
Commercial and mainstream banking in Pakistan 
Commercial banks dominate the banking sector. The largest five commercial banks are 
responsible for over 52 per cent of the industry’s bank assets, 52 per cent of deposits, 
and for 49 per cent of loans.115 The largest ten commercial banks are responsible for 75 
per cent of assets, 77 per cent of deposits, and for 73 per cent of loans. For CY18, total 
assets, loans, and deposits of the banking sector in 2018 stood at approximately PKR 20 
trillion, PKR 8 trillion, and PKR 14 trillion respectively, compared to PKR 10 trillion, PKR 
4 trillion, and PKR 8 trillion respectively in CY13. (SBP, 2018). 
Table 4.2: Breakdown of Pakistani commercial bank lending activities 
 
 PKR mn  per cent  
Corporate Sector 6,030,582 71% 
SMEs Sector 504,979 6% 
Agriculture Sector 324,291 4% 
Consumer sector  535,461 6% 
Commodity financing 863,976 10% 
Staff Loans 126,997 1% 
Others 138,522 2% 
Total 8,524,808 100% 
Source: SBP (2018) 
Table 4.3: Consumer lending breakdown 
 PKR mn per cent  
 Credit cards        40,917  8% 
 Auto loans      210,388  39% 
Consumer durable             866  0% 
Mortgage loans        94,937  18% 
Other personal loans      188,353  35% 
Source: SBP (2018) 
Table 4.4: Lending by Pakistani commercial banks: scope and scale 
 CY14 CY15 CY16 CY17 
Loan to deposit spread (basis points) 603 524 505 485 
Highest to lowest interbank rate spread (basis points) 350 165 55 70 
Advance to deposit ratio (per cent)  48.2 46.4 46.6 50.1 
Source: SBP (2018) 
_____________________________ 
115 This includes specialized banks and foreign banks but not microfinance banks.  
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The overwhelming focus of commercial bank lending is on the corporate sector. SME 
finance is mostly in the form of working capital loans and the data in Table 4.2 reflects 
the activities of less than 200,000 firms (SBP, 2018). The agricultural sector accounts for 
21 per cent of GDP and 60 per cent of total employment according to the SBP (2015), but 
as seen above, receives only 6 per cent of total lending.  The data shown below in Tables 
4.2 and 4.3 captures only about 40 per cent of total bank assets.116 SBP (2015) data shows 
that 122 per cent of bank credit is held in government securities and that as a result, 0.4 
per cent of bank borrowers receive 65 per cent of all bank loans.  
Aside from a heavy focus on corporate and government lending, other salient 
features of Pakistan’s banking sector include fairly tight regulation in light of the Basel 
Accords, and another is heavy government borrowing. Additionally, there are visible 
trends in the sector of growth and profitability even though spreads between lending 
and deposit rates are neither high nor low relative to other countries. World Bank data 
indicates that the average spread in 2017 for lower middle income countries is 6.1 per 
cent whereas for upper middle income countries it is 5.4 per cent (World Bank, 2018). 117 
Figure 6: Assets, Advances, and Deposits of the banking system (PKR million) 
 
Source: SBP (2018) 
_____________________________ 
116 Total bank assets amount to PKR 19.7 trillion and of this, advances amount to just under PKR 8 trillion.  
117 Pakistan falls into this lower middle income classification of the World Bank which includes a diverse group of countries 
including Bolivia, Egypt, India, Kenya, and Vietnam. The upper middle income countries classification also contains a diverse 
group of countries including China, Iran, and also Russia and other members of the former Soviet Union. 
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Figure 7: Private and government sector lending by banks (PKR million) 
 
Source: SBP (2018) 
 
Figure 8: Assets and liabilities (PKR million) 
 
Source: SBP (2018)  
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Source: SBP (2018) 
 
Figure 10: Number of bank branches (commercial vs. microfinance banks) 
 
Source: SBP (2018), PMN (2017) 
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Figure 11: Resident deposits (PKR million) 
 
Source: SBP (2018) 
Figure 12: Total deposits in banking system 
 
Source: SBP (2018) 
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Figure 13: Ratio of advances to deposits (per cent) 
 
 
Source: SBP (2018) 
4.3 COMMERCIALISING INCLUSIVE FINANCE 
The same environment of reform that resulted in a closely regulated commercial 
banking sector was also the setting in which microfinance was incorporated into the 
financial landscape. The earliest discussions on a possible role for microfinance in 
Pakistan’s development are reflected in the IMF backed PRSP papers of the 1990s: this is 
discussed in more depth in Chapter 7.  
The commercial banking sector became involved in microfinance during the 
late 1990s when the government of Pakistan, with a loan from the Asian Development 
Bank sought to provide regulated microfinance services by asking commercial banks to 
acquire stakes in a newly established microfinance institution. The Khushhali Bank 
Ordinance was passed in 2000 to support the creation of Khushhali Bank under the 
Asian Development Bank’s Microfinance Sector Development Program and also the 
Government of Pakistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (ADB, 2008). The Microfinance 
Institutions Ordinance 2001 and also prudential regulations for microfinance banks 
were subsequently introduced to address the incorporation, regulation and supervision 
of microfinance banks in Pakistan (ADB, 2008).  
Since then, teething issues aside, microfinance in Pakistan has strengthened its 
hold as a noticeable feature of banking in Pakistan.  At present, there are three 
categories of microfinance lenders: MFBs (microfinance banks), MFIs (microfinance 
institutions), and RSPs (rural support programmes), and two regulators.  The central 
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bank, the State Bank of Pakistan, is the regulator for one of these categories: 
microfinance banks/ MFBs. The Securities and Exchange Commission is the regulator 
for the other two categories: microfinance institutions/ MFIS, and rural support 
programmes/ RSPs. 
Mainstreaming inclusion 
MFBs are licensed and regulated by the SBP for the purpose of providing microfinance 
services. More specific details are available in the prudential regulations which describe 
‘microfinance services’ as ‘mobilizing deposits from the public and providing credit to 
poor persons and microenterprises’ (SBP, 2014).118 MFIs and RSPs are not permitted to 
take deposits. Since 2016, these non-deposit taking institutions are regulated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan or SECP, which is an autonomous 
body. The current mandate of the SECP includes the regulation of the corporate sector 
and capital market, as well as the supervision and regulation of insurance companies, 
non-banking financial companies, and private pension schemes. Additionally, it is 
responsible for overseeing various external service providers to the corporate and 
financial sectors, including chartered accountants, credit rating agencies, corporate 
secretaries, brokers, and surveyors. Noteworthy in this structure is that the dominant 
form of microfinance in Pakistan is of a commercial nature; most of it is offered by 
MFBs which are deposit taking institutions regulated by the central bank; and 
additionally, the nature of wholesale funding through apex funds emphasises 
sustainability even within the non-deposit taking institutions that operated on a non-
profit basis in the past.  
Table 4.5: Gross Loan Portfolio share by institution type 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Microfinance Banks 57% 60% 58% 61% 68% 70% 
Microfinance 
Institutions 
23% 22% 24% 23% 20% 20% 
Rural Support 
Programmes 
20% 18% 18% 16% 12% 11% 
 Source: Pakistan Microfinance Network (2017) 
Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 show the role of each type of institution in the domestic 
landscape for inclusive finance. The ascendancy of commercial microfinance may be 
heavily attributed to the support of the central bank and also of international, 
development focused, organisations. The backing of the central bank for the 
microfinance, and subsequently the financial inclusion movement has been unwavering 
_____________________________ 
118 The definition of a poor person is ‘an individual who has meagre means of subsistence but is involved in a livelihood 
activity and has an ability to repay debt from an annual income (net of business expenses) up to Rs. 500,000/’ (SBP, 2014; 
p4).  
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since the early 2000s, when the first licenses for MFBs were issued. In 2006, the SBP 
took measures to encourage commercial banks to offer microfinance services, which 
could otherwise be offered by microfinance banks operating under a separate legal and 
regulatory framework: at the time Pakistan was one of only a handful of countries to 
have special prudential regulations for microfinance (SBP, 2006).  
Table 4.6: Share of active borrowers by institution type 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Microfinance Banks 39% 40% 42% 39% 42% 46% 
Microfinance 
Institutions 
34% 35% 31% 38% 37% 36% 
Rural Support 
Programmes 
27% 25% 27% 23% 21% 18% 
 Source: Pakistan Microfinance Network (2017) 
In 2007-2008, the SBP enlisted the support of the UK Department for International 
Development, along with the Government of Pakistan to launch the FIP (Financial 
Inclusion Programme) to ‘provide equitable and efficient market-based financial 
services to the otherwise excluded poor and marginalized population including women 
and young people’ (SBP, 2008: 6).  Among the salient features of FIP were; one, a 
strategy that sought to engage the wider banking sector, particularly commercial banks, 
in enhancing access to financial services; and two, a planned shift from ‘reliance on 
subsidies to market based, sustainable and inclusive financial services’ through the use 
of commercial bank debt, syndication arrangements, and term finance certificates, as 
well government backed credit guarantee schemes (SBP, 2008).  
In addition, schemes such as PRISM or Programme for Increasing Sustainable 
Microfinance and grant-supported initiatives such as the Institutional Strengthening 
Fund and the Financial Innovation and Challenge Fund have also made the 
microfinance sector more open to private capital. This has been done particularly 
through large components of capacity building funds in such initiatives (PMN, 2008).  
The SBP Microfinance Credit Guarantee Facility (MCGF) has been particularly 
successful in this regard by channelling wholesale funds from the commercial banks to 
the microfinance sector (SBP, 2017a).  This facility operates through a risk sharing 
mechanism to provide wholesale funds — sourced from commercial banks — to 
microfinance banks and institutions. These funds are used for on-lending to the poor 
and marginalized groups. Amendments in the MCGF framework also allow 
microfinance providers to mobilise nonbank financing from capital markets, further 
diversifying sources of financing for micro borrowers. By providing partial risk cover for 
commercial bank financing of MFBs, the MCGF has also been used to facilitate access to 
capital markets for MFBs. This may be called in the event of default by the MFB.  The 
issuance in 2013 by Tameer Microfinance Bank, of commercial paper — in the form of 
term finance certificates amounting to PKR 1 billion — is attributed to this arrangement 
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under which the issuance is partially secured against the MCGF. The central bank notes 
that the guarantee scheme has successfully demonstrated the viability of microfinance 
for commercial lenders (SBP, 2017). It is noteworthy however, that the need for the 
MCGF appears to have been lessened by the recent launch of the PMIC investment 
company fund, which is discussed in the next section. 
Overseas asset managers began to take especial note of Pakistani microfinance 
in 2009 when the central bank allowed microfinance institutions to raise debt in four 
major foreign currencies: GBP, USD, EUR, and JPY (SBP, 2009). As a result, MFBs are 
able to receive direct funding — to finance their loan portfolios — from several 
difference types of organisations, including international financial institutions’, donor 
agencies, and microfinance investment vehicles. As per central bank stipulations, the 
disbursed foreign currency loan funds are to be immediately converted into PKR and 
credited to the borrowing entity’s PKR account maintained with an ‘authorized dealer’ 
or commercial bank. But as noted by the PMN (2009), because of limited hedging 
instruments and a volatile currency exchange rate, foreign currency loans are an 
expensive source of funds for on-lending.119  
An alternative impetus for overseas engagement with Pakistani microfinance 
has been the need for equity injections, as MFBs approach their capital limits. The 
central bank requires that MFBs maintain a 15 per cent capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 
compared to 8 per cent for commercial banks. The regulatory framework is structured 
to facilitate foreign investment to meet the growing equity needs of MFBs:  foreign 
equity investors are allowed to repatriate 100 per cent of profits, and may also hold a 100 
per cent equity stake (PMN, 2009).  
A comparison of the microfinance sector across two — non-consecutive — years 
shows how the macroeconomy has a key role in shaping funding strategies, especially 
for MFBs as they are deposit taking institutions. Data and analysis from the Pakistan 
Microfinance Network for 2010 indicates that tight monetary conditions, in which the 
interbank rate hovered around 13 per cent per annum, pushed microfinance banks to 
mobilise deposits: this was done in order to move away from other, more expensive 
sources of funding which were not viable in a high interest rate environment. (PMN, 
2010). In comparison, more recent evaluations show  that MFBs have over recent years 
come to rely more on deposits and less on other sources of funding such as commercial 
bank wholesale loans, and subordinated debt to meet their capital requirements: this 
may be attributed to a loose monetary policy environment in Pakistan (PMN, 2017).120  
Commercial funding models have created a co-dependence of traditional banks and 
microfinance banks which operates through the borrowing and deposit taking activities 
of both types of institutions. The liabilities side of microfinance bank balance sheets 
shows how these institutions borrow from commercial banks, and also accept their 
_____________________________ 
119 Over the five year period between May 2018 and May 2019 the USD has gained approximately 40 per cent relative to 
the PKR. 
120 The State Bank of Pakistan’s policy rate was at a historic low of 5.75% in 2017. Since then it has tightened considerably 
and was pushed up to 10.75% in the Monetary Policy Statement effective 1st April 2019.  
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deposits. The restriction on commercial banks in Pakistan on unsecured loans above 
PKR 5 million places constraints on this relationship and has limited the capacity of 
microfinance banks to borrow funds for on-lending from commercial banks (Akhuwat, 
2015; SBP, 2015a). Microfinance banks appear to have partially overcome this funding 
constraint by offering attractive deposit rates to individuals as well as institutions. For 
instance, the most recent annual report of Telenor Microfinance Bank (TMB) shows that 
of the PKR 3.7 million held in deposits, nearly one third is from institutional investors, 
that is, corporations, banks, and other financial institutions (TMB, 2017: 66). Table 3 
shows how high deposit rates also entail high lending rates.  For liquidity management, 
microfinance banks also place demand deposits in commercial banks, and also lend to 
commercial banks through reverse repo — with government treasury bills as collateral 
— and through call money operations.  
Table 4.7: Lending and deposit rate ranges  (based on weighted averages) 
   Microfinance Banks
121
 Commercial Banks 
Lending rates 20% -30% (APR) 7% to 22% (APR)  
Deposit rates  Up to 13% per annum Up to 7.27% per annum 
Compiled by author based on KPMG (2017), PMN (2017) and various microfinance company 
websites 
Figure 14: Funding microfinance (sectoral analysis)
Source: PMN (2017) 
_____________________________ 
121 There is limited transparency on MFB rates and these figures are based on estimates extrapolated from annual report 
data on cost of funds and net interest margins.  
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Figure 15: Assets, Advances, and Deposits of MFBs (PKR million) 
 
Source: SBP (2018) 
Figure 16: Sustainability ratios 
 
Source: PMN (2017) 
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Figure 17: Financial ratios  
 
Source: PMN (2017) 
The overall strategy to prioritise commercial sources of funding appears to have been 
fruitful based on the industry’s standard measures for sustainability: operational self-
sufficiency (OSS) and financial self-sufficiency (FSS). Here the OSS is used to reflect the 
sustainability of the microfinance sector based on profits reported by institutions but 
with no adjustment for implicit and/or explicit subsidies whereas the FSS captures the 
involvement of cheap credit as well as non-pecuniary subsidies such as rent, transport, 
training etc. (CGAP, 2002). Both measures in Pakistan have been consistently above one 
hundred percent since 2012, and have also been widening relative to each other since 
2014 (PMN, 2017). This widening captures the role, primarily, of cheap credit, indicating 
that despite success in commercialising microfinance, financial expenses for the sector 
are often based on rates below the market cost of funds. This observation is a basis for 
drawing the role of apex funds — and the World Bank — into this discussion. 
The role of the apex 
A crucial component of the microfinance funding landscape in Pakistan is the apex 
fund. This is a wholesale mechanism that channels funds, with or without supporting 
technical services, to retail microfinance institutions in a single country or integrated 
market (Levy, 2002). Apex funds may be seen as an example of the ‘blended finance’ 
strategies described earlier, in Chapter 2.122 Apex funds altered Pakistan’s microfinance 
_____________________________ 
122 These are 'financing mechanisms that link a grant element, provided by ODA, with loans from publicly-owned 
institutions or commercial lenders', representing a major shift which not only moves ODA from the public to the private 
sector but also replaces it with private finance (Bonizzi et al., 2015; Van Waeyenberge 2016). 
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landscape in 2000 when the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) commenced 
operations as autonomous not-for-profit company. This organisation had been in 
existence since 1997 but underwent regulatory changes following official approval in 
1999 for a 5 year World Bank project.  
‘The World Bank funded Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund Project was designed to 
reduce poverty and empower the rural and urban poor in Pakistan. The project 
provides access to much-needed microcredit loans and grants for infrastructure 
and capacity building. As such, the PPAF project aims to help the rural poor in 
Pakistan get out of a cycle of misery, and get into a virtuous cycle of opportunities’ 
(World Bank, 2005).   
The total project cost was USD 107 million: the Government of Pakistan committed to 
USD 10 million as equity and a World Bank credit of USD 90 million was to be provided 
through the International Development Association, the Bank's concessionary lending 
arm, as a single-currency loan repayable in 35 years with a 10-year grace period. The 
remainder was to be in the form of community contributions. This project came to be 
known as PPAF 1 concluded in 2005. It was followed by PPAF 2 which began in 2006 and 
concluded in 2011, and PPAF 3 began in 2009 and concluded in 2016: the respective 
tranches for these programmes from the World Bank were USD 238 million and 250 
million.123 
Related to the PPAF programme is the PRSP or Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers. These documents are a part of the IMF’s late 1990s strategy to target poverty 
reduction through more participatory approaches which required countries to prepare 
regular reports — updated every three years or so — in collaboration with various 
stakeholders and partners, including the World Bank and IMF (IMF, 2004). The 
Government of Pakistan released an initial or ‘I-PRSP’ in late 2000 and a full PRSP in 
2003 (IMF, 2004). The World Bank sponsored Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund was 
established in the year 2000 as a special purpose vehicle designed to channel funding to 
broad based programs in community physical infrastructure and capacity building 
interventions, as well as microfinance: as such it came to function as the country’s apex 
fund or what CGAP (2002) describes as ‘a second-tier or wholesale organization that 
channels funding (grants, loans, guarantees) to multiple microfinance institution (MFIs) 
in single country or region’. Eventually, as microfinance and financial inclusion became 
increasingly embedded in the strategies of the central bank of the Ministry of Finance 
(NFIS, 2015), the microfinance lending portfolio of the PPAF was shifted to a newly 
established private sector investment company: the Pakistan Microfinance Investment 
Company or PMIC. 
_____________________________ 
123 Specific details of the implementation and results of the various PPAF funded projects are available from the World 
Bank (2018a).   
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Table 4.8: Typology of debt and equity funders for inclusive finance 
  Subtype Further  
subtype 
Definition Example in Pakistan 
Development 
Finance 
Institution/ 
International 
Financial 
Institution  
Bilateral None Owned by a government 
to raise private capital to 
finance projects with 
development objectives.  
 
KfW (Germany), CDC 
Group (United 
Kingdom), 
PROPARCO (France).  
Multilateral None Owned by two or more 
governments to finance 
development projects 
through private capital. 
 
IFC (International 
Finance 
Corporation),  ADB 
(Asian Development 
Bank) 
Government Development 
Programme 
None Government or other 
public program with 
development objectives. 
 
Prime Minister's 
Interest Free Loans 
Scheme  (Pakistan) 
Government 
Agency 
None Administration, 
departments, or 
agencies of any 
sovereign entity 
Luxembourg Ministry 
of Foreign and 
European Affairs 
(Luxembourg) 
 
Multi /Bilateral 
Development 
Agency 
None Bilateral or multilateral 
aid agencies, owned by 
governments 
JICA (Japan), DFID 
(United Kingdom) 
Regulator None Domestic central banks State Bank of 
Pakistan 
 
Financial 
Institution 
Commercial Bank None Bank or other regulated 
financial institution 
where private entities 
are majority 
shareholders 
 
United Bank Limited, 
HBL 
Public Bank None Bank or other regulated 
financial institution 
where the government is 
a majority shareholder. 
 
National Bank of 
Pakistan, Bank of 
Punjab 
Microfinance 
Investment 
Intermediary 
(MII) 
Holding 
company 
 Provide financing and 
technical assistance to 
MFIs.  
FINCA, AKAM 
MIV Microfinance Investment 
Companies are 
independent investment 
entities open to multiple 
investors.  
 
Triple Jump 
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Other MII Various investment 
entities with a large 
microfinance component 
to investment strategy.  
 
ResponsAbility, 
Triodos, Acumen 
Other Private 
Corporation 
None Registered legal entities 
except government and 
financial institutions. 
Often tech companies 
seeking synergies. 
 
VEON 
Individual None A person or persons United International 
Group (Pvt) Ltd. 
Foundation None Non-profit corporation 
or other non-profit 
entity 
Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, Aga 
Khan Foundation 
NGO None Nongovernmental 
organization 
 
National Rural 
Support Programme 
Adapted from Sapundzhieva (2011) 
The start of the Pakistan Microfinance Investment (PMIC) in 2016 may be seen as a 
major advance in the commercialisation — and globalisation — of microfinance 
funding. This launched an entity for the sole purpose of providing wholesale funding for 
microfinance by allowing PPAF to spin off its microfinance operation and establishing a 
new company in partnership with the Karandaaz Foundation, and KfW. The Karandaaz 
Foundation is a non-profit organisation backed by DFID and the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, whereas KfW, based in Frankfurt — originally Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau — is a German government-owned development bank. The objective of 
PMIC is to attract funding from ‘development agencies, financiers, commercial banks 
and capital markets’ using a commercial — profit focused — structure (PMIC, 2017).   
The PMIC is equipped to offer financial instruments and products to tend  to 
the specific needs of deposit taking as well as non deposit taking institutions offering 
inclusive finance. These products include syndicated loans, Tier II financing, capital 
market instruments, securitization, transactional advisory services and complementary 
products /services such as partial or first loss credit guarantees, etc. that may be 
bundled with other investment banking products (PMN, 2017). The PMIC has thus 
opened a sizeable channel connecting the domestic microfinance industry to global 
fund managers.   
Despite being a private sector investment company, the PMIC plays a central 
role in official government policy for financial inclusion. This is evident from the 
emphasis on micro, small, and medium enterprise lending in the National Financial 
Inclusion Strategy which was launched in 2015 and which explicitly mentions the 
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creation of PMIC for the objective of enhancing commercial funding for both, MFBs/ 
MFIs. The emphasis placed on commercial funding has allowed financial inclusion 
policies in Pakistan to align neatly with the wider transformation in financing 
development, which is discussed earlier in this thesis, and also later in Chapter 7. 
Two models of banking in Pakistan 
The establishment of the PMIC thus draws on the apex structure that preceded it, and 
has created an infrastructure for two distinct models of banking.  One of these is used 
by mainstream or commercial banks in which client deposits are used to create loans for 
the private as well as public sector. The other model is used by deposit taking 
microfinance banks which use not only client deposits but also funding from financial 
institutions — which may be either public or privately owned but are nevertheless 
market based —to create loans.  
Figure 18: Interest earned for MFBs (per cent) 
 
Source: SBP (2018) 
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Figure 19: Interest earned for mainstream banks (per cent) 
 
Source: SBP (2018) 
In theory, under such an arrangement, microfinance banks could rely exclusively on 
funding from institutions such as mainstream banks and wholesale funds to fund their 
lending portfolios. Similarly, mainstream banks could rely exclusively on deposits to 
fund their lending portfolios. But in practice, this does not occur so neatly. This reality 
is demonstrated through the respective interest earning and expense patterns of 
mainstream and microfinance banks.  
As shown in Figure 18, for MFBs the main source of interest earnings are from 
loans: in recent years, particularly between 2015 and 2017, this has ranged from 89 per 
cent to 91 per cent of total interest earnings. Interest is also earned, for MFBs, from 
investments in the form of government securities which are held not only to earn 
interest but also to meet regulatory capital requirements. A relatively small amount for 
interest is also earned from the deposits placed by MFBs at other banks and financial 
institutions which are often used to meet statutory liquidity requirements. Here it is 
worth mentioning that interest earnings represent approximately 83 per cent of total 
income for MFBs.  
Earnings from fees and other incomes are responsible for the remainder of 
revenues. For mainstream banks, as shown in Figure 19, the main source of interest 
earnings is not always lending. Recent patterns show that the key driver of revenues is 
often investments. This is symptomatic of the dependence of the Pakistani state on 
budgetary support from the banking system. To meet fiscal revenue shortfalls, the 
Pakistani state regularly borrows from financial institutions. This is done through the 
issuance by the Government of Pakistan of two types of interest earning instruments: 
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market treasury bills or MTBs for short term borrowing, and Pakistan Investment Bonds 
or PIBs for longer term borrowing.  Financial institutions may buy or sell these 
instruments in the secondary market or during regular auctions conducted by the 
central bank.124 Another source of earnings from interest is from deposits and repo 
operations. Deposits are placed with other financial institutions, as is the case for MFBs, 
to count towards statutory liquidity requirements.  Interest earnings from repo or 
repurchase agreements are earned when banks trade government issued securities to 
manage their liquidity needs on a day to day basis. 125 The role of government securities 
and borrowing in the Pakistani banking sector is discussed in a shadow banking context 
in the next chapter, given how mainstream banks often invest in such instruments 
rather than lend to the private sector.  
Figure 20: Interest expensed for MFBs (per cent) 
 
Source: SBP (2018) 
_____________________________ 
124 Investors also have the option to participate in a ‘non competitive bid process’. See 
https://www.sbp.org.pk/dmmd/Guidelines/MTB.pdf 
125 Repurchase/ Repo is a repurchase agreement is the sale of a security with a commitment by the seller to buy the 
security back from the purchaser at a specified price at a designated future date. Basically a repurchase agreement is a 
collateralised loan, where the collateral is a security. Reverse Repurchase/ Reverse Repo or Reverse Repurchase is an 
agreement for the purchase and resale of a security at a specific price and a specific future date. It is the mirror image of a 
Repo transaction. Provider of funds does Reverse Repo transaction. See https://www.sbp.org.pk/DFMD/FM-intro.asp  
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Figure 21: Interest expensed for mainstream banks (per cent) 
 
Source: SBP (2018) 
For MFBs the main source of interest expense is deposits, as shown in Figure 20. Here it 
is worth noting that MFBs, relative to mainstream banks, tend to give clients a much 
higher return on deposits in order to generate funds for on-lending. This practice of 
offering expensive deposit accounts is discussed in the context of two specific MFBs in 
Chapter 6. Recent patterns demonstrate how MFBs have emphasised deposits over 
borrowing — from apex or investment institutions — as a source of funding. This may 
be attributed, as shown in Figure 22, to weakness and anticipated volatility in the 
Pakistani rupee relative to the US dollar which makes the domestic microfinance 
industry less appealing for overseas investors. A relatively small share of interest 
expense is also spent on other costs related to borrowing such as advisory and 
processing fees.  
For mainstream banks, as shown in Figure 21, the main source of interest 
expense is also deposits. The next largest source of interest expense is repo activities, 
and the category of ‘borrowings’ shown in the figure reflects repo activities in which 
securities offered remain on the asset side of the balance sheet while an equivalent 
amount is placed on the liabilities side.126  Borrowings also capture interest expenses 
_____________________________ 
126 Based on the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) as are notified under the Companies Act, 2017, in Pakistan the securities sold subject to repurchase agreements 
('repos') remain on the balance sheet; the counterparty liability is included in borrowings from financial institutions. 
Securities purchased under agreements to resell ('reverse repos') are recorded as lendings to financial institutions. The 
difference between sale and repurchase price is treated as interest / mark-up / return and accrued over the life of the 
underlying agreement using the effective interest method. 
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from subordinated loans. ‘Others’ captures expenses related to various other banking 
activities, including foreign currency and export refinancing.  
Figure 22: Pakistani rupees (PKR) per US dollar (USD) 
 
Source: http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca 
Calculations of return on assets and return on equity highlight the profitability 
implications of these differing models. 127  Return on assets or RoA reflects how efficient 
a financial institution is at managing its assets by using liabilities and equity to generate 
profits. Return on Equity or RoE reflects how efficient a financial institution is at using 
assets to generate profits.128 These measures are most practical when used to make 
‘apples to apples’ comparisons between similar institutions and are thus a crude way to 
compare the overall profitability of the two banking models discussed here. 
Nevertheless, they offer useful insights on the role of leverage in contemporary 
Pakistani banking.  
Based on RoA, mainstream banks are relatively more profitable than MFBs. 
Additionally, as Figure 23 indicates: trends in growth and decline have been similar for 
both types of institution. Lower RoA ratios for MFBs may be attributed here to weak 
portfolio quality in the case of MFBs: for mainstream banks between 2013 and 2017, net 
NPLs as a percentage of net advances range from 3.4 per cent to 1.2 per cent, with 
marked improvement in recent years (SBP, 2018). For MFBs the corresponding range is 
0.1 per cent to negative 0.4 per cent, with overall declining in recent years (SBP, 2018).  
_____________________________ 
127 RoA is calculated by dividing a company’s net income by total assets and RoE is calculated by dividing net income by 
shareholder’s equity. See www.investopedia.com 
128 Santos and Pennacchi (2018) discuss the benefits and disadvantages of measuring performance through RoE and also 
observe how banks have come to use RoE more frequently since the 1970s as the banking industry faced increasing 
competition from nonbank financial institutions, such as money market mutual funds .  
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Figure 23: RoA compared for mainstream vs. MFBs 
 
Source: SBP (2018), PMN (2017) 
Figure 24: RoE compared for mainstream vs. MFBs 
 
Source: SBP (2018), PMN (2017) 
A comparison of RoE tells a slightly different story, as shown in Figure 24. A higher RoE 
for MFBs relative to mainstream banks might be taken here as a commentary on deposit 
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taking activities. RoE appears to decrease for MFBs as they enlarge their deposit bases 
and increase for mainstream banks as they reduce their deposit bases.129  
Some key observations may be made based on the above.  One of these is that 
deposits are a core part of the operating models of both types of bank. For mainstream 
banks, these deposits drive profitability through investments in government paper, 
whereas for MFBs these deposits are used to create loans. Related to this is another 
observation: that MFBs are more inclined to lend to the private sector whereas 
mainstream banks are more inclined to lend to the public sector in the form of fixed 
income investments.  
4.4 SUMMARY 
Pakistan’s financial system is an example of bifurcated banking partially because of the 
linkages between informal finance and inclusive finance. These have their origins in the 
colonial period, but the separation has been retained even after the implementation of 
banking sector reforms to privatise, deregulate, and liberalise financial institutions. A 
commercially oriented microfinance sector is a component of these reforms. While the 
commercial model is equipped to function with a combination of deposits and 
wholesale funding from commercial banks, it has the scope to utilise funding from other 
sources as well. This approach has its roots in the apex fund model designed by the 
World Bank. Apex funds — as the example of Pakistan shows — came to be the gateway 
for shadow banks to absorb inclusive finance.  
The apex fund model thus provided the infrastructure for wholesale borrowing 
to become a core facet of the microfinance banking model. However, as shown above, 
microfinance banks continue to emphasise deposits as a source of funding for on-
lending. As such they use an approach that is similar to that used by the mainstream 
banking sector, which instead of using a model of intermediation in which deposits 
create loans, opts instead to generate interest income from government paper instead of 
private sector credit.  This fixation of mainstream banks with investments instead of 
loans is revealed in low private sector credit offtake numbers. Inclusive finance may 
thus be seen as a response to the reluctance of mainstream banks to lend to the private 
sector. It thus provides a gateway for global shadow banking networks to meet 
shortages created by mainstream bank behaviour.  
Inclusive finance as shadow banking is the driving force behind bifurcated 
banking. While the notion that inclusive finance is different from mainstream finance is 
not a novel one, it is centred overwhelmingly on how microcredit is expensive in 
relation to loans made by mainstream commercial banks. Such comparisons are 
premised upon inclusive finance as a lending product and highlight how relative 
inequities in pricing and rates characterise inclusive finance. Rates and pricing are 
_____________________________ 
129 An alternative inference could be that both types of institution improve their RoE as they increase borrowing, and vice 
versa, with shifts linked to changing MCR imposed by the regulator.  
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discussed in more depth in Chapter 8, which examines the costs of mobile money and 
payment services. But before that, Chapter 6 shows how inclusive finance as shadow 
banking extends beyond credit, particularly given its technological dimensions, and also 
its predilection for financial innovation. Technology is used primarily to extract value 
from digital footprints, whereas financial innovation is used to extract yield from debt. 
These practices cause inequities in privacy and surveillance, and inequities in eligibility 
and requirements respectively.  
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5. BIFURCATED BANKING: GAPS AND RESPONSES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter highlights the various factors behind the ascendancy of a 
commercialised model of inclusive finance in Pakistan. This is shown to exist in parallel 
with a closely regulated commercial banking sector. The bifurcated nature of Pakistan’s 
banking system, examined here through a framework of shadow financial citizenship, is 
revealed in the synchronised existence of separate banking systems.  
There are two components to this discussion of shadow financial citizenship; 
one is the process whereby inclusive finance becomes shadow finance; another is the 
nature of financial citizenship offered by such shadow financial institutions.  The case of 
Pakistan demonstrates how shadow banking practices shape inclusive finance because 
of the disinclination of mainstream banks to lend to private enterprises that are not 
large corporate firms. This reticence has underlying causes and has created a need for 
alternative arrangements to meet the borrowing needs of the public. The resulting 
system is bifurcated and the alternative arrangements cannot offer full financial 
citizenship.   
This study has, up until now, been centred on these alternative arrangements as 
they pertain to credit, loans, and borrowers. The current chapter expands on this 
discussion by observing how digital technology has become a core part of inclusive 
finance in Pakistan. This is reflected in the emphasis placed on strategies such as 
branchless banking and mobile money in the NFIS or National Financial Inclusion 
Strategy, which was prepared by the central bank in collaboration with other 
stakeholders. These strategies may be considered in the light of structural, 
macroeconomic, and other factors which demonstrate the capacity of inclusive finance 
to respond to constraints arising from the administration of the Basel Accord, FATF 
guidance, and practices of budgetary financing in Pakistan. Given this context, inclusive 
finance may be likened to shadow banking because it facilitates regulatory arbitrage and 
avoidance. Regulation here overlaps with structural and macroeconomic constraints, as 
well as the rules associated with FATF Guidance and the Basel Accord.    
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 studies the NFIS 
or National Financial Inclusion Strategy of 2015 which is presented in a document 
collaboratively prepared by the central bank, the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
and the Ministry of Finance. The NFIS is centred on a set of approaches to improve 
financial access for those in Pakistan who are currently ‘unbanked’ or ‘underserved’: 
these are identified and critiqued for their role in shadow financial citizenship.  Section 
5.3 examines the structural and macroeconomic factors that constrain private sector 
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lending and thus create the need for inclusive finance. Section 5.4 offers a framework to 
identify the nature of shadow financial citizenship in Pakistan. Section 5.5 offers 
concluding remarks.    
5.2 FINANCIALISED DEVELOPMENT AND THE REGULATION OF 
MICROFINANCE 
The NFIS or National Financial Inclusion Strategy 2015 document is the cornerstone for 
a number of policies that seek to advance financial inclusion by creating, facilitating, 
and reforming institutions.  Backed and circulated by the Ministry of Finance, the State 
Bank of Pakistan, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, this initiative presents 
a vision for financial inclusion in Pakistan so that ‘individuals and firms can access and 
use a range of quality payments, savings, credit and insurance services which meet their 
needs with dignity and fairness’ (NFIS, 2015: viii). By incorporating financial inclusion 
into official government policy, Pakistan has taken an approach that was concurrently 
adopted by several other national governments: 
‘Dozens of national governments have adopted policies to expand financial 
inclusion. These and other global and national efforts are paying off. New Global 
Findex data reveal that globally the share of adults owning an account is now 69 
percent, an increase of seven percentage points since 2014. These numbers 
translate into 515 million adults who have gained access to financial tools. The 2017 
figures on overall account ownership continue the upward trajectory we’ve seen 
since the Global Findex database was first released—with financial inclusion rising 
18 percentage points since 2011, when account ownership was 51 percent’ (Findex, 
2017: v). 
This upward trajectory has much to do with the rise of digital financial services and 
increased efforts to biometrically document large segments of the unbanked. The most 
recent Global Findex report also points to areas where the need for more concentrated 
efforts is recognisable.  
‘Still, in most of the world women continue to lag well behind men. Globally, 65 
percent of women have an account compared with 72 percent of men, a gap of 
seven percentage points that is all but unchanged since 2011. Nor has equality in 
account ownership been achieved in other regards. The gap between rich and poor 
has not improved since 2014: account ownership is 13 percentage points higher 
among adults living in the wealthiest 60 percent of households within economies 
than among those in the poorest 40 percent. And urban populations continue to 
benefit from far broader access to finance than rural communities. In China 
around 200 million rural adults remain outside the formal financial system’ 
(Findex, 2017: vi). 
In broad terms, the approaches taken in Pakistan are centred on three themes: (1) 
enhanced access through technological and digital solutions, (2) more efficient savings 
and lending products through commercialisation, (3) more secure and stable 
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transactions through the SBP’s regulatory oversight along the lines of FATF regulations, 
and also the Basel Accord for mainstream banks.  
The NFIS document thus notes that despite the presence of a sound and 
profitable banking sector and various — innovative and popular — initiatives, financial 
inclusion in Pakistan remains low. Just over 10 per cent of adults have a bank account, 
about 56 per cent of adults do not use any financial products, only 4 per cent or so of 
adults save with a formal financial institution, and only 3 per cent borrow from a formal 
financial institution (NFIS, 2015). While there is now rich data available from the Global 
Findex Database, the overall picture for Pakistan may be summarised thus: the 
financially included are ‘overwhelmingly male’ and ‘predominantly urban’ (NFIS, 
2015). The weak state of financial inclusion is described in the NFIS as a part of a 
broader pattern in which credit to the private sector has been declining recently:  
‘While the total assets and deposits of Pakistan’s banking sector have doubled 
since 2008, private sector credit to GDP has declined from 22per cent in 2009 to 
just 14.7per cent in June 2014. The decline in credit provided to SMEs has been 
particularly pronounced, falling from 16per cent of bank lending in 2008 to just 
7per cent in June 2014’ (NFIS, 2015: vi).  
 These patterns are attributed to economic and structural factors including 
macroeconomic weakness from the 2007-9 global financial crises which resulted in 
deteriorating asset quality and a resultant ‘flight to quality’. Additionally, sharp rises in 
public debt are reflected in the expansion of government securities holdings which 
provide banks with attractive yields at low risk: so even though bank deposit bases 
have continued to grow during this period, private credit has declined as a share 
of total bank lending (NFIS, 2015).  Other factors which help explain slow bank lending 
include the restrictions faced by enterprises because of energy shortages and security 
concerns, gender barriers which exclude women from the formal financial system, and 
growing informality in the economy with some calculations showing that the informal 
economy could be the size of 75 per cent to 91 per cent of the formal economy (NFIS, 
2015).   
The responses to these issues are highlighted in the NFIS and emphasise 
solutions that capture the structural and macroeconomic nature of constraints to 
financial inclusion. But in such policies, a discussion of how these constraints may be 
overcome is largely absent. Rather than attempt to widen access to mainstream 
banking, the approach of the NFIS is to present inclusive finance as an alternative 
approach. As such, it gives tacit support to a system of bifurcated banking.   
Universal but digital  
For instance, the NFIS notes that universal access to formal accounts need not be 
limited to traditional savings and transaction accounts but also include digital 
transactional accounts (DTAs), primarily branchless banking accounts, for which 
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Pakistan is globally, at present,  the fastest growing market (SBP, 2015a). The 
introduction, in 2008, of the Branchless Banking Regulation catalysed the expansion of 
financial services available through mobile phone networks. Nearly 80 per cent of 
Pakistanis aged 15 and over have access to a mobile phone (Rashid, 2015).  
The focus on digitisation may be seen in the light of wider, international trends 
exerted by multilateral institutions working with finance in the Global South. Three 
organisations are of particular relevance: the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), the 
Better Than Cash Alliance (BTCA), and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The 
influence of these institutions ensures that the nature of financial transformation in 
Pakistan is circumscribed within the directives that they issue. The NFIS exemplifies 
this tendency.    
Much of the NFIS is influenced by the Alliance for Financial Inclusion which 
was founded in 2008 as a project of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and is also 
supported by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid). The AFI 
bases its practices on a ‘South-South peer learning approach and truly member-driven 
governance (AFI, 2017). The Maya Declaration is arguably the AFI’s most widely known 
initiative.   
‘When a country commits to the Maya Declaration, they make measurable 
commitments in four financial inclusion areas: create an enabling environment to 
harness new technology that increases access and lowers costs of financial services; 
implement a proportional framework that advances synergies in financial 
inclusion, integrity, and stability; integrate consumer protection and 
empowerment as a key pillar of financial inclusion; utilize data for informed 
policymaking and tracking results’ (Center for Financial Inclusion, 2013: 2).   
Launched in 2011 at the Global Policy Forum (GPF) in Riviera Maya, Mexico, it is 
known as the first global and measurable set of commitments to financial inclusion 
(AFI, 2011 ), and counts over 80 countries, including the SBP among its signatories.   
Also emphasised in the NFIS is G2P or government to person transactions: this 
reveals the influence of The Better Than Cash Alliance (BTCA) which was launched 
in 2012 and is jointly funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Citi Foundation, 
MasterCard, Omidyar Network, United States Agency for International Development, 
and Visa Inc. Housed within the United Nations Capital Development Fund, the 
overriding objective of this organisation is to shift from cash to digital payments: 
ostensibly, this is a tool to promote financial inclusion and reduce poverty.  
‘The harsh reality is that the only way to make or receive payments for many poor 
people across the world is by using paper money in the informal sector - which is a 
barrier to the use of formal financial services. Cash-based transactions are also 
typically unsafe, expensive, inconvenient, inefficient, and lack transparency for 
governments, companies, and citizens alike’ (Better Than Cash Alliance, 2017: 1).  
One focal point here is the issue of corruption; another is the perception that G2P 
arrangements allow for the attainment of scale through bulk payments (NFIS, 2015) and 
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may thus function as an ‘on-ramp to financial inclusion’ (Stuart, 2015). Pakistan’s 
membership of the BTCA makes in eligible for technical assistance and funding to 
support the transition from cash to digital for G2P payments.   
Financial intrusion and the regulation of security  
Issues of terror funding and money laundering are of particular relevance in a Global 
South context, a point noted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which was 
established in 1989 as a Paris based, intergovernmental policy making body, that ‘works 
to identify national-level vulnerabilities with the aim of protecting the international 
financial system from misuse’ (FATF, 2018). FATF’s incursion into the inclusive finance 
movement began in 2011, when the organisation issued a guidance paper to ensure that 
countries ‘meet the national goal of financial inclusion, without compromising the 
measures that exist for the purpose of combating crime’: this paper was updated in 2013 
and subsequently in 2017 (FATF, 2018). Central to FATFs position is the notion of ‘a 
proportionate approach to risk’: this mirrors the principles adopted by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) and the World Bank (Aron, 2017).   
‘Clients have access to a range of different account functionalities depending on 
the extent of identification/verification conducted by the financial institution. 
Strict pre-set thresholds are defined for the various account levels. Access to the 
basic, 1st level set of services is provided upon minimum identification. Access to 
the subsequent account levels and additional services (e.g. higher transaction 
limits or account balances, diversified access and delivery channels) is allowed only 
if/when the customer provides the required additional identification/verification 
information. In the meantime, the accounts have limited services (e.g. caps on 
daily/monthly withdrawals, deposit limits based on the level of CDD conducted 
and the customer’s risk profile)’ (FATF, 2017: 7).  
This is reflected in the policy of the SBP on branchless banking (BB). BB accounts are 
categorised by three levels with level 0 and level 1 BB accounts for individuals and level 2 
accounts for individuals as well as firms, entities, trusts, not-for-profit organizations, 
corporations etc. Know-your-customer (KYC) requirements, and daily and monthly 
transaction limits vary depending on account type (SBP, 2015a).    
A core feature of the inclusive finance via branchless banking approach in 
Pakistan is the role of biometric technology. The National Database and Registration 
Authority (NADRA) of Pakistan is recognised as a global leader in the ‘application of 
identification systems and technology to a range of development issues’ (Gelb, cited in 
Malik, 2014). The main objective of this institution, since its inception in 2000, is to 
issue computerised national identity cards, or CNICs, with a unique thirteen digit 
number to Pakistanis aged 18 and over.  The CNIC is a requirement for conducting 
transactions of various types with the government as well as the private sector. For 
instance; voting in elections; applying for a passport or driving license; purchasing 
vehicles, land, and other assets; purchasing a plane or train ticket; obtaining a mobile 
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phone SIM card; opening and maintaining a bank account; and conducting financial 
transactions.   
Following an anti-terror drive in early 2015, the Pakistan Telecommunication 
Authority proceeded to block all mobile phone SIMs that had not been biometrically 
verified (Craig and Hussain, 2015). As a result, every mobile phone number in Pakistan 
is now associated not only with a CNIC number but also with a set of fingerprints. This 
has facilitated Pakistan’s commitment to FATF standards as biometric verification eases 
customer due diligence (CDD) requirements. It is estimated that as much as 98 per cent 
of Pakistan’s adult population is registered with NADRA (Malik, 2014).   
‘The standard of verification used to link a user with their SIM card – biometric 
data – is one of the highest standards of identity verification available and offers a 
more robust solution to meet KYC obligations that mitigate integrity risks. It 
surpasses the current standard used for entry level (Level 0 and Level 1) branchless 
banking account opening in Pakistan, whereby a CNIC number and photograph is 
verified against the NADRA database. To date, entry-level accounts have balance 
and transaction limits to create a product with a lower risk profile and thus allow 
for these simplified KYC requirements, commensurate with the level of risk’ 
(GSMA, 2015: 6). 
The centrality of NADRA and its biometric database to everyday life in Pakistan is at the 
core of DTA or digital transactional accounts as a financial inclusion strategy.130 
The DTA strategy has been formulated given the presence of a robust national 
infrastructure which includes a regulatory framework, widespread mobile phone 
ownership, and an extensive official biometric databank. There are two drivers behind 
the DTA strategy. One of these is distribution. The existing infrastructure facilitates an 
expansion of DTAs by addressing the issue of national distribution through the 
proximity and interconnectivity of ATM and POS machines linked to mobile phone 
networks. Account opening procedures in such an arrangement are eased by relatively 
lighter regulatory requirements on KYC procedures using biometric technology. At 
present, the branchless banking network is thin, particularly in rural areas, but the SBP 
observes that this problem may be overcome through the participation of third party 
service providers (SBP, 2015a).   
Third party involvement relates to the other driver of the DTA strategy here. 
Within the approach described above, recruiting more third party service providers is 
purely an operational matter. Extension of the agent network is dependent on the 
capability to select, recruit, train, and supervise agents, and to establish alliances with 
existing retail networks to manage the logistical demands of cash availability and 
interconnectivity. But this approach does not acknowledge the intrinsic value of data 
_____________________________ 
130 The role of NADRA, a state owned entity, in the NFIS,  may be likened to what Kaminska (2015, cited in Gabor and 
Brooks, 2017: 433) describes as a new arrangement between the state and financial capital : ‘In this case, the role of the 
state is recast to provide ‘an enabling environment’ for financial capital to flow freely, while allowing the consequences of 
systemic risks to be transferred to consumers precariously positioned at the ‘bankable frontier’, while their “digital 
footprints” are captured and quantified as evidence of potential income streams against which securitised loans can be 
made that form the basis for tomorrow’s financial ‘innovations’’.  
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and of the digital footprints created through a combination of biometric verification and 
algorithmic technology, so that financial institutions may expand their client bases.131   
 Although this application of data technology is not yet commonplace in 
Pakistan, this is changing rapidly with a small number of microfinance banks already 
using digital transaction data as well as mobile phone/ GSMA activity for credit scoring. 
The relatively lighter KYC requirement for branchless banking is a tacit endorsement of 
this practice. There is considerable space here for third party involvement, a pattern 
which has been facilitated by the development of a venture capital ecosystem in 
Pakistan. For instance, Finja, which is described as the ‘technology partner & Super 
Agent’ for Finca Microfinance Bank’s branchless banking operations has received USD 
1.5 million in series A funding , from Vostok, a Stockholm listed company headquartered 
in Bermuda, specializing in emerging market fintech (Chakraberty, 2017). Another 
example is Tez Financial Services. Headed by former Citi banker, Nadeem Hussain, Tez 
— translated as ‘fast’ in Urdu — is a part of PlanetN, a holding group which makes 
investments in existing companies and houses an accelerator based loosely on the 
principles of Y Combinator (Husain, 2016).132   Credit scoring based on digital data 
capture is a core strategy of this start up company and entails a suspension of rights to 
privacy associated with the absence of full financial citizenship. Uneven patterns of 
digital privacy are a feature of belonging to a class of poor borrowers who are removed 
— or excluded — from the workings of a closed system.133 
‘If you allow to me to access your smartphone and carry out a risk assessment, 
there are 12,000 data points I can take. Let me give you the easiest one. If your 
contact list consists of 10 people and your friend’s list consist of 1,000 people, your 
friend has a better credit risk profile, because, he or she is more networked than 
you are. The same goes for travel; credit risk improves with people who have a 
regular, as opposed to an erratic pattern, or if your phone is on 24 hours a day 
versus 12 hours a day, then you are a better risk. These are all data points that have 
been established by machine learning and algorithms. Once we launch this service 
and defaults happen, the machine will learn and correct the weightages we give; 
the algorithm learns as it goes along. The idea is to offer customers Rs 5,000 to 
10,000 loans, repayable after a month and eventually after three months. All they 
have to do is download our app and with their consent we will be able to tell 
within 10 minutes whether they are eligible for a loan’ (Hussain cited in Baig, 2017). 
Commercial appeal and the issue of penetration  
Commercial iterations of inclusive finance present an opportunity for private finance to 
take on the guise and role of development finance. Such approaches allow for a 
_____________________________ 
131 Gabor and Brooks (2017) draw on Kaminska’s (2015) observations and note that the FPD or finance-philanthropy-
development nexus entails the use of technology to interact with the subjects of inclusive finance by capturing their data 
and re-using it in a way that can change or condition customer behaviours, or alternatively to provide information flow to 
the lender for risk-management purposes.  
132 Y Combinator is an American accelerator company which provides funding in the form of seed money in exchange for 
equity to start up companies: among the most successful examples of their investments are Airbnb, Dropbox, and Reddit. 
See https://yclist.com  
133 This is a key characteristic of recent iterations of inclusive finance and theorised byGabor and Brooks (2017). 
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leveraged approach to development cooperation to attract private flows, including 
equity stakes, through reduced exposure to risk.134 Some examples are presented in the 
table below which describes sources of funding for inclusive finance in Pakistan.   
Aside from transactions and payments, the other aspects of inclusive finance are 
access to savings and loans.135 Pakistan is an example of a country where commercial 
models of microfinance are ascendant and where subsidies are seen as undermining 
sustainability.136 In such a context, savings relate to the context of deposit 
mobilisation.137 Because of the legislative structure permitting deposit taking, only one 
third or so of Pakistani microfinance providers offer savings products: MFBs are allowed 
to take deposits but MFIs are only permitted to mobilise deposits by requiring that their 
client place them in commercial banks (PMN, 2017).   
Available data allows for very limited inferences about the extent to which 
microfinance providers — MFBs and MFIs both — are responsible for mobilising 
deposits, as it is not possible to identify which commercial bank deposit holders are 
clients of microfinance institutions.138 However, the data for MFBs illustrates success in 
deposit mobilisation with the period 2015-16 experiencing a jump of 88 per cent in the 
number of depositors who rose to 15.9 million from 10.7 million in 2015: in terms of 
value, this amounted to 41 per cent, taking the deposit base to PKR 118 billion from PKR 
60 billion a year earlier  (PMN, 2017).   
This surge may be attributed to the recent moves by MFBs to compete with 
commercial banks for deposit mobilisation, by offering double digit rates on deposits: 
up to 13 per cent relative to 7 per cent offered by commercial banks. This strategy has 
been facilitated by the directive, issued in late 2015 by the SBP, permitting MFBs to use 
the same clearing system used by commercial banks (SBP, 2015b). The outcome of this, 
for those banks that have opted for this tactical approach, is a decrease in cost of funds, 
as well as an increase in the ratio of deposits to gross loan portfolio (PMN, 2017). As a 
result, many MFBs have not only enhanced their efficiency but also their liquidity.   
For some analysts of the ‘missing middle’ phenomenon this improved liquidity 
offers perceptible opportunities. The term ‘missing middle’ is generally used to describe 
the disproportionately small number of small and medium-sized enterprises as 
compared with the number of micro and large enterprises in many developing countries 
_____________________________ 
134 Van Waeyenberge (2015) attributes such approaches to the ‘private turn in development finance’. 
135 Savings were a key pillar of the microfinance movement for two reasons; they had the potential to reduce dependence 
on subsidies and donors by mobilising funds for on-lending; and they allowed for households to smooth consumption and 
build assets for collateral for future borrowing (Khandker, 1998). 
136 Subsidies need not necessarily preclude saving: the successes of forced or involuntary savings programmes in 
Bangladesh (Khandker 2000) and Indonesia (Morduch 2000) exemplify how savings can reduce the social cost of 
subsidisation.   
137 Analysing the trade-offs between subsidised and commercial models of microfinance, Murdoch (2000: 620 ) notes that 
the subsidisation of credit skewed the incentives for microfinance providers to promote savings because banks were losing 
money on the lending-side but were amply capitalized by governments and thus had little incentive to mobilize savings. 
Because deposit mobilization is costly, re-lending the deposits would just lead to greater losses. Instead, saving accounts 
were weighed down with restrictions and downward pressure was put on interest rates on deposits, generally to keep 
interest rates paid to depositors below the rates charged to borrowers. ‘The result was that real rates on deposits fell to 
zero or below and savers had little incentive to build up accounts. Ultimately, little saving was generated, and money 
stayed under mattresses or was moved into nonfinancial assets.’  
138 MFBs can accept deposits but MFIs can only direct clients to open deposit accounts at other banks.  
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(Ayyagari et al. 2005 cited in Shankar 2016). The standard approach to the missing 
middle presents it as an issue of both access to and lack of finance (World Bank, 2017). 
The NFIS (2015) takes a more measured stance on this, noting that according to survey 
data, access to finance is a less important issue for SMEs than lack of electricity, and 
corruption, respectively. Given the perspective that finance is a crucial issue for 
enterprises, the SBP has been encouraging MFBs to lend to microenterprises. The 
objective of such a policy, like that of promoting deposit mobilisation, is to promote 
competition between MFBs and commercial banks. In practice, such an approach has 
encouraged a bifurcated banking structure.    
Expensive lending and bifurcated pricing  
From a regulatory standpoint, microfinance banking differs from commercial banking in 
two ways: licensing requirements and lending requirements. The lending limit imposed 
on microfinance banks has been contentious —  it was revised upwards in 2012 from 
PKR 150,000 to PKR 500,000, and then to PKR 1,000,000, through a series of 
notifications over 2017 and 2019, for selected lenders in order to promote enterprise 
lending and housing finance.139 There is also support for issuing separate licenses with 
higher lending limits to increase coverage (Aslam, 2013).  
Lending rates in Pakistan are not regulated by the central bank. Within the 
global financial inclusion industry, this is regarded as a best practice. Despite concerns 
about exploitative and predatory lending practices, capping rates is seen as counter-
productive and the CGAP finds that interest rate curbs reduce poor people’s access to 
financial services:  
‘Interest rate ceilings make it difficult or impossible for formal and semi-
formal microlenders to cover their costs, driving them out of the market (or 
keeping them from entering in the first place)’ (CGAP, 2004: 1).  
In Pakistan, high lending rates persisted even in a low interest rate environment with 
the benchmark policy rate at a 42 year low of 5.75 per cent (PMN, 2017). Microfinance 
practitioners reiterate that it is misleading to draw causal connections between 
benchmark interest rates and lending rates as it is operating costs — and not funding 
costs — that determine loan terms. 140  These rates are primarily due to expenses such as 
personnel compensation, supplies, travel, depreciation of fixed assets, etc. 141 
_____________________________ 
139 http://www.sbp.org.pk/acd/2019/C1.htm 
140 It is thus argued that the very practice of making small loans — since that is what the poor require — entails high 
interest rates because smaller loans have a higher administrative cost per dollar than do larger loans (Rosenberg et. al, 
2013).  
141 Given this, and also the fact that the alternative to microfinance is very often the unregulated money-lender Sandberg 
(2015:143) argues that it is governments, commercial banks and the international political community that should be held 
responsible for high interest rates caused by credit rationing because these may be reduced by creating background 
institutions and/or making infrastructural improvements which could reduce some of the costs for MFIs. 
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Despite commercialisation — which has entailed a strong nexus with the 
mainstream banking sector — the financial inclusion agenda has not made 
convergence, between the micro and mainstream finance sectors, a priority. Although in 
many countries microfinance and other services offered under financial inclusion 
initiatives are regulated they are nevertheless distinct from, and presented as an 
alternative to, the formal financial sector. This is clear from the CGAP emphasis on 
‘unbanked’ who are excluded from the formal financial sector but offered an alternative 
in the form of microfinance and IT based payments systems (CGAP, 2018).  
What is the potential for an easing of this separation? Efforts in Pakistan to 
earmark the category described as MSEL or medium small enterprise lending (Aslam, 
2013) reflect the realization that larger loan sizes are essential for bridging the gap 
between the microfinance and commercial banking.142 
‘This is too low to make a difference to the growth and expansion of MSEs. Average 
loan size has remained low because the mission of microfinance was believed to 
consist in provision of finance to low income persons rather than MSEs’ (Aslam, 
2013: 6). 
Loan size is also directly related to the issue of collateral requirements which constrain 
lending to any enterprise that is not a government entity or a large corporate. The 
central bank is acutely aware of such lending constraints which emphasise the need for 
immovable collateral and has sought to relax collateral requirements. For instance, in 
2004 the SBP amended prudential regulations so commercial banks could lend up to 
PKR 3 million without collateral (Nenova et al., 2009). And in 2012, the SBP amended 
prudential regulations to allow microfinance banks to accept gold as collateral (SBP, 
2012).   
Rules on collateral reveal how microfinance banks have a key role in shaping 
rules and regulations: this was the case when policy changes effectively created new 
asset streams by expanding the definition of collateral. As observed by Zulfiqar (2013), 
exuberant lobbying efforts by the microfinance giant TMB resulted in revised prudential 
regulations on acceptable collateral made by the State Bank of Pakistan to allow gold 
backed lending.  These amendments allowed MFBs to accept gold jewellery as security 
for loans. This was an extension of new rules that permitted collateralised lending: 
previously, all microfinance loans were unsecured. This step from the central bank was a 
response to two realities; one, that Capital Adequacy requirements (CAR) —based on 
Basel II — were limiting the growth of MFBs (Aslam and Azmat, 2012); and two, in many 
parts of South Asia, the accumulation of gold is a traditional and preferred form of 
saving (Chen and Rasmussen, 2012).   
Collateral, in both the formal and informal market context, serves a dual 
function; it protects the lender against risk by allowing for either partial or complete 
_____________________________ 
142 Recent efforts in Pakistan and elsewhere in South Asia to focus on the needs of ‘graduates’ (Shankar, 2016) are a step 
in this direction as they offer a shift away from lending to low income individuals; a model that relies on small loan sizes 
and high lending rates. 
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recovery in case of default; and it serves to vet prospective clients by linking risk to 
readiness to repay. In economic theory, this dual function of collateral may be said to 
address the problem of asymmetrical information, which might occur for example when 
buyers in a market have much better information than sellers in the same market.143 
Adverse selection, and moral hazard, are the two components of information asymmetry 
and provide the conceptual justification for collateral.144   The International Labour 
Organisation uses a similar vocabulary in its definition of collateral:   
‘Collateral is an asset pledged by a borrower to a lender until a loan is paid back. If 
the borrower defaults, then the lender has the right to seize the collateral and sell 
it to pay off the loan’  (Balkenhol and Schutte, 2001: 7).  
In Pakistan, perhaps the most prominent example of collateralisation is that of gold 
jewellery. Zulfiqar (2013) likens collateralisation trends in Pakistani microfinance, 
particularly when gold is involved, to Hernando de Soto's concept of dead capital (de 
Soto, 2000), with lenders justifying their practices as an extension of property rights. 
The collateralisation of gold is a practice associated with the jewellery owned by 
Pakistani women. A key theme in such practices is that of drawing the informal sphere 
into the formal sphere by reviving dead capital.145 Another, overlapping theme, is that of 
redressing issues arising from patriarchy in ownership.146    
Policies to support gold collateralisation arose from the need to balance risk 
management, following the delinquency crisis of 2008, with expansionary pressures — 
to deepen and widen this sector — from the SBP which had committed to increasing 
outreach to 3 million by the end of 2010 and 10 million by 2015 (SBP, 2008). As a result, 
the viability of reaching targets through the group loan approach came under scrutiny: 
group or joint liability loans tend to be small enough to circumvent the issue 
of collateral, aside from social collateral in the form of the group guarantee 
(Aslam and Azmat, 2012). But when loans are larger — though still capped in size by the 
regulator — immovable assets are impractical to collateralise and often valued at much 
more than the loan itself. The need for collateral is thus linked to the push for larger 
loans because group members are wary of providing guarantees for large amounts: so, 
small value, liquid movables are considered more often by lenders to secure 
performance of obligations (Aslam and Azmat, 2012).   
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
143 The Nobel laureate economists George Akerlof  (2002), Michael Spence (2002), and Joseph Stiglitz  (2002) have an 
extensive body of work that shows how informational asymmetries lead to market failure. 
144 Studies on microlending byStiglitz (1990) and Ghatak (1999) emphasise how group lending and joint liability models — 
before microcredit became commercialised — is an effective strategy to evade the need for collateral by using peer 
monitoring to overcome adverse selection and moral hazard issues. 
145 De Soto (2000) sees dead capital as an asset that cannot easily be bought, sold, valued or used to accumulate wealth.  
146 In a study for the World Bank, Almodóvar-Reteguis et al.  (2012)  note that access to land is heavily skewed against 
women and that this limits their access to finance: it might be addressed by banks through expanding the range of assets 
accepted as collateral 
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5.3  STRUCTURAL AND MACROECONOMIC ISSUES   
Initiatives to draw microfinance banks into MSEL highlight the sense of urgency 
undoubtedly felt by a central bank confronted with declining — in real terms, relative to 
previous decades — private sector credit offtake (SBP, 2015a).   
While the total assets and deposits of Pakistan’s banking sector have doubled 
since 2008, private sector credit to GDP has declined from 22 per cent in 2009 to just 
14.7 per cent in June 2014. The decline in credit provided to SMEs has been particularly 
pronounced, falling from 16per cent of bank lending in 2008 to just 7per cent in June 
2014. (SBP, 2015a: vi)  
More recent data indicates that improvements have been small, with private 
sector credit at 16.2 per cent in June 2017 (SBP, 2017b). This weakening and its 
persistence are ascribed to a number of factors. Khalid and Nadeem (2017) attribute the 
initial decline to knock on effects from the global crisis of 2008, which coincided with 
security concerns, political instability, and energy shortages in Pakistan: five years of 
double digit interest rates followed, with counter-cyclical monetary policy vetoed 
because of parched FDI inflows and a balance of payments crisis from a feeble external 
sector. The outcome is the familiar scenario of an unfavourable balance of payments — 
necessitating IMF led demand compression and stabilisation policies —eventually 
compromising deregulation and liberalisation by quashing market mechanisms for 
interest rate determination (Khalid and Nadeem, 2017).  
The rollback of the state 
Aside from exogenous factors, there are other reasons for the austere position that 
lenders find themselves in. A general argument is that it was the liberal reform process 
of the 1990s — fixated with buttressing regulatory frameworks and enhancing 
institutional stability — that compromised financial inclusion, primarily by cost-cutting 
strategies that resulted in downsizing and branch closures (Khalid and Nadeem, 2017). 
Though the SBP was conscious of the need to keep the banking sector accessible and 
took regulatory steps such as preventing banks from refusing to open accounts for 
prospective clients; provision of free services by banks for the opening and maintenance 
of regular savings accounts; and, some exemptions on minimum balances; between 
2004 and 2015, the total number of small accounts fell by 3.1 million (Zaidi, 2015: 406). 
This is depicted in numbers by Pakistan’s position in IMF 2015 rankings of financial 
development: in efficiency the country is ranked 52 but in access to institutions it is 130 
(Svirydzenka, 2016). The issue of limited private sector credit offtake is brought into 
sharp focus when regional comparisons are made: Pakistan not only has one of the 
lowest proportions of adult population with access to a transaction account, but also has 
one of the highest ratios of currency to deposits (Khalid and Nadeem, 2017).   
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These trends may be associated with a key feature of liberal reforms in 
Pakistan:  the rollback of the state which commenced over the 1980s and 1990s.147 This 
resulted in sharp reductions in government ownership of the banking sector and also 
the abandonment of direct, or priority lending strategies. The absence of an official 
push factor has made it possible for lenders to dodge the comparatively riskier prospect 
of SME lending. The state in Pakistan controls only 20 per cent of banking assets: this is 
low compared to other emerging economies — including China, India, Egypt, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam and Bhutan, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Russia, and Turkey — 
where the public share ranges from 30 per cent to 50 per cent (World Bank, 2012). The 
policy of mandatory lending to sectors identified by the state is still practiced in a 
number of countries; India’s priority sectors receive over 40 per cent of bank loan 
portfolios; Brazil’s directed lending amounts to over 50 per cent of total credit; and in 
both Thailand and Indonesia, 20 per cent of lending is allocated to SMEs (Khalid and 
Nadeem, 2017).   
Strong government borrowing and weak bank lending  
Why else have commercial banks been so reticent about customer base expansion? This 
can be at least partially attributed to fiscal patterns: the low tax base, at less than 11 per 
cent of GDP, compels the government to rely on borrowing for deficit funding (Ministry 
of Finance, 2017). Private businesses account for 40 per cent of bank credit and only 0.4 
per cent of all borrowers are responsible for 65 per cent of all bank loans (State Bank of 
Pakistan, 2015). In the absence of effective measures to widen and also deepen the tax 
base it is unlikely that commercial banks — which are currently earning heavy spreads 
by investing in risk free treasury bills — will shift their focus to the private sector — but 
away from the corporate sector — particularly for those in lower income segments.   
Also noteworthy here is the relationship between government borrowing from 
commercial banks and banking spreads. In developing economies the state tends to be 
insensitive to the cost of such borrowing to finance its budget deficit when it has no 
recourse to other sources: this is an outcome of a shallow secondary market for lending, 
suggesting the need for policies to enhance domestic debt markets alongside liberal 
reforms (Choudhary et. al, 2016). Governments may also borrow directly from the 
central bank. These borrowings finance deficits require the central bank to print money 
which creates inflation in the economy and generates seigniorage revenues for the 
government.  
‘Developing countries resort to such practices because (i) their governments tend 
to have limited fiscal space and as such rely on such practices as a short-term 
arrangement, (ii) credit market frictions encourage banks to place their funds in 
_____________________________ 
147 Two recent papers emphasise the intense nature of deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation in Pakistan. Naqvi 
(2018: 1065) analyses the shortcomings of financial reform, observing that the Pakistani financial sector ‘performed its 
function better under state direction’. Munir and Naqvi (2017: 1695) draw attention to the Pakistani case for how ‘the 
suboptimal outcomes of the privatizations went largely unchallenged’.  
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risk-free assets and (iii) direct central bank financing of fiscal expenditure is 
deemed inflationary’ (Choudhary et. al 2016: 4775).  
This ‘Dominant Borrower Syndrome’ is interrogated by Choudhary et al. (2016)  who 
find that persistent government borrowing from commercial banks has limited the 
sector: the widening of interest rate spreads, lower private sector credit — despite a 
policy rate that has fallen by over 550 basis points over four years— and a weak 
transmission of monetary policy have been created by lack of impetus for credit 
intermediation, given an ample supply of zero-risk weighted assets in the form of 
government paper. But this explanation, which rests on the macroeconomic assumption 
of crowding out, is somewhat simplistic. It is more reasonable to infer that stringent 
capital requirements — as necessitated by the Basel framework — deterred banks from 
lending to the private sector, especially where high default risk was a feature of 
incomplete collateral and/or uncertain cash flows.148 
The issue of weak lending in Pakistan cannot then accurately be described in 
the relatively simplistic terms of government involvement; which might be excessive 
and cause crowding out, or be inadequate and fail at direct lending strategies. Instead, a 
shadow banking lens explains the need for and shape of inclusive finance.   
5.4 SHADOW BANKING IN PAKISTAN   
Inclusive finance is like shadow banking because it entails credit intermediation that 
involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system.149 Some of 
these entities and activities are mentioned above and whilst MFBs are indeed deposit 
taking institutions, the discussion above, as well as figures in the previous chapter, 
demonstrate how these deposits form only a part of total MFB liabilities. Particularly 
relevant here is what is known as the regulatory arbitrage view which ascribes shadow 
banking to the need for financial institutions to avoid regulations.  
 
Given the perspective detailed above, in which inclusive finance is the response 
to weak lending, two phenomena are of especial relevance; (1) regulations to enhance 
financial stability have pushed commercial banks to eschew lending outside the 
corporate and public sector; and (2) a lack of depth in domestic debt markets has 
created an interest inelastic demand from the state for bank borrowing.  The effect of 
these two phenomena has been to constrain mainstream banks from meeting the 
borrowing, and other banking needs, of the public. Inclusive finance has emerged in its 
contemporary shape as a response to these constraints for two reasons.   
One reason is that because inclusive finance is offered by specialised institutions 
associated with only a small share of financial sector assets, the lack of complex 
_____________________________ 
148 This link between Basel regulation and constrained lending is an empirically documented tendency discussed in a 
shadow banking context by Toporowski (2017).   
149This particular description of shadow banking is attributed to Adrian et al. (2013). 
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operations, and limited interactions with international markets it is not affected by 
Basel restrictions.150 Additionally, FATF directives on KYC or know-your-customer 
requirements are explicitly designed to support digital transactions in the form of 
branchless banking or mobile money: these specific requirements allow customers to 
use banking services with limits on the frequency and cash amount of transactions. 
FATF outlines this CDD or customer due diligence approach as ‘tiered’ or ‘progressive’ 
(FATF, 2017: 7).   
Another reason is that inclusive finance is offered as a solution to the problem 
of the mainstream bank fixation with servicing the government and large corporate 
institutions. It is for this reason that inclusive finance finds itself at the core of policies 
not just for meeting the consumption needs of the poorer segments of society, but as 
reflected in the ‘missing middle’ and MSME contexts, for driving small and medium 
enterprises. (Shankar, 2016; Aslam, 2013).    
5.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter draws attention to salient features of inclusive finance in Pakistan which 
underlie bifurcated banking. This association between regulation and bifurcated 
banking is highlighted because within the current regime for the global governance of 
finance, regulatory measures such as lighter KYC requirements emphasise the difference 
between inclusive finance and mainstream finance, but do not seek to overcome the 
inequalities that arise from it. At the same time the heavy emphasis on making inclusive 
finance initiatives commercially attractive to avoid the need for donor support, create 
incentives to facilitate financial intrusion to create value through data.   
The strategic focus on harvesting data is enabled by a set of international 
institutions which enlist the most recent iteration of the global assemblage — of 
products, services, and knowledge — that constitutes the inclusive finance model.151 For 
the Pakistani case, this approach has been facilitated by the presence of a large and 
powerful national biometric database. Chapter 6 will draw attention to how biometric 
usage in Pakistan is an enticement for mergers and acquisitions in the domestic 
inclusive finance industry. 
This chapter also draws attention to the commercialisation of penetration: 
under this process, microfinance banks have sought to bring down interest rates and 
widen their client base through innovative approaches to collateral. As such, clients of 
inclusive finance are required to present collateral in forms very different from those 
required or permitted in mainstream finance.  
And in addition to digital finance and collateralisation, another set of salient 
features of inclusive finance which drive bifurcated banking in Pakistan pertain to MSEL 
_____________________________ 
150 Goldberg and Palladini (2010:10) note that this would not be the case if the size of the microfinance sector is large in 
relation to the overall financial system or if the microfinance institution is a part of a large regulated financial institution.  
151 Inclusive finance is shown to have a predilection for technological approaches that seek to extract asset streams, given 
that ‘All data is credit data’ (Aitken, 2017: 274). 
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or micro and small enterprise lending. Policy focus here, particularly from the central 
bank, draws on the contention — advanced heavily by the World Bank and other 
multilateral development banks — that many poor countries, including Pakistan, are 
afflicted with a ‘missing middle’ in credit offtake. This problem is characterised by the 
absence of credit options for firms which are too large for inclusive finance but too 
small for mainstream finance.  
These trends in the Pakistani inclusive finance industry allow for a distinction 
between commercialisation and financialisation. Whereas earlier attempts to base 
microfinance on commercial models focused on autonomy from subsidies and public 
ownership, newer iterations are centred on utilising diverse sources of funding which 
involve ‘pools of cash’ seeking yield. This shift from commercialised to financialised 
approaches to inclusive finance is reflected in the growing diversity of funding 
mechanisms for microfinance, as well as for other forms of inclusive finance such as 
branchless banking. These funding mechanisms have been a gateway for shadow 
banking that is drawn to the asset streams associated with inclusive finance.    
These observations, combined with those made in the previous chapter, are the 
building blocks for the inequities that characterise shadow financial citizenship: these 
three core inequities are (1) inequities in rates, (2) inequities in requirements, and (3) 
inequities in surveillance. These are discussed in more depth in Chapter 6 which is a 
study of specific microfinance institutions and their role in advancing shadow financial 
citizenship.   
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6. SHADOW FINANCIAL CITIZENSHIP: PRACTICES, 
PROCESSES AND PRODUCTS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter demonstrates how shadow banking practices occupy a core role in 
global development strategies and hence drive shadow financial citizenship by 
bifurcating banking. The current chapter builds on this analysis and links it with the 
specific examples of two deposit taking microfinance banks: Telenor Microfinance Bank 
(TMB) and the First MicroFinance Bank (FMFB).  As shown earlier, inclusive finance in 
Pakistan — which is closely regulated by the central bank and driven by a government 
led financial inclusion agenda — has experienced a managed immersion in the broader 
financial sector. Microfinance banks (MFBs) are deposit taking institutions with a heavy 
share —nearly 70 per cent — in the gross loan portfolio of the overall microfinance 
sector which includes commercial as well as non-commercial and non-profit 
organizations (PMN, 2016). This form of microfinance shares similarities with 
commercial banks but offers distinctly different products and services.   
The practices, processes, and products associated with TMB and FMFB — 
respectively, a bank owned by a mobile phone carrier and a subsidiary of a faith based 
organisation — highlight the disciplining effects of global finance. Partially expressed as 
‘mission drift’, a notion mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, these 
effects are also reflected in the nature of inclusive finance, given its tendency to 
bifurcate banking. The conceptual tool of shadow financial citizenship is applied to 
interrogate the role of inclusive finance in bifurcated banking. More specifically, the 
objective of this chapter is examine how the practices of two specific inclusive finance 
institutions bifurcate banking through the products and services that underlie their 
respective business models.  
To achieve this objective, the two institutions are probed for their role in 
producing shadow financial citizenship, which is shown to be characterised by; high 
service charges for loans; the compulsion to provide fungible collateral; and the 
insidious forfeiture of digital privacy. These features may be cast as a set of inequities: in 
rates, requirements, and surveillance. How did these characteristics come to be essential 
features of inclusive finance? To address this question it is necessary to ask what drives 
shadow financial citizenship? MFBs are components of the shadow banking system 
because of the microfinance proclivity to receive blended finance from public, private, 
and also philanthropic sources. Additionally, tight but dynamic regulation has made 
inclusive finance institutions the target of mergers and acquisitions involving global 
investment firms and development finance institutions. 
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 6.2 examines how 
shifts in funding inclusive finance have shaped the industry to become a destination for 
inflows of foreign capital, from private as well as public sources, Section 6.3 draws 
attention to the transformation of two Pakistani deposit taking microfinance banks — 
FMFB and TMB — which began operations as a charitable initiative, and a subprime 
lender respectively, Section 6.4 is an analysis of the financing structures of these 
institutions and notes how strategies centred on collateral and fintech are advanced by 
shadow banking and raise concerns about the reproduction of inequalities, section 6.5 
builds on these observations to highlight the politics of shadow banking in the makeup 
of shadow financial citizenship, and Section 6.6 concludes.  
 
6.2 SHADOW BANKING FOR ‘SUSTAINABILITY’ 
The shareholder patterns of Pakistani microfinance banks reveal that of the eleven 
deposit taking institutions in this sector, only one of these entities — which operates 
regionally and is newly formed by a provincial government —is not owned by a financial 
institution. This reflects the overwhelmingly privatised, commercially oriented nature of 
microfinance in the country. Its superiority over a subsidised, altruistic model has been 
accepted by Pakistani policymakers (1) because international donors focus on engaging 
with public and for-profit financial institutions for the purpose of reducing financial 
exclusion; and (2) because the performance of the sector depends not just on individual 
financial institutions but on the broader governance of the sector as well as economy.152  
The above points have consistently been reflected in the Pakistani regulatory 
emphasis on diversified funding sources. State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) apprehensions 
about non-profit and public sources of funding are mentioned in their 2006 Financial 
Stability Review: given heavy dependence on grants and subsidies there is a need to 
enhance deposit mobilisation for long term sustainability (SBP, 2006)  
CGAP’s engrossment with sustainability is reflected in their Microfinance 
Consensus Guidelines which stress consistency in measuring the performance and 
‘financial viability of microfinance institutions’ (CGAP, 2003). Additionally, following 
the most recent global financial crisis, there was apprehension that reduced liquidity 
would adversely affect the cost and availability of funding for microfinance (Littlefield 
and Knelding, 2009). Aside from grants and guarantees, funding for microfinance may 
come from one or more of three sources; one of these is debt with borrowings either 
from larger banks and investors, or through the issuance of bonds; another is from 
deposits, which are described as savings products from customers; and a third source is 
from equity investments or ownership stakes, for a share of profits.  
The matter of growth in Pakistan microfinance is frequently framed as a 
problem of funding. The Microfinance Growth Strategy 2020, from the think tank, 
_____________________________ 
152 These are general arguments in favour of commercial microfinance and are attributed to Copestake (2007). 
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Pakistan Microfinance Network (PMN), forecasts sector requirements of additional 
equity, debt and deposits of up to USD 3 billion to target 10 million borrowers (PMN, 
2015). One approach to addressing this gap has been aggressive deposit mobilization; 
another has been to attract equity from local and foreign sources, recognizing that 
donors increasingly eschew subsidized funds.  
This demand for equity is often portrayed as a growth opportunity for 
investment and development assistance. This portrayal has inspired a holding company 
model in addition to other arrangements: A typology of funding sources is available in 
Chapter 5. Table 6.1 supplements the literature on commercialisation and on how the 
microfinance industry has become a magnet for capital inflows. This has implications 
for financial citizenship because microfinance banks shape themselves to attract shadow 
finance.153 
Table 6.1: Microfinance bank ownership patterns 
MFB and Year of 
Inception  
 
Origins  Transitions  and  Stakeholders  
Khushhali Bank  
2000  
Component of ADB backed 
Microfinance Sector Development 
Program (MSDP) and also state 
backed poverty reduction 
strategy. Owned 
initially by 16 Pakistani commercial 
banks, mostly state-owned. 
 
Acquired by a consortium of national and 
international investors in 2012, thus ending its 
quasi-public status.   
UnitedBank Limited 29.7 %, Incofin Investment 
Management 24.4 %, Equator LLC 14.3 %, Triple 
Jump B.V 9.9 %, ResponsAbility S.A 19.9 %, 
Bank AlHabib Ltd. 1.8 % 
 
First MicroFinance Bank 
2002  
Created through a structured 
transformation of the credit and 
savings section of the Aga Khan 
Rural Support Programme’s 
(AKRSP), an integrated 
development programme 
operating since the 1980s in 
Northern Pakistan.   
 
51% stake acquired by nationwide bank, HBL, in 
2016. Both companies have been owned by the 
AKFED since HBL was privatised in 2004. FMFB is 
now a subsidiary of HBL which is owned by the 
AKFED (51 %), CDC (5 %), IFC (3 %) as well as other 
institutions and individuals.   
HBL (50.5 %), AKAM (21 %), AKFED (11 %), IFC (8.5 
%), JICA (8.5 %).      
 
U MicrofinanceBank  
2003  
(Telecom owned
154
) 
Founded as Rozgar Microfinance 
Bank and granted banking license 
in 2005.   
  
Becomes U Microfinance Bank after acquisition by 
PTCL in 2012 and also transitions from operating at 
district level to nationwide.  
Shareholders include PTCL which
155
 is owned by the 
Government of Pakistan (62 %), UAE owned Etisalat 
(26 %), and the public.   
 
Telenor Microfinance 
Bank 
2005  
(Telecom owned) 
Commenced operations in 2005 
as Tameer Microfinance Bank.  
Partnered with Telenor 
Pakistan to jointly 
launch Easypaisa: Telenor 
was thus incorporated into  
Tameer’s equity structure in 2008.    
Became Telenor Microfinance Bank in 2012 after 
being acquired by Telenor Pakistan a subsidiary 
of Telenor Group which eventually raised its stake to 
100 %  by buying out minority shareholders 
including the IFC. In 2018 Telenor sold a 45 % stake 
of TMB to Ant Financial: a tech affiliate company of 
the Chinese Alibaba Group. 
 
_____________________________ 
153 ‘Shadow finance refers to all financial transactions that take place outside regulated and transparent financial 
markets.’ (Bolton et al., 2012). 
154 The reasons for heavy telecom involvement in the Pakistan microfinance sector are explained in section 4, p 22. 
155 Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited.  
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Apna Microfinance Bank  
2005  
Backed by Network 
Leasing Co which has an 
established micro leasing program 
since 1995.     
Ownership structure changes after Network Leasing 
Co. Merger with KASB Bank. KASB Bank was 
acquired in 2015 by Bank Islami. In 2012 a Group 
of Investors (GOI) acquired a 91 % stake from 
various shareholders: now owned by various 
individuals and associated companies of the United 
International Group.   
 
Pak Oman  
2006  
Sponsored jointly by the Sultanate 
of Oman with 67 % shareholding 
and the 
Pak Oman Investment company wit
h 33 % shareholding.   
Lanka ORIX Leasing Company, Sri Lanka's second 
largest non-banking financial institution by asset 
size, acquires a 50.1 % equity stake in 2017.   
Pak Oman Investment Company (16.7 %), Sultanate 
of Oman (33.3 %), Lanka ORIX Leasing Co. (50.5 %). 
   
FINCA Microfinance 
Bank  
2008  
Incorporated as a majority owned 
subsidiary of Kashf Holdings Private 
Limited after the Kashf Foundation 
spun off its high-end, individual 
loan portfolio to establish the 
bank.  
In 2013 FINCA International, a global microfinance 
network, acquires majority shareholding 
in Kashf Microfinance Bank Limited.   86 % stake 
owned by FINCA International. 
Other shareholders include Kashf Holdings, 
IFC, Triodos Bank, and Acumen Fund.   
 
Advans  
2012  
Created in 2012 as Advans group’s 
sixth greenfield project.   
 
Owned by Luxembourg based Advans (70 
%) and Netherlands (30 %) based FMO.  
 
Mobilink 
Microfinance Bank 
Limited  
2012  
(Telecom owned) 
 
A subsidiary of Global Telecom 
Holding S.A.E   
Re-branded to Mobilink Microfinance Bank Limited 
in May 2016  
Owned fully by Russian-backed, Amsterdam-
headquartered VEON  
Sindh Microfinance Bank  
2015  
Wholly owned subsidiary of Sindh 
Bank, which is owned by the 
provincial government.   
 
 100 % shareholding by Government 
of Sindh through provincial finance department.   
 
NRSP Microfinance Bank 
2011 
Created through a spin off the 
mega NGO, NRSP’s microfinance 
operations.   
NRSP is the major shareholder with minority 
shareholding from IFC 16 %, KfW   16 %,  and the 
Acumen Fund 16 % 
 
Source: Annual reports and company websites 
6.3 FMFB AND TMB: SHADOW BANKING EVOLUTIONS 
A key objective of this study is to consider the nature of bifurcated banking when 
inclusive finance is a form of shadow banking.  As shown earlier, in a bifurcated banking 
system, inclusive finance is characterised by high interest rates, collateralised lending, 
and digital intrusion. Two microfinance banks in particular, FMFB and TMB, exemplify 
how the commercialisation of microfinance has shaped inclusive finance as separate 
from the mainstream banking system. The empirical examples used in this current 
chapter exemplify the concept of a shadow financial citizenship, utilised here as an 
analytical lens to probe the nature of bifurcated banking. 
The obvious contrasts between FMFB and TMB are thus: the former was 
launched through the Aga Fund Foundation, which is a faith based philanthropic 
organization, whereas the latter was started by a group of bankers as a privately owned 
business. Both institutions have consistently been among the five largest microfinance 
institutions in Pakistan since at least the last decade. The example of FMFB is used 
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because as a pioneer in the field, this institution provided the blueprint for how a small, 
rural focused lender may transform into a nationwide banking organisation and benefit 
from global financial networks. Despite this, it manages to retain the image of a poverty 
focused initiative, resistant to decision making on the basis of profit alone (Zulfiqar, 
2013). The example of TMB demonstrates how a for-profit, American subprime inspired, 
financial institution came to be in close and direct competition with an institution of 
very different origins. The similarity of the services offered by TMB and FMFB highlight 
the disciplining effects of global finance: this not only reveals ‘mission drift’ but also the 
homogeneity of shadow financial citizenship. 
Microfinance through blended finance  
The story of FMFB’s origins and outlook understandably reflect the strategies of its 
parent organisation, the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), a global network of 
development agencies focused on Asia and Africa. Two of these agencies, the Aga Khan 
Agency for Microfinance (AKAM), and Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development 
(AKFED), have been involved in Pakistan’s financial sector even before the liberal 
reforms of the 1990s. Up until 2015, AKAM owned a 42 per cent stake in FMFB. AKFED, 
following a Government of Pakistan privatisation drive, had since 2003 owned 51 per 
cent of HBL, the largest privately owned bank in the country. In 2016, HBL acquired a 
controlling stake in FMFB: as a result, both HBL and FMFB are subsidiaries, directly and 
indirectly respectively, of AKFED.  
An achievement of the AKDN that has not yet been studied extensively is the 
role of this institution in promoting blended finance for development. The recent 
traction gained by blended finance strategies is associated with the OECD and the SDG 
2030.156 The World Economic Forum and OECD describe blended finance as the 
strategic use of development finance and philanthropic funds to mobilise private capital 
for development through which it is not only possible for private investors to make an  
attractive return on their capital but also for public and philanthropic organizations to 
make their limited resources do more, particularly when their funds are directed to 
‘emerging and frontier markets’ (World Economic Forum, 2015). This echoes what has 
been the strategy of the AKDN for decades: it is exemplified in the view of the Aga Khan 
that ‘Public, or State owned, enterprises can never be a complete substitute for private 
enterprise in building a nation’s economy and in bridging the development gap’ (Aga 
Khan, 1983).157 
His Highness the Aga Khan — Prince Karim Aga Khan IV —the founder and 
chairman of the AKDN is also the 49th hereditary Imam or Spiritual Leader, of the Shia 
Ismaili Muslims. His personal wealth, by some estimates, is USD 800 million (Forbes, 
2009) and some of this is directed to AKDN activities. However, the bulk of funding is 
_____________________________ 
156 Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 
157 Speech by His Highness the Aga Khan in Nairobi, Kenya, 7th October, 1982: http://www.akdn.org/speech/his-highness-
agakhan/private-sector-economic-development 
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from other sources, including partnerships with national governments, multilateral 
institutions and the private sector, income from user fees and endowment funds, and 
donations from corporations and individuals, including large amounts from the Ismaili 
Muslim community: surpluses are reinvested and the annual budget for non-profit 
development activities is USD 925 million and this is deployed in over 30 countries with 
the organization employing over 80,000 people mostly based in developing countries 
(AKDN, 2018b).   
The activities of the AKDN, its various agencies, and its funding organisation, 
the Aga Khan Foundation, have been the subject of numerous studies, given that the 
organization supports and conducts research, education and cultural programs, as well 
as welfare and humanitarian aid projects in developing as well as developing countries. 
Dewji (2018) notes, using the example of Canada, how such activities entail a close 
relationship with a national government, and Clarke (2007) observes how shifts in 
donor agenda change how faith based organisations engage in international 
development.  
The specific initiative which is behind the birth of FMFB is the Aga Khan Rural 
Support Programme (AKRSP) which began promoting microfinance in Northern 
Pakistan using a savings oriented village organisation model in 1982. By 2000 more than 
USD 10 million had been saved by members and over USD 2 million disbursed in credit 
each year. The State Bank of Pakistan's Microfinance Ordinance of 2001 allowed for the 
First MicroFinanceBank Ltd. of Pakistan to commence operations in May 2002 by 
absorbing AKRSP's credit and savings portfolio and launching a program of urban 
microcredit in various cities, growing to a nationwide 25 branch network within a few 
years. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) acquired a 24 per cent shareholding 
stake in 2002 (The First MicroFinanceBank Ltd, 2003). 
The AKRSP-FMFB transition might come across as a classic instance of 
commercial motives taking precedence over social ones. However, a more nuanced 
depiction of this transformation would account for the inception of the Aga Khan 
Agency for Microfinance (AKAM), launched in 2005 as ‘a non-profit Swiss foundation to 
formalise and develop microfinance activities of the AKDN’ (AKDN, 2018a). This move 
reflects a perceived need to separate microfinance from other interventions, recognising 
that finance is one of a set of tools to attain developmental goals. This is corroborated 
by Khan (2010), who partially attributes the formation of FMFB to the sentiment that 
leaving commercial lending to a separate entity — a private financial institution — 
would enable the AKRSP to resume focusing on rural development. Hussein and Plateau 
(2006:342) report that between 1995 and 2000, the AKRSP had to raise the number of 
field officers responsible for loan auditing and performance evaluation from six to 
thirty-one: an indication of how cumbersome lending practices had become for the 
NGO. Additionally, as noted by Khan (2008), there was growing discontent among 
members of village organisations about the loss of savings — under the AKRSP's joint 
liability structure — because of defaulting co-members. 
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Through the support of AKDN, FMFB was able to establish itself as a bellwether 
for the nascent industry. Less than a year after inception, FMFB was in the process of 
implementing technological solutions — with heavy support from IFC sponsored 
external consultants — to manage loans and deposits (The First MicroFinanceBank Ltd, 
2003). Other first year achievements included a funds transfer program for remittances 
(The First MicroFinanceBank Ltd, 2003). The appeal of the worker-remittance market 
also drove mobile money ventures such as EasyPaisa in Pakistan, just as it did for 
example, M-Pesa in Kenya (Mitha, 2011). Particularly noteworthy is the drastic variation 
of the AKRSP approach used by FMFB: inviting urban borrowers, who already had 
geographical proximity to mainstream bank branches, into the microfinance net. This 
became the strategy for many subsequent entrants to the industry, including TMB.  
The appeal of sub-prime Pakistan 
The birth story of TMB contains less altruism. Five bankers — former colleagues at 
various Citigroup global offices — partnered to launch Tameer Microfinance Bank in 
2005. The explicit intent was to meet the financial needs of the economically active 
urban poor in Pakistan: the commercially viable strata of the financially excluded. The 
initial investment was USD 10 million, of which USD 6 million came from one of the 
founders, Nadeem Hussain, Tameer’s first CEO: the IFC also invested USD 1 million in 
Tameer. Technical assistance came from the Bethesda, Maryland based consulting firm, 
Development Innovations Group, in the form of strategies and systems for growth and 
outreach, operational procedures, financial products, staff recruitment, training, 
monitoring, evaluation systems etc.158  
Tameer’s approach to microfinance was seen as innovative and bold: ‘It was the 
first microfinance bank in Pakistan to offer real-time online banking at branches, open 
24-hour service branches, and to make use of capital markets to fund the microfinance 
bank.’ (McCarty and Bjaerum, 2013) Initially, Tameer’s strategy was to replicate the 
American subprime model and to target urban, women borrowers using a cash-flow 
oriented, low collateral model based on a system of neighborhood checks: this approach 
proved troublesome, particularly in the megacity of Karachi where weak law 
enforcement and coercive behaviour from ethnic political activists caused loan officers 
to engage in a number of questionable practices including ‘ghost loans’ and ‘Ponzi 
schemes’. This is corroborated by Zulfiqar’s (2013: 109) fieldwork: she notes that 
Tameer’s reliance on local community ‘agents’ curtailed outreach because of defaults 
and operational losses, with lost ground salvaged only after the Norwegian telecom 
giant, Telenor acquired a majority stake of 51 per cent in 2008. In 2016 this was increased 
to 100 per cent, and the bank changed its name from Tameer Microfinance Bank to 
Telenor Microfinance Bank.  
_____________________________ 
158 Based on personal communications with senior executives of TMB, but also Husain (2016), Zulfiqar (2013), and annual 
company reports. 
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 TMB under Telenor retained some of their more innovative approaches to 
inclusive finance, including through controversial products such gold-collateralised 
loans. More recent initiatives have tended to emphasise fintech, particularly given the 
success of Easypaisa. This flagship product thus came to be Tameer’s gateway into 
fintech and also the motivation underlying TMB's third round of M&A, in early 2018. 
This time Telenor was the seller, and not the buyer, and China's Ant Financial — the 
fintech arm of e-commerce conglomerate Alibaba — purchased a 45 per cent stake in a 
transaction announced as a 'strategic partnership' (Financial Times, 2018) that sought to 
capture the value created in digital footprints, particularly of the poor.  
6.4 FINANCING STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIES 
The three key activities of — or services offered by — microfinance banks in Pakistan 
are lending, deposit taking, and payments or remittances. How these services are 
offered relates closely to the financing structure of the bank offering them: this 
relationship is at the centre of shadow financial citizenship. More specifically, lending 
and deposit taking strategies are influenced by funding arrangements; either from 
deposits, debt, or equity. The cost and availability of funding is a key determinant of 
how high rates on loans are, the extent and nature of collateral required, and how high 
deposit rates should be. Expensive loans and also the tendency of loan agreements to 
require collateral reproduces inequalities not only associated with poverty but with 
gender as well. Additionally, lending and also payment and remittance services are 
increasingly shaped by fintech — which often exerts its influence through ownership 
structures — resulting in a reproduction of vulnerabilities as poorer clients are required 
to, often insidiously, forfeit their privacy to obtain loans. The respective experiences of 
FMFB and TMB in shaping and being shaped by such arrangements are described 
below.  
Table 6.2: Selected recent banking statistics compared for FMFB and TMB 
(2017) FMFB TMB 
Total assets  25.9 billion 47.1 billlion 
Loan portfolio 14.55 billion 24.7 billion 
NPL 95 million 256 million 
Number of borrowers                       304,563                 535,413  
Deposits 20.9 billion 36.6 billion 
Number of depositors                       718,107   8,122,495  
Number of branches                                186  85 
ROA 3.50% 8% 
ROE 16.50% 1% 
Non mark up income 302 million 8,486 million 
Advance to deposit ratio 70% 68% 
Source: Annual reports 
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Collateralised loans and deepening deposit bases 
FMFB, owned by one of the largest national financial institutions, which is in turn 
owned by a global philanthropic foundation, has been able to take a relatively passive 
stance in all three areas related to financing: (1) deposit mobilisation, (2) debt issuance, 
and (3) seeking equity partners. In contrast, TMB’s approach has been aggressive in all 
of these areas: this is evidenced in their (1) push for deposits by offering high rates, (2) 
use of capital markets for debt finance, and in (3) active pursuit of high profile 
partnerships with global telecom and fintech companies.  
Figure 25: Deposit mobilisation 
 
Source: PMN, Annual financial reports 
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Figure 26: Average size of active deposit (PKR) 
 
Source: PMN, Annual financial reports 
Surges in deposit base are a recent occurrence (Figure 25 and Figure 26). The context for 
these is the easing of collateral rules by the central bank. In 2012 the SBP amended the 
Prudential Regulations for Microfinance and allowed MFBs to accept gold jewellery as 
security for loans. This was an extension of new rules that permitted collateralised 
lending.159 Previously, all microfinance loans were unsecured. These new rules 
responded to two realities; (1) that Capital Adequacy requirements (CAR) — based on 
Basel II — were limiting the growth of MFBs (Aslam and Azmat, 2012); and (2), in many 
parts of South Asia, the accumulation of gold is a traditional and preferred form of 
saving (Chen and Rasmussen, 2011).  
The Pakistan specific context for collateralisation, mentioned earlier in Chapter 
5, arose from the need to balance risk management following the delinquency crisis of 
2008: there was also pressure to deepen and widen microfinance as the SBP had recently 
committed to increasing outreach to 3 million by the end 2010 and 10 million by 2015 
(SBP, 2008). The viability of reaching targets through the group loan approach thus 
came under scrutiny: group or joint liability loans tend to be small enough to 
circumvent the issue of collateral, aside from social collateral in the form of the group 
guarantee (Aslam and Azmat, 2012). But when loans are larger — albeit capped in size 
by the regulator — immovable assets are impractical to collateralise and often valued at 
much more than the loan itself. The need for collateral is thus linked to the push for 
larger loans because group members are wary of providing guarantees for large 
_____________________________ 
159 See SBP (2015) 
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amounts: so, small value, liquid movables are considered more often by lenders to 
secure performance of obligations (Aslam and Azmat, 2012). 
Specific collateral requirements for loans vary across banks and are available 
online, including on the respective websites of TMB and FMFB. The former has a larger 
number of collateralised lending products including a few based on gold; the latter 
instead has opted to offer loans based on tangible current assets such as cash and near 
cash instruments, but also in some cases requires livestock or property as collateral.  
The use of collateral also relates to the issue of steep interest rates on 
microfinance: these are invariably higher than those offered by commercial banks and 
attributed to the operational costs of microlending institutions (Rosenberg et. al 2013). 
Gold collateralisation facilitated aggressive lending patterns: swelling gross loan 
portfolios and larger loan counts are shown in the figures (1) and (2). Within the year 
following regulatory approval, TMB, had managed to shift over 85 percent of its 
portfolio into gold-backed loans as new verification processes allowed for credit to be 
disbursed within 3 days, relative to the 21 day norm between application and disbursal 
for other products using standard verification processes (PMN, 2012). Gold collateral, as 
per prudential rules, is first evaluated by a 'shroff' or local goldsmith, who has been pre-
approved by the regulator (SBP, 2015). This evaluation is much like a third party 
guarantee: the ‘shroff’ undertakes to purchase the gold at an agreed price, should the 
need — given defaults — arise. This process allows for quick disbursement as well as a 
lower lending rate: the PMN (2012) reports that gold collateralised loans tend to be 4-6 
per cent cheaper than uncollateralised loans. 
This surge in lending (Figure 27 and Figure 28) was backed by TMB’s success in 
deposit mobilisation. This is reflected in individual depositor growth figures: an increase 
of 73 per cent to 8.57 million in 2016, from 4.96 million in the previous year, and 
translating into a 75 per cent increase in deposits over the same time period (Telenor, 
2016: 57-60). Interestingly, the institution in the same year, 2016, reported no 
borrowings from banks and other financial institutions: ostensibly choosing to rely on 
deposits instead. In contrast, individual depositors for FMFB increased to 0.44 million in 
2016 from 0.28 million in the previous year: 57 per cent growth in percentage terms but 
translating to a rise in deposit base of only 27 per cent. Despite the incongruity in 
growth here, TMB’s deposit base at PKR 20.82 billion is large compared to FMFB’s PKR 
12.24 but the incongruity in depositor numbers indicate that the average deposit size for 
TMB is PKR 2429 compared to PKR 27818 for FMFB when institutional depositors are 
also taken into consideration: it is noteworthy also that FMFB appears reliant on 
institutional donors whereas the opposite is true for TMB. FMFB's relatively passive 
stance here may be attributed to the nature of their deposits. By avoiding costly 
liabilities from high yielding deposits, FMFB has avoided the need to push loan 
disbursement in the same manner as TMB: this is evident in a comparison of their 
respective deposit to GLP ratios, as seen in the figure below. Other comparative 
inferences that can be drawn from the financial data of the two banks are revealing as 
well; one is the declining trend in costs of funds; another is the rising trend in gross loan 
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portfolios. Both appear to be related and may be attributed to the combined effect of 
falling benchmark rates and a relaxation of capital at risk (CAR) and collateral rules. 
These are also expressed in the figures below.  
The issue of collateral is not a new one and the instance of gold backed loans 
demonstrates innovation from the microfinance sector to enhance credit offtake. 
Nenova et. al (2009: 109) note how the commercial bank fixation on collateral — 
particularly immovable collateral —for lending to firms has impeded SME loan for 
which collateral is limited and movable. Regulatory intervention to allow flexibility in 
what is accepted as collateral as well as enhanced information sharing through a credit 
bureau is thus needed to expand SME lending (Nenova et al., 2009: 100). Noteworthy is 
that a credit bureau can be instrumental in creating a potential collateral substitute in 
the form of a credit history to enable financial access for groups that may not have cash 
or asset collateral required but nevertheless have a good repayment record (Nenova et 
al., 2009: 100). 
Figure 27: Gross Loan Portfolio (PKR 000) 
 
Source: PMN, Annual financial reports 
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Figure 28: Deposits to GLP 
 
 
Source: PMN, Annual financial reports 
 
Financialising fintech 
Fintech in Pakistan is at present almost synonymous with the payment service known as 
Easypaisa, which is the country’s foremost digital payment and domestic money transfer 
service. Easypaisa was initially the proposed remedy to the burden of personnel costs 
which remained high despite the shift from a branch oriented approach to one that 
relied on community centres and sales centres with satellite touch points (Mitha, 2015). 
The management of Tameer was intrigued by the potential of a network of agents to 
open bank accounts and provide a full range of financial services using mobile 
technology instead of traditional branches. They explored partnerships in Pakistan 
while piloting a branchless banking channel with CGAP to ‘test drive’ various 
technologies including biometric ATMs and POS based lending services. 161 At the same 
time the Telenor, a Norway based global telecommunications company, was facing 
difficult competition in Pakistan and had identified mobile money as an opportunity to 
generate an additional income stream given weakening mobile communications 
revenue. Regulatory requirements held that only a bank could hold a branchless 
banking license to offer mobile financial services: Telenor thus sought to partner with a 
financial institution and was the potential for Easypaisa that drove the partial 
_____________________________ 
161 Through for instance, hand-held ‘point of sale’ bank machines.  
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acquisition of Tameer Microfinance Bank in 2008: the institution eventually became 
Telenor Bank after the Norwegian company raised its stake to 100 per cent in 2016.162  
Telenor’s role here was thus part of this multinational company’s planned 
incursion into mobile money and resulted in the — eventual and immensely successful 
— launch of Easypaisa in 2009.163 Contemporaneous initiatives included M-Pesa in 
Kenya, backed by Vodafone — and supported by research from DFID — which had 
launched in 2007. Elsewhere, mobile money services were in a nascent stage in 
Afghanistan in 2009 (Heinrich, 2013), and Bangladesh in 2011 (CGAP, 2014). The appeal 
of mobile money had been proven earlier, in the Philippines where Smart’s Smart 
Money launched in 2001 and Globe’s GCash launched in 2004 (CGAP, 2009). The two 
main products offered initially by Easypaisa provided services for utility bill payments 
and for domestic remittances: these were sold through a network of 12,000 agents, who 
were usually owners of small retail businesses. With the help of extensive marketing 
campaigns, this OTC (over-the-counter) model proved to very effective. Easypaisa met 
impressive results and processed five million transactions. By the end of 2012 this had 
risen to 100 million transactions, the equivalent of USD 1.4 billion in less than one year. 
Importantly, 70 per cent of its customers were new and not Telenor Pakistan mobile 
subscribers (McCarty and Bjaerum, 2013)  
The management’s decision to postpone the launch of a purely digital service by 
focusing on OTC proved remarkably effective. The OTC model made it possible to serve 
all mobile phone subscribers, instead of only Telenor Pakistan customers, whilst 
complying with KYC (know-your-customer) regulatory requirements. Based on a 
registration process that includes a photograph and biometric fingerprinting to verify 
government issued identification documents, KYC requirements for financial 
transactions tend to intimidate many potential users. The model used by TMB may be 
likened to a Western Union wire transfer: the customer simply hands over cash to an 
agent who facilitates the transaction on the customer’s behalf (Ratcliffe and Goldstein, 
2013).  
Despite its success, the OTC model appears to have created an issue of path 
dependence.164 This is evidenced by subsequent launches of competing mobile money 
products including UBL’s Omni, Mobilink Jazz’s MobiCash, and Askari Bank and Zong’s 
TimePey. In all of these cases both models were offered but with a clear focus on OTC, 
showing how mobile money strategies are primarily shaped by comprehensive KYC 
requirements in a telecommunications landscape without a dominant provider. OTC 
_____________________________ 
162 ‘Synergies between both organizations started developing around Telenor’s willingness to grow in rural areas and 
Tameer’s need for a partner who could bring both the technology and the agent network. This culminated in a formal 
agreement in 2008. The agreement made official both parties’ intentions to jointly launch Easypaisa, an agent and mobile 
assisted payment service, and resulted in Telenor’s entry into Tameer’s equity structure.’ (Mitha, 2015)  
163 USD 7 million was invested in the technology platform, national marketing campaign, organisational structure, and 
agent training, with an additional budget ringfenced for expected losses over initial years of operations: the service began 
operating at break-even very quickly and boosted expectations that financial services will generate up to 10per cent of total 
revenue in Pakistan for the telecom giant (McCarty and Bjaerum, 2013). 
164 Where despite voluntary and individually maximizing behaviour ‘a minor or fleeting advantage or a seemingly 
inconsequential lead for some technology, product or standard can have important and irreversible influences’ (Liebowitz 
and Margolis, 1995).   
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popularity is also a likely consequence of low literacy levels. The ease of use of a system 
where customers access services locally from agents they are acquainted with and trust, 
and also do not need to register with is difficult to replace (McCarty and Bjaerum, 2013). 
A key implication of OTC dominance — with 87 per cent of transactions based 
on this model — is that most customers do not register and own personal accounts: this 
is an impediment to digital finance which relies on personal accounts for the use of 
mobile phone based services such as savings, insurance and loans (Ratcliffe and 
Goldstein, 2013). This is particularly irksome in Pakistan, given that each and every 
transaction is recorded through biometric data and photo identification. But it also 
represents a sizeable opportunity for new technology to bridge the gap between OTC 
and digital transactions. This appears to have been the motivation underlying TMB's 
third round of M&A, in early 2018 when China's Ant Financial — the fintech arm of e-
commerce conglomerate Alibaba — purchased a 45 per cent stake in Telenor for a 
'strategic partnership' (Financial Times, 2018). Ant Financial’s origins are in Alipay 
which was established in 2004 by Alibaba and its founder, Jack Ma, as a mobile payment 
platform. It eventually overtook the combined transaction value of Paypal and Square 
and became the leading payment platform globally. Ant Financial is ‘a technology 
company that brings inclusive financial services to the world’ (Ant Financial, 2017). It is 
perhaps the most triumphant instance of a ‘unicorn’, with some valuations placing it 
above financial giants such as BNP Paribas, Goldman Sachs, and Credit Suisse (Quartz, 
2018).165  
Ant Financial's specialist role in utilising biometric technology to push financial 
inclusion is well established. Their foray into the Pakistan microfinance market appears 
to have been strongly motivated by the biometric potential of mobile money, 
particularly given the prowess of Pakistan’s National Database and Registration 
Authority database (NADRA) in biometric verification for financial transactions 
(Financial Times, 2018).  The tech giant is known for its authentication expertise 
through technologies such as fingerprint and facial recognition: these are used 
extensively by Ant Financial’s own companies including its payment platform, Alipay, 
and tech developer, Megvii Technology (SBP, 2017).  
These examples, and TMB’s shareholder appeal — as evidenced by acquisitions 
— demonstrate the role of digital finance in contemporary banking.166 Compared to 
TMB, FMFB comes across as passive in its approaches to use digital finance as an 
expansion strategy. But this is an inaccurate representation when the digital finance 
strategies of its parent bank, HBL, are considered. In recent media interviews, the 
president of HBL has described his organisation’s focus on technology and innovation, 
including cross selling across different businesses. This could very well include making 
_____________________________ 
165 A start-up company valued in excess of USD 1 billion (Lee, 2015).  
166 Digital finance may be seen as an important narrative thread of financial accesss story. The first and second threads are 
the narratives of participatory/ inclusive development and financial globalization respectively. The confluence of these 
narratives is the logic of what Gabor and Brooks (2017) call the digital financial revolution: this is based on a fintech–
philanthropy–development complex. This complex which runs on the mapping, monetisation, and also expansion of digital 
footprints, has been described by Izabella Kaminksa as ‘financial intrusion’ (Financial Times, 2015). 
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sales to clients of FMFB, given the permissibility of cross selling products amidst lax 
data privacy regulation.167 
‘From my perspective, we have to start thinking that we’re an IT company with a 
banking license. With 1,700 bank branches and 2,000 ATM’s all over the country, 
HBL acquires 1 million new customers a month. With the rollout of biometric 
devices nationwide that number is set to double or triple’ (Pakistan Today, 2018). 
The involvement of microfinance banks in Pakistan in this movement is 
reflected in recent transformations undergone through mergers and acquisitions. More 
prominent examples include those MFBs that came to be owned by mobile phone 
operators: U Microfinance Bank and Mobilink Microfinance Bank. Less obvious 
examples are Finca Microfinance Bank and Khushhali Microfinance Bank: the former is 
partnered with a local start-up company, Finja, to offer cashless financial services, 
whereas the latter is majority owned by a large bank, UBL, known for its nationwide 
digital financial services network. The other MFBs have not yet attempted to offer 
digital services: at present they do not have permission in the form of Branchless 
Banking licenses. This fintech-philanthropy-development complex has thus obscured 
the distinction between funding for development and that for investment, an overlap 
that augments the appeal of inclusive finance.  
6.5 SHADOW FINANCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN PAKISTAN 
The key argument of this chapter has been that shadow financial citizenship is an 
outcome of the products and services offered as inclusive finance because shadow banks 
cannot offer financial citizenship. Figure 29, below, shows how inclusive finance, 
shadow banking, and fintech converge and also diverge, through a schema borrowed 
from Knaack and Gruinn (2017). 
Inclusive finance from mainstream banks is offered through ‘Asaan’ accounts 
which are basic bank accounts. 168  This type of account is described by the regulator as a 
low risk bank account with simplified due diligence that all commercial banks must 
offer. Mobile money, such as Easypaisa, is used mainly by individuals for domestic 
remittances or for transferring money from one part of the country to another. The 
overlap here is noteworthy because it highlights the limitations of the basic bank 
account to offer interbank transfer services that are accessible and priced reasonably 
enough to compete with mobile money.   
 
_____________________________ 
167 This was also indicated through personal communications with HBL senior executives, during fieldwork. 
168 ‘Asaan’ is the Urdu word for ‘easy’.    
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Figure 29: Overlapping spaces of shadow banks, inclusive finance, fintech 
Adapted from Knaack and Gruin (2017) 
Other forms of inclusive finance which overlap with shadow banking — as they are 
funded through disintermediated models of banking — include microfinance also 
known as microloans or microcredit, and also digital loans offered specifically through 
microfinance banks. The latter product is relatively new in Pakistan and has been 
launched by Easypaisa as a ‘digital nano loan’ which can be approved online within five 
minutes: timely repayments are rewarded with larger loans in future applications.169 
This type of loan tends to be expensive: rates are not disclosed on the websites of loan 
providers but anecdotal evidence shows that these are equivalent to triple digits on an 
APR basis.170 Such pricing is justified by practitioners for these loans because (1) they 
usually have a maturity period of 30 days rather than 4 – 24 months as is the case 
generally with microcredit, and (2) they rely on processing fees which are applied on 
every application (Dawn, 2018).  
‘This innovative service is aimed at the common man who has no access to formal 
loans or banking services. It enables easy access to working capital requirements 
for farmers, selfemployed individuals, street hawkers, and home-based workers. It 
also works as an effective tool in creating financial literacy by incentivizing positive 
credit behavior through access to better borrowing terms’ (Telenor, 2018). 
_____________________________ 
169 http://www.telenorbank.pk/easypaisa-sahara.html 
170 Private communications with microfinance practitioners in Karachi (August, 2017) 
170 
 
Shadow banking and fintech are of course not limited to the market for inclusive 
finance. More traditional forms of shadow banking also exist in Pakistan which are 
mainly focused on debt capital, such as money market bonds and term finance 
certificates. Noteworthy is that these markets are dominated by public borrowing 
activities since government debt exceeds 40 per cent of GDP in Pakistan. Qoumi Bachat 
Digital is an extension of the government’s National Savings Schemes which currently 
accounts for over one fifth of total domestic debt.171 Blockchain is mentioned in the 
figure as a form of fintech that is separate from shadow banking because it does not rely 
on debt.  
6.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter explains how shadow financial citizenship emerges from bifurcated 
banking. Like many other poor countries where enhanced access to financial services is 
a policy goal, the Pakistani financial system has two parts with inclusive finance offered 
separately from mainstream or commercial finance. While both these parts are similar 
in that they (1) accept deposits, (2) provide credit, and (3) transfer payments and 
remittances, there are differences in the nature of the services provided by inclusive 
finance relative to mainstream finance.  
The deposit taking activities of the two microfinance institutions in this study 
reflect the paramount role of deposits in the inclusive finance model which is, in 
Pakistan, dominated by deposit taking microfinance banks. Because deposits are needed 
to create loans, MFBs have come to compete with mainstream banks by offering high 
returns to depositors. Successful deposit mobilisation has meant that these same banks 
must aggressively offer loans in order to service expensive liabilities. For such lending 
patterns to be viable, it is necessary for MFBs to accept innovative, unconventional 
forms of collateral. The example of TMB shows how such strategies are shaped, with 
surging deposits accompanied by a growing loan portfolio, heavily collateralised by gold 
jewellery. In contrast, FMFB, given its background, has been relatively passive in deposit 
mobilisation as well as lending, particularly in its collateralised form. This is so because 
a deposit centred funding strategy is the preliminary approach taken by FMFB. In the 
sphere of payments and remittances, TMB’s Easypaisa product has made a strong 
contribution to its overall profitability, revealing the crucial potential of fintech in 
inclusive finance: this is reflected in the growth strategies of FMFB’s parent bank, HBL. 
For both MFBs, the strategic potential for future growth has driven ownership patterns.  
The nature and implications of bifurcated banking are thus exemplified through 
the two deposit taking microfinance institutions studied here. Despite clearly different 
initial strategies and goals, both institutions eventually adopted similar approaches: this 
reveals the homogenising influence of global finance through the push to make 
institutions ‘sustainable’ through profit orientation. A key outcome of this push has 
_____________________________ 
171 http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/Chapters_15/09_Publicper cent20Debt.pdf  
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been the presence of shadow financial citizenship through the grey area between 
financial exclusion and financial citizenship. The features of this include high service 
charges for loans, the compulsion to provide fungible collateral, and the insidious 
forfeiture of digital privacy.  
As shown above, the institutions offering shadow financial citizenship are adept 
at redesigning themselves as different yet similar to the mainstream banking sector: 
they are different because they offer opportunities for ‘leapfrogging’ and imply fast 
growth and innovation. At the same time, their proximity to traditional banks makes 
them appealing for investors and donors as part of the financial sector.   
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7. EVOLUTIONS IN SHADOW FINANCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN FINANCING 
DEVELOPMENT 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter expands the arguments made earlier about funding inclusive finance 
through private capital through a study of the practice known as impact investing. The 
key contention is that impact investing exemplifies shadow banking — by advancing its 
practices and utilising its networks — and is a driver for bifurcated banking by 
providing funding for the ‘grey area’ identified earlier. This claim is made by drawing 
linkages between inclusive finance in Pakistan and the broader trend of ‘financialised 
development’ (A. Roy, 2010).   
The rise of impact investing in Pakistan, which has a penchant for inclusive 
finance projects, is examined here as an extension of the financial sector and 
development sector nexus identified in Chapter 2. Two contentions are thus made: one, 
that impact investors fill the void in enterprise finance created by regulatory constraints 
on banks, and two, that impact investors accommodate the demand for yield by 
shepherding global capital into poor countries. These contentions augment the finance 
and development literature, which critiques the financialised development associated 
with the Finance for Development (FfD) agenda construed by global institutions 
ostensibly for the Millennium Development Goals, or MDGs, of 2015 and subsequently 
the Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, of 2030.  
More recently, the narrative of slogans such as Billions to Trillions and the 
World Bank’s Maximizing Finance for Development agenda have, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, drawn criticism because they advance shadow banking through a ‘Wall Street 
Consensus’ (Gabor, 2019). The case of Pakistan exemplifies the traction gained by 
impact investing as an asset class and the related imperative to measure and evaluate 
outcomes. The resultant focus on base-of-pyramid initiatives, particularly inclusive 
finance, is a corollary of the shifts and transformations in development initiatives 
centred on private and philanthropic or ‘patient’ capital. Impact investing is a key driver 
of bifurcated banking because it provides funding specifically for projects — centred 
often, but not only on inclusive finance —  which measure success through the quantity 
of poor individuals who use its products and services.  
Earlier chapters in this thesis probe why the Pakistani banking system is 
bifurcated. Shadow banking is a recurrent theme in this analysis because (1) inclusive 
finance is a response to lending constraints faced by mainstream banks produced by 
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regulatory and structural factors and (2) inclusive finance is an investment opportunity 
for global institutional investors searching for yield. By drawing attention to how global 
institutional investors — in possession of private as well as public capital — fund 
inclusive finance in Pakistan, the current chapter builds upon the argument that 
inclusive finance is a form of shadow banking.  
In advancing shadow banking practices, institutions, and networks, these global 
institutional investors are responsible for advancing disintermediated forms of banking. 
As such, they widen the separation between inclusive finance, which is based on 
disintermediated models, and mainstream finance, which is based on traditional models 
of intermediation. This separation underlies bifurcated banking in Pakistan.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 7.2 presents a 
concise, Pakistan specific, context for why impact investing bears relevance for 
contemporary development strategies in general and inclusive finance in particular, 7.3 
is a discussion on the role of patient capital in development, and how this relation 
creates a gateway for shadow banking practices, 7.4 presents a concise overview of the 
shifts and transformations that have occurred over recent years to shape development 
initiatives by incorporating private and philanthropic capital, 7.5 describes the link 
between shadow banking, inclusive finance, and impact investing in Pakistan and 7.6 
concludes.  
7.2 FINANCING DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN THROUGH 
SHADOW BANKING  
The financialisation of development underlies crucial shifts and transformations in 
development initiatives that incorporate private and philanthropic or ‘patient’ capital. 
In the context of inclusive finance, the incorporation of private and philanthropic 
capital has gained remarkable traction because of the practice known as impact 
investing: based on the virtues of patient capital, this approach explicitly targets 
financial as well as social goals, or a ‘double bottom line’.  
The experience of Pakistan particularly as depicted in the grey literature of the 
Global Impact Investing Network or GIIN, development finance institutions, and fund 
managers, is used as the empirical setting to consider the trends and repercussions of 
impact investment as development finance.172 Noteworthy patterns include the 
dominance of the energy and financial services sectors respectively, which extend BoP 
approaches to investment. Financial services are of particular interest because the 
‘impact investment-inclusive finance-nexus’ provides a visible example of the 
expansionary imperative of global finance. The example of Pakistan shows how impact 
investing is drawn to inclusive finance as a development intervention for its financial 
logic. In other words, impact investing as a form of shadow banking absorbs inclusive 
_____________________________ 
172 The Global Impact Investing Network is a nonprofit organisation dedicated to increasing the scale and effectiveness of 
impact investing particularly through research and building infrastructure such as measurement and evaluation tools. See 
https://thegiin.org/  
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finance. As such, it bifurcates Pakistan’s banking sector by widening the scope of 
disintermediated approaches to finance. Additionally, the data indicates that impact 
investors prefer deploying capital as debt rather than equity. These tendencies are 
examined here and a theoretical basis for impact investing in Pakistan is then offered by 
invoking arguments from the literature on shadow banking.  
Impact investors are effectively shadow banks because impact investing is a 
response to constraints imposed on mainstream banks given tight regulation, including 
stringent capital requirements, regulatory arbitrage: additionally it is a response to a 
search for yield from global institutional investors. This second tendency is particularly 
relevant in the Pakistan context where like other shadow banking practices, impact 
investing enables the push for new financial markets, products, techniques, and 
institutions because the demand for investables outstrips supply.  The supply of 
investables is expanded through impact investment funds and their propensity for 
varying capital structures and asset classes. These rely on capital from investors such as 
pension funds, philanthropic foundations, banks, or public sector funders. To attract 
this capital these investment funds create investables in two ways: through debt and 
through equity.  
7.3 PATIENT CAPITAL IN SHADOW BANKING 
Impact investment strategies have — over the last decade or so — entrenched 
themselves simultaneously in the vocabulary of two global communities: development 
and finance. This overlap is a corollary of the Finance for Development (FfD) agenda 
mentioned earlier, in Chapter 2. Global institutions, particularly those under the United 
Nations umbrella, exuberantly support this agenda because they see it as the ostensible 
means to attain the targets set for the Millennium Development Goals, or MDGs, of 2015 
and subsequently the Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, of 2030 (UNDP, 2017). 
More recent iterations of these approaches are reflected in the narrative of slogans such 
as Billions to Trillions and the World Bank’s Maximizing Finance for Development 
agenda, which have drawn criticism for seeking to advance shadow banking.173 This 
criticism is directed at development strategies that are reliant on private capital or 
credit, but more specifically at shadow banks which are financial institutions that are 
‘entities and activities fully or partially outside the regular banking system’ (FSB, 2013: 
5). 
These concerns pertain directly to inclusive finance, particularly given the need 
for funds for on-lending. The practice of obtaining funds from large financial 
institutions and then disbursing them as credit under the pretext of inclusive finance 
facilitates the meeting of a double bottom line. Such lending is profitable, and given a 
narrative of self-help, it is also socially desirable. This is also emphasised in Target 1.4 of 
the SDGs: 
_____________________________ 
173 These concerns are summarised in the open letter circulated here: https://criticalfinance.org/2018/10/10/  
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‘By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the 
vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic 
services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, 
natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including 
microfinance’ (UNDP, 2017).
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International organisation increasingly emphasise private sector involvement in 
development. Their strategies are thus focused on the role of, and need for, financial 
capital from various sources, including public, private, and philanthropic organisations. 
To accommodate this variety, finance for development appears in various forms, 
including PPPs or public-private partnerships, blended finance, and impact investing 
strategies. The latter is of special interest because of its linkages with philanthropy, 
which has the capacity to be a source of patient capital.  
Patient capital is a means to draw investors to risky but socially desirable 
projects. Deeg and Hardie (2016) describe it as: ‘equity or debt whose providers aim to 
capture benefits specific to long-term investments and who maintain their investment 
even in the face of adverse short-term conditions for the firm’. As such, it is a means to 
de-risk financial capital and to thus crowd in more investment. The need for patient 
capital entails the involvement of actors — including, but also from outside of the 
public sector — willing to accept below market returns for investments.  
This aligns closely with what Bishop and Green (2006) call 
‘philanthrocapitalism’, an approach to altruism which is the core of the ‘philanthropy-
finance-development complex’ (Stolz and Lai, 2018; Gabor and Brooks, 2017; Mawdsley, 
2015). Below market returns are an alternative to risk-based pricing because they ensue 
from investments that seek a double bottom line: this is the difference between risk 
capital and patient capital.175 Patient capital encompasses financial gain as well as 
positive social and environmental outcomes, otherwise known as ‘impact’. This is so 
because impact investing draws on the same arguments that fuel the aspirations of 
individuals and institutions to be philanthrocapitalists (Bishop and Green, 2006), by 
committing ‘patient capital’ to initiatives where other financial capitalists fear to tread.  
Both impact investors and philanthrocapitalists assume that their capital will 
generate some degree of financial return, but there are two key differences between 
impact investing and philanthrocapitalism: intent and measurement. These features 
instil a structural rigour on the strategies of impact investors by dictating what can and 
cannot be regarded as an impact investment. These constraints bear relevance for the 
developmental potential of impact investment as they influence how capital is deployed. 
This argument is made by presenting the origins and transformation of impact investing 
— an extension of the FfD initiative — and then noting how the emphasis on 
measurement prioritizes base-of-the-pyramid (BoP) markets.  
 
_____________________________ 
174 Sustainable Development Goal 1 is ‘End poverty in all its forms everywhere‘: https://sdg-tracker.org/no-poverty 
175 This characterisation is used by the Acumen Fund (2018).  
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7.4 PPPS, BLENDED FINANCE, AND IMPACT INVESTING: 
ORIGINS, AND TRANSFORMATIONS 
Impact investing, as a development strategy, overlaps with slightly older tools, 
particularly blended finance and PPP. For all of these strategies there are multiple 
definitions. What links them is some form of a joint funding structure to cover finance 
gaps for projects that would otherwise be borne fully by either the public or private 
sector. What separates these strategies is perhaps more interesting: whereas PPP 
strategies, and to a lesser extent but also blended capital, are ostensibly designed to 
enable the public sector to attract private capital, impact investing strategies are 
designed to attract patient capital, usually from governments or philanthropists.  
The World Bank (2018) definition of a PPP or public-private partnership is: ‘a 
long-term contract between a private party and a government entity, for providing a 
public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant risk and management 
responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance’.176 The mainstreaming of 
PPPs, also known as 3P or P3, is linked to their popularity — with governments in the 
Global South — in the 1990s.177 These strategies sought to replicate the experience of 
advanced capitalist countries — particularly of the Thatcher and Reagan regimes — 
where PPPs had been used extensively in the 1980s for projects of urban development 
(Hodge et al., 2017; Miraftab, 2004). A recent initiative is the launch of the World Bank 
PPP Knowledge Lab in 2015.178 Another is the G20 Global Infrastructure Hub in 2014. 179 
have been central to the formation of what Hodge et al. (2017) describe as a new identity 
for PPPs: with a focus on infrastructure and growth, rather on the mode of delivery.  
This emphasis on infrastructure has to a certain extent, been retained in 
blended finance strategies, but tends to weaken when blended finance is explicitly 
linked to the MDGs and SDGs. Blended finance, according to the OECD (2018), refers 
to: ‘the strategic use of development finance and philanthropic funds to mobilize private 
capital flows to emerging and frontier markets’. Some definitions specifically mention 
ODA or official development assistance.180 Others are focused on grants or ‘grant-
equivalent finance’.181 And some are explicit about the role of philanthropy.182. Blended 
finance strategies are thus similar to PPPs but move beyond the public and private 
spheres to involve development agencies, international organisations, and also 
philanthropists.  
In its earlier forms blended finance was oriented to infrastructure projects. This 
is reflected in the examples of various projects lead and supported by the Aga Khan 
_____________________________ 
176 Hodge and Greve (2017) note that there are several historical examples of PPP arrangements including toll roads, land 
reclamation, canals, and sanitation projects in Western Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. 
177 Since the 1990s PPPs have come to seen as ‘mainstream’, particularly after receiving the backing of international 
organisations and development agencies including the UNDP and DFID.  
178 https://pppknowledgelab.org/  
179 https://www.gihub.org/  
180 See Eurodad (2017)  
181 See Mustapha et al. (2014)  
182 See OECD (2017)  
177 
 
Foundation, a faith based organisation that operates in over 30, mostly poor, countries 
and generates revenues for reinvestment in further development ventures. The Aga 
Khan Fund for Economic Development (AKFED), through its project companies 
generates revenues of USD 4.1 billion with all surpluses reinvested in further 
development activities (AKDN, 2018b). By many accounts, AKFED through the Aga 
Khan Development Network, or AKDN, has played a pioneering role in promoting 
blended finance for development: this has been done by combining the financial capital 
of its own philanthropic network with resources from vast and diverse consortia of 
partners and stakeholders. These include international organisations such as the World 
Bank and the International Financial Corporation, national governments such as 
Canada and Switzerland, regional development banks such as the African Development 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and large financial institutions such as BNP 
Paribas and Blackstone. This strategy is exemplified in a 1980s speech from Prince Karim 
Aga Khan, as below. 
‘Bringing together the best what private initiative has to offer from various nations 
has many attractive aspects to developing countries. Individual financial and 
monetary risk is reduced, the sources from which to draw qualified manpower are 
multiplied and political acceptability is increased. Public, or State owned, 
enterprises can never be a complete substitute for private enterprise in building a 
nation’s economy and in bridging the development gap’ (Aga Khan, 1982, cited in 
AKDN, 2018a: 22).  
There are numerous examples of large projects that have utilised the above approach. 
Pamir Energy which was established in 2002 through the collaboration of the 
Government of Tajikistan, the International Finance Corporation, and the Swiss 
government is an AKDN project that supplies clean energy to over a quarter of a million 
people in eastern Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan (European Foundation Centre, 
2018). Another example of an infrastructural project, also in Afghanistan is that of 
Roshan, a telecom services provider, which has, since its inception in 2003, invested 
approximately USD 700 million in Afghanistan as the country’s single largest private 
investor: it is also the largest taxpayer, contributing approximately five percent of the 
Afghan government's overall domestic revenue (Roshan, 2016: 3). The company is 
owned by a consortium of investors, comprising AKFED, Monaco Telecom, and the 
Swedish telecom provider, Telia. Another project in Afghanistan is the Government’s 
National Solidarity Programme (NSP), of which AKDN is a facilitating partner and 
assists in establishing village-based Community Development Councils: this is done 
through an elected, accountable and transparent Council that formulates village 
development plans, and prioritizes village needs.  
Elsewhere, there are other examples of blended finance as a development tool. 
These include the Bujagali Hydropower Plant, inaugurated in 2012 and built through a 
public-private partnership model between the AKFED, Sithe Global Power LLC, an 
American company majority-owned by the private equity fund, Blackstone Capital 
Partners IV, L.P., the International Finance Corporation, the African Development Bank, 
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the European Investment Bank and the Government of Uganda. The West Nile Rural 
Electrification Company is another AKFED lead project; a 1.5 MW plant, commissioned 
in September 2004, was upgraded in 2012 to boost electricity generating capacity. This 
was done with the support of the Government of Uganda, the German Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW), and the World Bank as well as others. The 3.5MW River Nyagak 
mini hydroelectric plant now provides a renewable source of energy to 1.4 million 
people.  
More recently, initiatives that promote blended finance strategies have come to 
be associated with the SDGS for the year 2030 (OECD, 2017). The roots of this 
association are in the FfD or Financing for Development Agenda mentioned above. FfD 
as a development strategy emerged from the United Nations International Conference 
on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002. The ensuing 
Monterrey Consensus was a direct response to the concern that the MDGs required 
immense financial resources. Several studies place cost on the MDGs, with USD 50 
billion per annum offered as a commonly cited figure (Clemens et al., 2007). The 
Monterrey Consensus made FDI one of the six pillars of development finance, and in the 
process underscored the role of private finance in an FfD or Financing for Development 
agenda.  
In the 16 years since its inception, FfD has been subject to shifts. Initially 
designed for MDGs with a target date of 2015, a revised plan was presented in the July of 
that year at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis 
Ababa, to accommodate the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
Whereas the United Nations (UN, 2002) estimated that USD 50 billion per annum 
would be required to meet the MDG targets, for the SDGs, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development or UNCTAD estimates that USD 5 to USD 7 
trillion is required overall and this indicates that there is an investment gap in 
developing countries of USD 2.5 trillion (UNCTAD, 2016). As Emma Mawdsley observes, 
previous financing needs for development interventions including official development 
assistance or ODA and also the MDGs have been dwarfed in comparison to the targets 
of the SDGs:  
‘A variety of MDG-related donor meetings sought to encourage the (so-called) 
“traditional” donors to reach their long-standing commitments to provide 0.7 % of 
gross national income in ODA. Few donors have ever met this target, and it seems 
most unlikely that the majority ever will under current definitions. As the SDGs 
coalesced, on the other hand, their ambition and scale evidently rendered this 0.7 
% target grossly inadequate. ODA continues to be recognized as an important 
resource, especially for the poorest and/or most conflict-affected countries, but 
even if every donor met the 0.7 % target it would barely touch the trillions that 
have been variously estimated to be required to achieve the SDGs’ (Mawdsley, 
2018: 192). 
Whereas the MDG focus was on poverty reduction, the SDG focus is on areas such as 
energy, innovation, and efficiency. Investment opportunities in these areas are framed 
as having trickle down effects for poverty reduction (Mawdsley, 2018). This narrative 
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reveals a shift: whereas the MDGs were seen as moving the emphasis from poor 
countries to poor people (St. Clair, 2005) and critiqued because ‘to speak of poverty is to 
postpone speaking of development’ (Sindzingre, 2004: 176), the SDGs envision a distinct 
role for the state. Not unlike in the past, the state is responsible for supporting the 
financing of development, but unlike in the past, this financing is to be arranged 
through the collaborative participation of public, private, and also philanthropic 
stakeholders. The importance of philanthropy is reflected in the literature of the joint 
ReDesigning Development Finance Initiative, from the World Economic Forum and 
OECD, which describes blended finance as the ‘strategic use of development finance 
and philanthropic funds to mobilize private capital for development’ (World Economic 
Forum, 2015: 3). 
The attention directed to philanthropy for its potential to supplement FfD and 
to advance blended finance strategies has driven the institutionalisation of 
philanthrocapitalism. The contribution of the Rockefeller Foundation has been 
substantial in highlighting the nexus between finance and philanthropy which produced 
the concept of impact investing. The term ‘impact investing’ was coined in 2007 at the 
Foundation’s Bellagio Center, ‘putting a name to investments made with the intention 
of generating both financial return and social and/or environmental impact’ 
(Rockefeller Foundation, 2018). A focal point for the Rockefeller Foundation is 
‘innovative finance’, described as ‘Private Capital for the Public Good’ (Keohane and 
Madsbjerg, 2016). Innovative finance is an approach to channel private money from 
global financial markets by using ‘philanthropic risk capital’ (Rockefeller Foundation, 
2018).  
This approach underlies the presentation of impact investing as a new asset 
class that offers a double bottom line: market returns and social good (JP Morgan, 2010). 
In its annual Global Family Office Report, the Swiss based bank UBS observed that as 
family offices of high net worth individuals are taken over by younger — millennial — 
generations, the demand for profitable investments which also seek to address 
environmental and social issues has grown (UBS, 2017). Additionally, another instance 
of the mainstreaming of impact investment is in the endorsement by the Vatican: Pope 
Francis convened a landmark conference on impact investing in 2014 and this was 
followed by subsequent conferences in 2016 and 2018: 
‘…to share and evaluate blended finance models and investible vehicles to address 
systemic challenges of great importance to both the Catholic Church and the 
global community: Climate Change, Health, Migrants and Refugees, and Youth 
Unemployment’ (Vatican Impact Investing Conference, 2018:1). 
Is there then an overlap between blended finance and impact investments? The latter 
are described as ‘investments made into companies, organisations, and funds with the 
intention to generate social and environmental impact alongside a financial return’ 
(GIIN, 2018). Given this definition, the concept of impact investment shares 
commonalities with blended finance strategies formulated to advance developmental 
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goals. The key difference that sets them apart is this: blended finance is a strategy 
whereas impact investment is an asset class.  
The salience of this distinction is reflected in the definition of the Global Impact 
Investment Network, which is comprised of various international development agencies 
and large investment banks, and which portrays impact investing as an instrument 
rather than a practice. Additionally, when impact investing is presented as an asset 
class, the role of financial practices and instruments such as de-risking and patient 
capital, exemplify contemporary manifestations of development and finance. Moreover, 
the position of impact investment as an asset class also relates to the need for 
evaluation: in this case based on the metrics of intent and measurement. 
 Impact investing as a new asset class 
The positioning of impact investing as an asset class connects the practices of 
philanthrocapitalism and shadow banking. Impact investing has led to the production 
of financial instruments that are offered by asset managers to attract capital from 
philanthropists: impact investments thus link shadow bankers to 
philanthrocapitalists.183  
The Financial Times defines an asset class as a broad group of securities or 
investments that tend to react similarly in different market conditions: the three basic 
asset classes are equity securities (stocks), fixed-income securities (bonds), and cash 
equivalents (money market vehicles) but the consideration is often expanded to include 
real estate, commodities and derivatives (Financial Times, 2017). 184  
The notion that impact investments are a separate and new asset class has much 
to do with risk and return.185 Whereas the other asset classes mentioned above are 
evaluated in terms of how much they return relative to the risk they entail,, impact 
investments look beyond return in a purely financial sense, and seek to achieve non-
financial goals even when this compromises financial profitability. The attainment of 
these goals is made possible by patient capital and measurement techniques geared to 
evaluating social and environmental outcomes. While the objectives of such 
investments are diverse, some outcomes are more conducive to measurement than 
others. Table 7.1 presents illustrative examples of measurable outcomes, showing how 
projects that have a focus on numbers of individuals — such as financial services, 
education, or energy — are more conducive to being measured and reported.  
_____________________________ 
183 Here the description of shadow banking by Pozsar et al. (2010) of shadow banking as consisting of financial 
intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without explicit access to central bank liquidity or 
public sector credit guarantees, is relevant. 
184 Other alternative classes may be found under the headers of private equity, energy, infrastructure, real estate and 
credit.  
185 This concept, of a risk-return spectrum or trade-off, is central to Modern Portfolio Theory and is attributed to the 
American economist Harry Markowitz who was awarded a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1990.  
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Table 7.1: Illustrative Examples of Measurable Social or Environmental Outcomes 
Agriculture Increase in productivity or crop yield as a result of improved technology or training 
Education Participation rates of girls in secondary education in sub-Saharan Africa 
Energy Number of individuals at the base of the pyramid who gain access to electricity 
Environment Tons of CO2, equivalent offset as a result of organisation’s product or service 
Financial 
Services 
Number of micro-insurance products sold to people with AIDS and infected with HIV 
Health Readmission rate of diabetes patients using innovative product for monitoring health 
Housing Reduction in the rate of homelessness among major US cities 
Source: World Economic Forum (2013: 7) 
Table 7.2: Key tools for measuring impact 
Tool Description Institutional background 
IRIS 
(Impact Reporting 
and Investment 
Standards) 
Taxonomy or set of terms 
with standardized definitions 
that governs the way 
companies, investors, and 
others define their social and 
environmental performance. 
  
Sponsored by The Rockefeller 
Foundation, Acumen and the B Lab to 
create common metrics for reporting the 
performance of impact capital. Since 
2009, IRIS has been housed at the Global 
Impact Investing Network. It 
incorporates sector-specific best 
practices and reports major trends 
across the impact investing industry. 
 
B Analytics Customizable platform that 
various players in the impact 
space use for measuring, 
benchmarking and reporting 
on impact. 
Acumen developed PULSE in 2006 as a 
software that enables impact investors 
to collect, manage and report on the 
impact of their investees: PULSE was 
incorporated into B Analytics in 2013 
turning it into a fully integrated data and 
technology platform for investors to 
measure their impact of their portfolios.  
 
GIIRS (Global 
Impact Investment 
Ratings System) 
Impact ratings tool and 
analytics platform that 
assesses companies and 
funds on the basis of their 
social and environmental 
performance. Based on IRIS 
definitions; generates data 
that feed industry benchmark 
reports. 
Developed by B Lab and launched in 
2011 to manage, benchmark and assess 
the social and environmental impact of 
developed and emerging market 
companies, portfolios, and funds. Uses a 
ratings and analytics approach based on 
a broad universe of impact data. Data is 
self-reported by companies and 
reviewed by a third-party verification 
service provider, Deloitte before a 
company can receive a rating.  
 
Sources: Compiled by author, based on Acumen (2018); Brandenburg (2012). 
These social and environmental outcomes are the subject of a range of measurement 
techniques. Commitments to measure impact, along with expectations of returns, and 
the intent to have a positive social impact are the three features that set an impact 
investment apart from forms of investment (UNDP, 2017). This focus on measurement 
subjects this developmental approach to a level of standardisation that is 
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unprecedented in global development, albeit not in finance. The three key tools for 
measuring impact are IRIS, PULSE, and GIIRS. Table 7.2 shows how these are likened to 
tools used by commercial investors, such as the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (Financial Reporting Council, 2013) and credit rating tools such as Moody’s.  
These tools are employed across various geographies including the Global South 
as well as advanced capitalist countries. However, in the context of development IRIS is 
of particular interest because of its capacity to frame investment strategies. In doing so 
it facilitates a form of ‘social closure’ (Palan, 1999), which Heloise Weber describes this 
as a form of governance that ‘pushes questions of social and political struggle away from 
the realm of the public sphere’ (2004: 61). Particularly worrying is the predilection of 
IRIS for the narrative of BoP or base-of-pyramid initiatives which are the subject of C.K 
Prahalad’s immensely successful 2004 book: ‘The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: 
Eradicating Poverty Through Profits’.  
BoP strategies for reducing poverty rest on the assumption that poor people, 
who make up a substantial chunk of the world’s population, offer immense potential as 
customers of products and services that can meet their specific needs (Prahalad, 2005). 
Microfinance and mobile banking are examples of such products and services, as are 
singularly packaged toiletries and alcohol: such strategies have been criticised however, 
for exploiting ‘poor people’s vulnerabilities, such as their lack of education and their 
desire for cheap relief from chronic distress’ and also for under-emphasising the state’s 
role and responsibility in poverty reduction (Karnani, 2009).  
Such critiques problematise the impact investing industry’s hefty emphasis on 
financial services, as shown in Table 7.3. In particular, the BoP bent of IRIS is strongly 
reflected in the manner in which outcomes are measured. Very often, the unit of 
analysis is either individuals or products consumed. This is reflected in the heavy 
presence of impact enterprises operating in the financial services sector: these measure 
impact, for instance, in terms of number of micro-insurance products sold or number of 
persons or number of women who accessed financial services. Data gathered by the 
Global Investment Impact Network (GIIN) for 2013 shows that 73 per cent of impact 
enterprises, 2,707 in number, were in the financial services: data for 2015 shows a 
decrease in percentage and but a rise in absolute terms with financial services 
organisations making up a percentage of 63 per cent of the total despite growing to 
2,949 in total (see Table 7.3). This can be ascribed to the rise in the number of 
organisations described as ‘other’ or ‘technical assistance’. The latter might indicate a 
sharp increase in the number of consulting or advisory organisations operating in the 
impact investment sphere: in 2013 there were only 4 reporting organisations worldwide 
that were classified as technical assistance, whereas in 2015, there were 158, of these, 139 
were based in North America. While data for 2018 does not contain the number of 
organisations, it does show that financial services including microfinance accounted for 
28 per cent of assets under management by the global impact investing industry (GIIN, 
2018). 
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This overlap between BoP and financial services is the essential basis for lapses 
in financial citizenship because it legitimises less than complete access to mainstream 
finance and causes the system to be bifurcated. Mawdsley (2018a) notes that 
mainstream development models seek to deepen and expand financial markets and 
logics and that this is exemplified thus: in the shift from foreign aid to development 
finance, and also in the nature of the macro-micro linkages between financial circuits in 
interventions such as microfinance which extend the reach of financial technology and 
capital.186  
 
 
Table 7.3: Number of impact investment enterprises by region and sector187 
   East Asia 
and 
Pacific 
Sub 
Saharan 
Africa 
South 
Asia 
Europe 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
North 
America 
Middle 
East and 
North 
Africa 
Total 
Agriculture 18 141 14 17 293 34 3 520 
Artisanal 4 .. 3 4 14 8 0 33 
Culture 0 0 0 .. 15 11 .. 26 
Education .. 0 .. .. 5 34 0 39 
Energy 48 32 14 3 17 9 0 123 
Environment .. 0 0 .. 9 48 0 57 
Financial 
Services 
361 598 406 443 518 542 81 2949 
Health 3 10 8 4 21 27 .. 73 
Housing 
Development 
0 .. 5 .. 5 31 0 41 
ICT 11 46 16 8 50 64 4 199 
Infrastructure/ 
Facilities 
.. 0 .. .. 7 0 0 7 
Other 12 12 30 14 104 51 9 232 
Supply Chain 4 .. 3 .. 12 78 0 97 
Technical 
Assistance 
.. 0 .. 4 15 139 0 158 
_____________________________ 
186 The ascendancy of financial logic has also been the subject of concern in an emergent literature about the 
encroachment of the financial sector into development.  For instance, Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge (2018: 578) point to a 
recent revival in PPPs to exemplify this encroachment and observe that past efforts such as those in 1990s — involving the 
World Bank and also regional development banks — to enlist the private sector in development initiatives were driven by a 
narrative of efficiency gains through privatisation; but, current approaches present PPPs as an opportunity to utilize 
financial capital given ‘a glut in global savings’. 
187 Dots denote non-zero values that have been withheld due to the IRIS anonymity policy. The total column does not 
include these non-zero values.  
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Tourism .. 0 0 4 4 9 0 13 
Water 3 .. .. 0 .. 4   7 
Total 472 844 505 510 1091 1089 100 4611 
Source: GIIN (2015, p. 2) 
How to use shadow banking and financial innovation for 
development 
Recent survey data from GIIN (2018) indicates that private debt, often in the form of 
fixed income is, responsible for 34 per cent of the assets under management in the 
impact investing industry; this is followed by real assets — for instance infrastructure, 
real estate, and commodities — at 22 per cent; and private equity — through which 
investment funds acquire shareholding and ownership stakes in companies — at 19 per 
cent. These investables are incorporated into the strategies and portfolios of the some of 
the largest financial institutions. For instance, the 2015 acquisition of Imprint Capital 
Advisors, an 18 person San Francisco based impact investment fund, by Goldman Sachs 
was an indication, for the Wall Street financial community, that client demand for 
impact investments is substantial (Bloomberg, 2015).  
Another instance of Wall Street engagement with impact investing is to be 
found in the Global Impact fund launched in 2018 and managed by KKR, the New York 
based private equity firm which manages over USD 190 billion.188 For global financial 
institutions, acquiring or establishing a fund dedicated to impact investing is often a 
means to overcome size constraints: poor countries have shallow markets so investment 
opportunities, even when lucrative, tend to be too small to attract financial capital in 
the large tranches that are customary for global fund managers. The FfD agenda has to 
an extent overcome this problem and connected small impact investment funds with 
large global financial institutions through initiatives such as the PRI or United Nations 
Principles on Responsible Investment. By asking financial institutions to become 
signatories, the PRI generates explicit commitments to report on responsible 
investment activities annually; the current list of signatories currently exceeds two 
thousand (PRI, 2018).  
In addition to global financial institutions, impact investment funds receive 
capital from development finance institutions. For instance, the United Kingdom’s 
DFID, through its investment company the CDC or Commonwealth Development 
Corporation, has been deploying capital in impact investment funds since 2012: this is 
done directly, such as through establishment of a CDC managed Impact Fund, and also 
indirectly, as is the case with investments made by the Impact Fund into other funds 
focused on Africa, and Asia (The Impact Programme, 2018). Another instance which 
_____________________________ 
188 http://www.kkr.com/businesses/global-impact 
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reflects a somewhat different arrangement is the Microfinance Initiative for Asia (MIFA) 
Debt Fund. This was established in 2012 by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Germany’s development bank (KfW), and the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), and is managed by a privately owned, Swiss 
based, impact investment firm (OECD, 2018).   
There are thus investments made in impact investment funds, such as those by 
global financial institutions and by development finance institutions; and there are 
investments made by impact investment funds, such as those in BoP initiatives for 
financial services. The onus of meeting the requirements of metrics such as IRIS fall on 
the latter whereas the deployment of capital, either in the form or debt or equity, is in 
the hands of the former. The next section discusses how this arrangement has shaped 
development and finance in Pakistan.  
7.5 IMPACT INVESTING AS SHADOW BANKING IN PAKISTAN 
The relationship between impact investing and shadow banking in Pakistan is reflected 
in two trends that have occurred in the country. One of these is the growing 
interconnectivity between microfinance and global capital: this is discussed below in the 
context of how microfinance lenders have been enabled — domestically and also 
internationally — in seeking wholesale funding, first from the World Bank, and then 
through other investors such as British and German development finance institutions.  
This is related to the second trend of how development finance institutions, with a 
preference for credit based investment or debt instruments, dominate the impact 
investing landscape in terms of capital deployed. These trends may be seen in the light 
of the two explanations of shadow banking presented above: supply side and demand 
side. 
Shadow banks, development finance, and inclusive finance 
Impact investing though microfinance in Pakistan has a context in the wider financial 
landscape of the country: this is comprised of commercial banks, development finance 
institutions, and microfinance banks, all of which are regulated by the State Bank of 
Pakistan or SBP.189 As mentioned earlier, in Chapter 4, this arrangement has arisen 
following a programme of financial liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation which 
commenced in the 1990s, and the first for-profit, commercial, microfinance institution, 
Khushhali Bank, came into existence in August 2000.  
_____________________________ 
189 In Pakistan, DFI refers to a bilateral institution established to promote investment into Pakistan and to enhance trade 
flows between Pakistan and the sponsoring country. Another category of financial institution regulated by the central bank 
or SBP is that of specialized banks which are permitted to lend to specific types of borrowers such as agriculturalists but not 
permitted to carry out other banking activities such as deposit taking. Other financial institutions such as leasing 
companies, mutual funds, and microfinance providers which are non deposit taking institutions are regulated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). 
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Official support for microfinance was however, expressed much earlier in the 
country’s PRSP or Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. These documents are a part of the 
IMF’s late 1990s strategy to target poverty reduction through more participatory 
approaches which required countries to prepare regular reports — updated every three 
years or so — in collaboration with various stakeholders and partners, including the 
World Bank and IMF (IMF, 2004). The Government of Pakistan released an initial or ‘I-
PRSP’ in late 2000 and a full PRSP in 2003 (IMF, 2004). Of especial relevance in the 
strategies articulated thus is the role of the World Bank sponsored Pakistan Poverty 
Alleviation Fund. Chapter 4 discusses how this was established in the year 2000 as a 
special purpose vehicle designed to channel funding to broad based programs in 
community physical infrastructure and capacity building interventions, as well as 
microfinance: as such, it came to function as the country’s apex fund.190 
Eventually, as microfinance and financial inclusion became increasingly 
embedded in the strategies of the central bank of the Ministry of Finance (NFIS, 2015), 
the microfinance lending portfolio of the PPAF was shifted to a newly established 
private sector investment company: the Pakistan Microfinance Investment Company or 
PMIC.  As mentioned earlier, the establishment of the PMIC opened a sizeable channel 
connecting the domestic microfinance industry to global fund managers. This is so 
because of the ownership structure of this institution: 49 per cent by the PPAF, 38 per 
cent by Karandaaz, and 13 per cent by Germany’s state owned KfW. The role of these 
shareholders is to connect microfinance lenders in Pakistan with global capital markets 
as well as international donors. The PPAF, for instance is funded by multiple donors 
including the Government of Pakistan, the World Bank, DFID, and KfW. Microfinance 
lenders had in the past been partially reliant on World Bank disbursements to the 
PPAF.191 But they can now seek funds — in the form of wholesale structured credit and 
equity-linked direct capital investments —from the PMIC which had additional backing 
from a major development agency, and also from DFID as well the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation (Karandaaz, 2018).   
The company structure of Karandaaz is a revealing example of an impact 
investing institution that is described both as a nonprofit company and a special 
purpose vehicle (GOV.UK, 2014) focused on promoting access to finance for small and 
medium enterprises and financial inclusion (Karandaaz, 2018).192  This organisation was 
set up by DFID ‘to strengthen the microfinance industry, entrepreneurship and small 
business development in Pakistan by working with existing institutions and through 
innovative financial products’ (GOV.UK, 2014: 3) and is legally equipped as a special 
purpose vehicle to participate in various financial instruments: equity, quasi-equity, 
_____________________________ 
190 CGAP (2002) describes an apex fund as ‘a second-tier or wholesale organisation that channels funding (grants, loans, 
guarantees) to multiple microfinance institution (MFIs) in single country or region’. See Chapter 4 for more details. 
191 Some lenders could use the funds of depositors for on-lending but this option was not widely available because of (1) 
low numbers of depositors/ savers and (2) licensing restrictions on which institutions were permitted to accept client 
deposits.  
192 Companies in Pakistan that wish to be registered as nonprofit or non governmental oraganisatiaons may do so under 
Section 42 of the 1984 Companies Ordinance: this is the status under which Karandaaz operates.  
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debt, guarantees and other instruments for providing capital to small, medium, and 
microfinance enterprises.193   
Microfinance lenders had in the past been partially reliant on World Bank 
disbursements to the PPAF.194 But they could now seek funds — in the form of 
wholesale structured credit and equity-linked direct capital investments —from the 
PMIC which had additional backing from a major development agency, and also from 
an impact investing fund sponsored by DFID as well the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (Karandaaz, 2018).   
The importance of development finance institutions such as KfW and DFID is 
mentioned in the reports of the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), which is the 
key source of data on such initiatives particularly in South Asia. Within such reports 
Pakistan is described as one of the largest impact investment landscapes in the region, 
with close to a total of USD 2 billion deployed: most of this is by institutional investors 
— mainly DFIs — but there is also considerable investment from high net worth 
individuals (HNWIs) (GIIN, 2014). This includes impact investors as well as ‘impact 
related investors’: the latter are a separate category because despite being involved in 
activities that are much like impact investing, there is an absence of an explicit impact 
intention. A view from many fund managers that impact is achieved by default through 
their activities. This might be in the form of increased access to capital where there was 
less before, or impact through investment in sectors like agriculture, which will affect 
farmer incomes, even without this being intentional ex ante (GIIN, 2014: 12). There is an 
understanding that such institutions are poised to act as intermediaries for the 
deployment of impact capital and as such have either expressed interest in or are in the 
process of developing a metric based approach to measuring and reporting impact 
(GIIN, 2014). Additionally, there are several foundations as well as family offices of 
HNWIs, which are not impact investors as they tend to have either purely philanthropic 
or commercial objectives but are nevertheless relevant in the broader landscape as they 
have the potential to offer a large pool of domestic capital (GIIN, 2014).  
These observations capture the presence of a large number of social enterprises 
in Pakistan that resist the classification of impact enterprises, primarily because they 
pre-date the rise of FfD and the formal conceptualisation of impact investing.195 GIIN 
(2014) analysis indicates that such activity accounts for a small share of the overall 
impact investment landscape: impact-related investors deployed capital of 
approximately USD 481 million relative to the nearly USD 2 billion deployed by impact 
_____________________________ 
193 The SPV structure typically used for development programs is based on creating “not–for–profit” legal entities, into 
which development programs can place often large amounts of money to implement projects/ objectives (KPMG,2017) 
194 Some lenders could use the funds of depositors for on-lending but this option was not widely available because of (1) 
low numbers of depositors/ savers and (2) licensing restrictions on which institutions were permitted to accept client 
deposits.  
195 A number of social enterprises in Pakistan are categorized as NGOs despite operating with commercial models. One 
instance is the Pakistani branch of Hamdard, which became an Islamic trust or ‘waqf’ in 1953 and now runs a wide range of 
organisations and businesses, including a university and several laboratories that produce and distribute a wide range of 
pharmaceuticals at highly affordable prices: another instance is the organisation known as The Citizen’s Foundation, which 
is a low-cost education provider that has been running schools in various poor neighborhoods across Pakistan since the 
mid-1990s (Ali and Darko, 2015). 
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investors. The former category consists of an unconfirmed number of angel investors: 
some of these are tied to incubators and accelerators whereas others operate more 
informally. The latter category refers to 18 impact investors identified by GIIN (2014): 
these are constituted by 11 DFIs as well as nine funds with a venture capital or private 
equity strategy that incorporates social impact.  
This mixed structure reflects gradual changes that have occurred since the late 
1990s, when Ashoka, a USA based organisation that ‘identifies and supports the world’s 
leading social entrepreneurs, learns from the patterns in their innovations, and 
mobilises a global community to embrace these new frameworks and build an “everyone 
a changemaker” world’recruited its first fellows in Pakistan in 1997.197  This was followed 
by the arrival of the Acumen Fund in 2002.198 And subsequently, by the Karachi based 
SEED (Social, Entrepreneurship and Equity Development) fund established in 2009 to 
offer investment, incubation and entrepreneurial services for ‘societal and economic 
change’.199 These early participants played a meaningful role in highlighting the 
developmental significance of ‘patient’ or philanthropic capital (Acumen, 2018). They 
are also seen as key players in the social enterprise industry (Ali and Darko, 2015). This 
reputation belies their relative contribution in terms of monetary value: to date, the 
Acumen Fund has invested USD 16 million in Pakistan since 2002 (Acumen, 2018), 
whereas SEED has invested just under USD 0.65 million since 2009 (Seed Ventures, 
2018). This may be compared to the USD 157 million that the CDC — the development 
finance arm of DFID — has invested since it first entered the Pakistan marker in 2015 
(CDC Group, 2015).  
The CDC’s approach here typifies that of DFIs in terms of sectoral focus; of the 
USD 157 million, USD 122 million was invested in financial services and USD 32 million d 
in energy (CDC, 2015). It is notable that the CDC investment in financial services 
consisted of a 5 per cent direct equity stake in HBL, which is Pakistan’s largest 
commercial bank and controlled by the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development or 
AKFED which holds a 51 per cent stake in the institution.200 The AKFED, through HBL, 
also owns FMFB or First Micro Finance Bank, one of the largest and oldest microfinance 
banks in Pakistan which is discussed methodically in Chapter 6. Through this subsidiary 
organisation, the CDC’s share in HBL allows it to ‘help people on low incomes access 
potentially life-changing financial services such as micro-credit to start or grow a small 
business’ (CDC, 2015: 4).  
Like the CDC, Proparco, the private sector financing arm of Agence Française de 
Développement has invested USD 20 millionin wind energy.201 Another USD 21 million 
has been invested for a gas fired power plant.202  USD 5 million has also been invested 
_____________________________ 
197 https://www.ashoka.org/en-gb/about-ashoka-0 
198 Acumen Fund (2018) 
199 http://seedventures.org/about-us/vision-mission/  
200 This is the same organisation mentioned earlier in this article for its work in Africa, Central Asia,and Afghanistan.  
201 http://www.afd.fr/en/pakistan-winds-hope  
202 https://www.proparco.fr/en/engro  
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by Proparco in financial services.203 Other DFIs involved in energy and finance in 
Pakistan are the Norwegian Norfund, which has a Pakistan allocation of 3 per cent of a 
USD 42 million investment fund to concentrate on micro-financing institutions 
(Norfund, 2018). And as mentioned earlier, KfW, the German development bank has 
provided finance for various sectors in Pakistan including energy and health and also 
owns 13 per cent of the Pakistan Microfinance Investment Company, the apex fund for 
microfinance in the country. 204 
This interest in financial services, primarily microfinance, is captured in GIIN 
(2014) data which indicates that financial services received USD 213 million of the capital 
deployed by both DFIs and non DFIs whereas the energy sector received approximately 
USD 624 million. The dominance of energy here is directly related to the acute power 
shortages that Pakistan has faced, particularly over the last decade (Haque, 2017), and 
also to the proclivity of this sector to absorb ‘large ticket size investments that align 
with DFI mandates’ (GIIN, 2014: 19). This is partially so because Pakistan’s energy sector 
has since the reforms of the 1990s been geared towards attracting private investment. 
This has been done by ensuring that the independent producers of electrical power 
receive a fixed return (IRR) on their investment and are also reimbursed for all direct 
‘pass through’ costs/expenses incurred in power generation (Shaikh et al., 2015). 
Inclusive finance in Pakistan through private equity and private 
debt  
Such arrangements underlie the preference of impact investors for debt over equity: 
most impact capital, approximately USD 1.3 billion of nearly USD 2 billion, has been 
deployed in Pakistan through debt (see Table 7.4). This is noteworthy because impact 
investing tends to be associated with private equity and venture capital approaches: 
these imply that the investor acquires a stake in the enterprise. However, recent data on 
global trends in impact investing shows that private debt is the biggest asset class now 
for impact investments, and that a large chunk of investments in developing and 
emerging markets are via PDIF or private debt impact funds (Forbes, 2018). 
Table 7.4: Impact investing amounts deployed in Pakistan to date 
USD Million DFI Non DFI Total 
Equity  153 26 179 
Debt 1189 127 1316 
Total
205
 1830 162  
Source: GIIN (2014) 
The focus on debt in Pakistan is largely driven by DFIs with relatively low risk appetites. 
Debt instruments require a lower level of due diligence relative to equity investments, 
_____________________________ 
203 https://www.proparco.fr/en/proparco-finances-microfinance-institution-pakistan  
204 http://pmic.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/PACRA-PMIC-PR-Oct17.pdf  
205 Includes other instruments, mainly guarantees. 
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and also demand less post-investment management. Even though non-DFI impact 
investors tend to invest a greater percentage of capital in equity than DFIs — 16 per cent 
versus 7.3 per cent for DFIs — the partiality to debt rather than equity still prevails 
(GIIN, 2014). Though not clear from the GIIN (2014) study, there appears to be an 
overlap between the activities of DFIs and investment funds. For instance the 
Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries invests in microfinance through 
its NMI Global Fund which in turn invests in a number of investment funds focused on 
microfinance: earlier data shows that NMI Global Fund has a 3 per cent allocation for 
Pakistan (Norfund, 2018). Similarly, the DFID Impact Fund invests in Pakistan through 
the Singapore based Insitor Impact Asia Fund, which uses DFID capital for stakes in 
early and growth stage companies across South Asia. Another instance is USAID’s 
Pakistan Private Investment Initiative is comprised of three professionally managed 
investment funds: the Abraaj Pakistan Fund, the Pakistan Catalyst Fund, and the 
Boltoro Growth Fund (USAID, 2018). 
Given the case of Pakistan, there are two arguments for applying a shadow 
banking lens to impact investing. One of these operates on the ‘crowding out’ 
assumption of bank finance and, more specifically, on the low ratio of private credit to 
GDP. The central bank notes for instance that the total assets and deposits of the 
country’s banking sector have doubled since 2008, but private sector credit to GDP has 
declined from 22 per cent in 2009 to just 14.7 per cent in June 2014. The decline in credit 
provided to SMEs has been particularly pronounced, falling from 16 per cent of bank 
lending in 2008 to 7 per cent in 2014 (SBP, 2015). Fiscal patterns come across as the 
underlying cause of why commercial banks in Pakistan have been so lax in widening 
their customer base: the low tax base, at less than 11 per cent of GDP, compels the 
government to rely on borrowing for deficit funding (Ministry of Finance, 2017). Private 
businesses account for 40 per cent of bank credit, and only 0.4 per cent of all borrowers 
are responsible for 65 per cent of all bank loans (SBP, 2015). 
And, as discussed in Chapter 5, the absence of effective measures to widen and 
also to deepen the tax base, make it unlikely that commercial banks, which are currently 
earning heavy spreads by investing in risk free treasury bills, will shift their focus away 
from the government and large corporate to the lower income segments of the non 
corporate private sector. Persistent government borrowing from commercial banks has 
crippled the banking sector by inundating it with a supply of zero risk weighted assets 
as government paper (Choudhary et al, 2016). These are a strong disincentive for 
commercial banks to actively seek projects to expand their loan portfolios. The 
borrowing patterns of the Pakistani state are insensitive to the cost of borrowing when 
there is a need to finance the budget deficit, given the absence of a sufficiently deep 
local currency bond market (Choudhary et al., 2016). Additionally, it is important to 
consider the role of stringent capital requirements — such as those imposed by the 
Basel rules — which deter banks from private sector lending as default risk comes across 
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as high for various reasons including limited collateral options and irregular cash 
flows.206 
The role of impact investors in meeting the credit needs of enterprises excluded 
from the traditional banking sector because commercial banks will not lend to them is 
an empirical expression of shadow banking done to overcome regulatory constraints. 
Moreover, by enlisting philanthrocapitalists in the global FfD initiative through a 
valorisation of ‘patient capital’, investment funds seeking impact have prompted an 
expansion in the production of debt instruments, and responded to a demand from a 
global community of investors, including private asset managers and public donors,  for 
asset streams or yield. The yield seeking aspect pertains mainly to the deployment of 
impact capital in the form of debt: as mentioned earlier, in Pakistan this is the dominant 
form of impact investment and preferred particularly by DFIs. 207 Using an OTD 
approach, fund managers — often subsidiaries of DFIs — are able to originate equity 
investments to attract capital from IFIs, DFIs, and other investment funds, as 
demonstrated earlier in the examples of DFID, USAID, and Norfund. 
7.6  SUMMARY 
The impact investing fixation with inclusive finance — which is itself an extension of 
the financial sector and the subject of several critiques — draws attention to the role of 
shadow banking in development. Financialised development of this nature sees impact 
investors, on one hand, fill a void in enterprise finance which has been created by 
regulatory constraints, and on the other hand accommodating a buoyant demand for 
financial yield by shepherding the entry of global capital into developing markets.  
Impact investing strategies in Pakistan reflect shifts in development approaches: 
these arose as global financial capital came to occupy a principal function in 
philanthrocapitalism. Initiatives such as the FfD agenda and the adoption of impact 
investing strategies by private as well as non-private institutions, including international 
organisations such as the World Bank and the UNDP, have been central to such shifts: 
they also reflect an influential viewpoint: that development is essentially a problem of 
finance. This viewpoint is invoked regularly in the context of the SDGs, and has in the 
past, informed the pursuit of the MDGs.  
Recent examples from impact investing in Pakistan show that the core features 
of impact investing, measurement and reporting facilitate a BoP focus which limits 
_____________________________ 
 
207 This is an empirical case of shifts in banking models. Chapter 3 discusses such shifts— from an originate-to-hold-model 
(OTH) to an originate-to-distribute-model — and describes the dramatic outcome of new financial technologies and 
regulations that pushed banks to shed their traditional role of intermediation since they were no longer constrained by 
balance sheets. Under OTH, banks accept deposits to grant loans and operate on the spread generated. Under OTD, banks 
‘slice and dice’ the loans they grant and then sell the risks associated with these loans to other financial market players. 
This process is known as ‘securitisation’ (Kessler and Wilhelm, 2013; Engelen et al., 2010; Aalbers, 2009; French and 
Leyshon, 2004) and permits banks to eschew the incentives to control and account for the variety and quality of risks they 
themselves originate (Nesvetailova, 2017). 
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social impact and leaves such strategies open to the development critiques of ‘self help’ 
and ‘romanticising the poor’. This BoP focus in financial services is at the core of 
shadow financial citizenship because (1) it is consistent with the financial logic of 
contemporary development which seeks to strengthen links between private, often 
global, capital and development strategies and often enlists shadow banks in this 
process (2) it bifurcates finance by widening the grey area between complete access to 
mainstream finance and exclusion from formal finance.   
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8. HOW INCLUSIVE IS INCLUSIVE FINANCE AND WHY 
DOES IT BIFURCATE BANKING? 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
As shown in the last four chapters, Pakistan has a bifurcated banking system.  This is 
characterised by uneven access to financial services across two segments of banking: 
inclusive finance and mainstream finance. While those who use inclusive finance are 
considered financially included (Global Findex, 2017) the financial services they are able 
to access are different from those available from mainstream banks.  
The existing scholarship frames bifurcated banking in poor countries as caused 
by a split between formal and informal financial services. Related to this is the 
conceptualisation of a ‘missing middle’, which acknowledges the gap between financial 
access for very large firms, and financial access for very small firms.  In advanced 
capitalist countries, a bifurcated system is revealed in the disparity between those who 
attain ‘financial citizenship’  and those who are described through terms such as 
‘adverse incorporation’, ‘exploitative greenlining’, and ‘precarious inclusion’. These 
themes prevail with inclusive finance. 
The colonial history discussed earlier shows that a separation between formal 
and informal existed well before inclusive finance was used as a poverty reduction 
strategy. But by offering financial services to those in informal employment, without 
giving them full access to formal finance, inclusive finance strategies reinforce — rather 
than overcome — the separation between formal and informal.  
This is reflected in the inequities in eligibilities and requirements described 
earier.  Innovative collateralisation practices, such as the use of gold jewelry, are one 
particularly salient example of the techniques used by the inclusive finance industry to 
incorporate the informal sphere into one part of this bifurcated banking system. Other 
examples include relaxed KYC requirements, such as those that allow customers with 
limited documentation to open accounts, but these also place strict controls on how 
those accounts may be used in terms of transaction amounts, frequency, and range of 
services.  Also, because credit offered as inclusive finance is subject to loan caps, those 
who can use only inclusive finance are restricted in how much they can borrow.  
This is related to the observation that inclusive finance creates inequities in 
rates and pricing. Inequities in interest rates add to the difficulties — which include stiff 
competition and limited scalabilty — that microentreprenuers face in growing their 
businesses. Loans made purely for day to day or ‘consumption smoothing’ purposes are 
particularly expensive; they also rely heavily on data capture in the form of digital 
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footprints, which carry information related to location, phone usage, and existing loan 
history. Inequities in pricing are also revealed in mobile money and payment services; 
these are largely used as a substitute for interbank transfers which are unavailable to 
those using ‘low KYC requirement’ bank accounts. Because of the emphasis in Pakistan 
on biometric verification, these too are an opportunity for the inclusive finance industry 
to extract data which is also eventually used for credit scoring.  
These practices of data extraction are another feature of bifurcated banking and 
they substantiate inequities in privacy and surveillance. These inequities are at the core 
of an emergent trend in finance, in which data is harvested to be used for credit scoring. 
Such practices expand the reach of global financial capital by allowing for new products 
to be created and offered to support debt led consumption. This is the case for financial 
services such as ‘nano loans’ which rely on digitised evaluation techniques to offer what 
is in effect, instant credit.  In exchange, borrowers are required to renounce any claims 
to privacy insofar as their mobile phones are concerned. Such lending practices are in 
contrast with personal loans or credit cards for those who are able to avail credit issued 
from mainstream banks. 
The inequities highlighted here are facets of the shadow financial citizenship 
framework which is used in this thesis to conceptualise bifurcated banking in Pakistan. 
But to what extent can these findings be generalised? This question is addressed by 
revisiting the financialisation perspective invoked earlier.  
Inclusive finance as a driver of bifurcated banking reveals both general and 
particular features of financialisation in poor countries. Indeed, a core argument of this 
chapter — that there are features of financialisation specific to poor countries — is 
made by locating inclusive finance in the vibrant discussion on financialisation in 
developing economies (e.g, Bonizzi et al., 2019), and also what Akyüz (2017) describes as 
‘playing with fire’ in commenting on the deeper integration of emerging and developing 
economies into the global financial system. This latter discussion is an extension of one 
initiated earlier in this study, in Chapter 2, which questioned the practices of financial 
deepening and builds on the scholarship of ‘subordinate financialisation’ (Bonizzi et al, 
2019, Powell, 2013).   
These structures may be associated with the liberalisation of global finance and 
emanate from changes imposed thus on state policy, including through the 
macroeconomics of debt and austerity. Bifurcated systems are a corollary of the 
phenomenon of subordinate financialisation which is for Pakistan, reflected through 
reserve accumulation, responses to currency hierarchies, and a misplaced emphasis on 
credit constraints from the demand for and supply of loanable funds. The incapacity of 
mainstream banks to facilitate money creation and to support economic activity is thus 
a feature of how financialisation operates in poor countries in general and Pakistan in 
specific.  For this reason, alternative approaches to banking, involving the state, such as 
through the post office and the central bank, and particularly through the utilisation of 
technology, are considered as a means to widen financial citizenship 
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 8.2 draws on Susanne 
Soederberg’s concept of debtfare to examine the role of the state in making financial 
systems predatory, rather than inclusive: this is centred on the monetary facets of state 
fragility.  Section 8.3 builds on this by drawing attention to constraints faced by the 
state and monetary authorities in poor countries which arise from the structure of the 
global macroeconomy. Section 8.4 identifies potential strategies to bring financial 
inclusion closer to financial citizenship.  Section 8.5 concludes. 
8.2  THE PAKISTANI ‘DEBTFARE STATE’ 
The structural inequalities which lie at the core of bifurcated systems, are both the 
cause and consequence of policies centred on financial inclusion and democratisation of 
credit. Here, the related concepts of the debtfare state and the poverty industry are 
especially useful as they capture the role of the state as well as the financial system in 
upholding bifurcated banking.  
The notion of ‘debtfare states’ is among Susanne Soederberg’s contributions to 
the literature on financial inclusion and the ‘democratisation of credit’. Both terms refer 
to similar concepts, but the former tends to be invoked for poor countries and the latter 
for rich countries. For Soederberg (2014), the debtfare state is a particular form of 
neoliberal governance which upholds a ‘poverty industry’  running on the exorbitant 
fees and charges from products such as payday and student loans, and credit cards: the 
clients of the poverty industry are synonymous with the Marxian sub-category of the 
‘surplus population’.  
Soederberg (2014) observes that the poverty industry exists not only because of 
the need for financial services for the unemployed and underemployed, but because this 
need is persistent and recurring. Repayment obligations deepen the imperative for 
indebted workers to work in low paid jobs, and these compulsions underlie the 
reproduction of the surplus population.  
‘The debtfare state, alongside other components of the neoliberal state form (e.g. 
workfare, competition states, and prisonfare), has partly assisted in the 
rearticulation and re-creation of the outside–inside (or, informality – formality) 
dualism in Mexico, and, more generally, in the making and remaking of neoliberal 
forms of domination, albeit in an uneven and paradoxical manner’ (Soederberg, 
2012: 562). 
Debtfare states, as Soederberg (2015; 2012) shows through the examples of the United 
States and Mexico, feature in advanced capitalist as well as Global South countries. In 
doing so, they offer a framework to draw parallels between segregated banking and 
inclusive finance. These linkages have been identified by Soederberg (2015) in her 
depiction of the poverty industry as a contemporary feature of American as well as 
Mexican capitalism. This analysis may be extended to draw further country 
comparisons, including with Pakistan.   
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For instance, the Mexican debtfare state is described as formulated on two —
macro and micro — scales. One of these is that of the politics of austerity and the other 
is the colonisation of informal spaces through debt. The politics of austerity seek to 
‘normalize and discipline social relations, particularly labour, to the exigencies of capital 
under the auspices of growth’ (Soederberg, 2012: 565), and the colonisation of informal 
spaces ‘assists in legitimizing the penetration of formal banking institutions into spaces 
of informality, where the relative surplus population resides’ (Soederberg, 2012: 567).  
The macroeconomics of debt and austerity in Pakistan (Kemal et al., 2017; 
Shabbir and Yasin, 2015) are like those of Mexico and largely typical of Global South 
countries where ‘the disconnect between the promises of the pro-growth orthodoxy 
(and the “Washington Consensus” of the World Bank and the IMF, more generally) and 
the outcomes of neoliberal reform’ has been experienced (Soederberg, 2012: 566). These 
outcomes, characterised by low growth as well as fragile export and capital markets, 
troublesome current account and public budget deficits, and high socio-economic 
inequality, arise from a state policy fixated with achieving economic growth through 
expanding the private sector (Soederberg, 2012).208  
For Pakistan, a habitual implication of this approach has been tight monetary 
policy to control inflation.209 This tends to be accompanied by a strong emphasis on 
building foreign exchange reserves, to ward off financial vulnerability. Such strategies 
complicate the management of both domestic investment and domestic debt as 
weakened tax revenues expose the economy to the inflationary pressures that arise from 
deficit financing (Akram, 2011). The issue of deficit financing — when the government 
seeks to borrow from either the public or private sector, and often both, to plug the gap 
between revenues and expenditures — is a chronic problem for policymakers in 
Pakistan.210 It is not only inflationary but also crowds out private sector investment. 
Small borrowers in particular are overlooked by banks which prefer to lend to corporate 
or government organisations.211  
The other scale on which the debtfare state is formulated pertains to intrusions 
made by debt capital into an informal economy which is recast, on occasion, through 
terms such as ‘the unbanked’ or ‘the bottom of the pyramid’. These strategies are 
integral to the ‘neoliberal developmental model’. The commercialisation of 
microfinance and the rise of retail banking highlight how state backed initiatives ‘seek 
to integrate the poor into the secondary forms of exploitation involved in making 
money from money’ (Soederberg, 2012: 569) 
For Pakistan, the clearest explication of state backing for commercial 
microfinance, and related inclusive finance products and services, is to be found in the 
_____________________________ 
208 Particularly compared to the period between the 1960s and 1980s (Cypher and Wise, 2010 cited in Soederberg, 2012).  
209 The enlistment of the central bank or State Bank of Pakistan in the processes of the Washington Consensus is discussed 
in Chapter 4 
210 Fiscal deficits may be financed through various combinations of domestic and external sources. Domestic sources have 
two subcomponents: printing new money (government borrowings from the central bank) or issuance of interest bearing 
debt to both bank and non-bank institutions. Externally, governments borrow money from international financial markets 
(Agha and Khan, 2006).  
211 The government’s role as a ‘dominant borrower’ is discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
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National Financial Inclusion Strategy document published by the central bank (SBP, 
2015).212 Within this, financial inclusion in the form of access to credit as well as 
payment and remittance systems is presented as vital for national growth, and also for 
overcoming poverty and inequality. But the problem that Soederberg (2012) draws 
attention to for Mexico is also applicable for Pakistan: how are the poor to build up 
financial assets given the configuration of the poverty industry? An alternative form of 
this conundrum — on how to escape the poverty industry — is presented through the 
question of graduation which Shankar (2016) observes in the need for microfinance 
clients to systematically transition from microfinance to commercial finance. But this 
need remains unfulfilled and manifests itself as an issue of the missing middle, in which 
there is ‘a lack of financing options for enterprises whose needs fall in between the 
typical loan sizes offered by MFIs and commercial banks’ (Shankar, 2016: 3).213   
8.3 FRAGILITY FROM FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION 
These patterns of segregation, inclusion, and predation draw attention to how financial 
globalisation affects the Global South. Recent scholarship on this issue builds on earlier 
debates about the risks of financial globalisation and liberalisation: these past debates 
have generated a vast literature — including engagement with Latin American 
Structuralist studies on the hegemonic role of the US dollar and its financial and 
monetary implications — and this is summed up in Akyüz (2017). 
As noted by Alami (2018), more recent approaches on the subordinate position 
of poor countries in the global financial system (Bonizzi et al., 2019; Kaltenbrunner and 
Painceira, 2018; Bonizzi, 2017; 2014) perceive it as a feature of financial as well as 
monetary structures.  Such an approach relies on highlighting how financialisation is 
transmitted through interconnected channels and mechanisms: primarily reserve 
accumulation, currency hierarchies, and a misplaced emphasis on credit constraints 
from the demand for and supply of loanable funds.  
The practice of heavy foreign exchange reserve accumulation is often attributed 
to the experiences of developing and emerging economies following the 1990s financial 
crisis in East Asia, and also the 1995 Mexican Peso crisis and 2001 Turkish banking crisis 
(Marois and Munoz-Martinez, 2016).  For instance, China saw its reserves grow from 
USD 107 billion at the end of 1996 to USD 1,068 billion at the end of 2006; and, the 
combined value of the foreign exchange reserves of China, Japan, and Korea in 2006 
exceeded USD 2,000 billion (Aizenman and Lee, 2008).214  
For some researchers (e.g, Dooley et al., 2005) these patterns underpin the 
adoption of mercantilist strategies by emerging economies: hoarding international 
reserves advances a development strategy that is based on growth through under-valued 
real exchange rates.  Additionally, strong reserves offer potential ‘collateral’ to attract 
_____________________________ 
212 See Chapter 4 for more on this policy document 
213 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion on ‘the missing middle’ 
214 Reserve accumulation patterns for selected countries are in Appendix F.  
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foreign direct investment, and as such, reserve accumulation is seen as instrumental to a 
an outward oriented growth strategy (Aizenman and Lee, 2008). The alternative 
explanation for reserve accumulation or hoarding is that of ‘self-
insurance/precautionary demand’ (Aizenman and Lee, 2008: 593, Ben-Bassat and 
Gottlieb, 1992): large reserves reduce the probability and magnitude of output drop in 
case of capital flight.  
Regardless of motivation, the trend of heavy reserve accumulation is a key 
mechanism through which the international financial system advances domestic 
financialisation (Bonizzi, 2014). For some countries, reserve growth strategies have 
enabled central banks to create domestic liquidity through bond issuance linked to 
sterilisation activities. This augmented liquidity has been used by domestic banks for 
balance sheet expansion, including through risky and speculative purchases (Gabor 
2010; Painceira, 2010). This has been the case in Brazil, Korea, and some East European 
economies where inflows from exports and foreign direct investment exerted upward 
pressure on the domestic currency; however for many other countries, reserve 
management has been concerned less with countering currency appreciation, and more 
with managing external debt and liabilities, and consequently, currency depreciation.215 
Pakistan falls into this latter category because of the unenviable reality of an 
external debt to GDP ratio of 30.4 per cent (World Bank, 2018) combined with an acute 
case of ‘original sin’.216  As noted by Husain (2017) as much as 24 per cent of government 
revenue is used for interest rate charges and to repay foreign loans. Not only is this a 
strain on the public budget, it is also troublesome for the overall economy because of 
volatility from retail price inflation, especially when currency depreciation causes spikes 
in domestic commodity rates: particularly fuel, edible oil, and wheat (SBP, 2018).  Retail 
price inflation is measured through the CPI or consumer price index: 37.5 per cent of its 
weighting is for food and related items and items that are sensitive to global oil prices 
— including electricity, gas, and transport — are responsible for another 37 per cent of 
so of CPI weighting (SBP, 2018).  
Inflation, which refers to decreases in the purchasing power of money may be 
taken to represent monetary volatility. For Antonia Settle (2016: 107) this is a feature of 
financialisation in developing and low-income countries: or ‘a problem of uncertainty 
arising from the liberalisation of money and markets under global conditions of 
financialization and articulated empirically in price volatility’. Settle (2016: 108) argues 
that in countries where the population of the ‘unbanked’ is large, households and 
individuals engage with financialisation in ways that are detached from ‘the conventions 
of official banking and state money’. This is exemplified through field work in Pakistan 
in which individual economic strategies are found to be aligned with the beginning of a 
period of sustained rupee decline that followed 1990s policies of opening up the rupee 
to foreign markets (Settle, 2016). These economic management strategies entail the 
_____________________________ 
215 See Moreno (2011) for how in many such economies, such an approach can hinder the conduct of monetary policy. 
216 ‘Original sin’ is a term attributed to Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) to describe the inability of developing and 
emerging countries to borrow in their domestic currency. 
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greater use of ‘real assets’ such as cattle, vacant land, and second-hand motor vehicles, 
diversification away from cash, and the use of dollars as a hedge, including for overnight 
holdings.  
‘Financialization here plays itself out not within the institutional norms of 
advanced economies’ financial sectors but in the specific institutional context of a 
low-income economy. Hence, informality is dominant and state money is not 
trusted, formal financial markets are largely inaccessible and ‘real’ markets provide 
liquid markets for alternative stores of value. The fact that these practices respond 
to new instability norms generated by financialized globalization reflects that these 
practices are not some kind of absence of financialized globalization or receding 
engagement with complex finance; not a return to pre-capitalist ‘survival practices’ 
but an expression of global financial integration and an alternative, locally 
constituted version of financialized globalization’ (Settle, 2016: 117). 
To a large extent, the phenomenon described above is reflective of the currency 
hierarchies, which Bortz and Kaltenbrunner (2018: 382) see as manifest in the 
‘subordinated position of DEE currencies’. 217 This approach builds on a Post-Keynesian 
perspective which distinguishes between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ currencies, given differing 
abilities to credibly maintain value because of variations in liquidity premia. This 
subordinated position is described in the emergent literature on subordinated 
financialisation, which examines the role of the international economy in domestic 
financialisation.  The international currency hierarchy compels DEEs to keep domestic 
interest rates high to uphold the value of their currencies: but higher interest rates push 
excessive borrowing in cheaper international markets. This pattern creates external 
indebtedness, debt‐servicing costs, and vulnerability to shocks in external financial 
markets: a possible solution involves capital controls and specialized financial 
institutions, such as development banks, to fill the domestic financing gap (Bortz and 
Kaltenbrunner, 2016).  
The problem of domestic financing gaps may be studied through recent analyses 
by Antonia Settle (2016) of the constrained nature of bank deposit mobilisation in 
Pakistan, particularly since the reforms of the 1990s. For the central bank, this weakness 
in the deposit base shows a preference for consumption over saving: the underlying 
assumption is that whatever is not saved is consumed (SBP, 2016). But as Settle (2016: 
358) asserts, this view reflects a misunderstanding of how individuals and households 
respond to a feeble currency: a more accurate reading on of a low deposit base 
attributes it to the risks associated with holding money as cash or bank deposits which 
erode the ‘privileged position of national currency as money’. In the words of Pakistan’s 
central bank: 
‘Fundamentally speaking, Pakistan seems to be stuck in a low-saving low-
investment trap, which has seriously hampered its growth potential: a low savings 
rate reduces the volume of investible funds; low investments make growth spurts 
unsustainable; and low growth generates fewer domestic savings’ (SBP, 2016: 3). 
_____________________________ 
217 ‘DEEs’ refers to developing and emerging economies. 
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To overcome this, the SBP has sought to enhance competitive pricing and 
product innovation, for instance in the form of a National Financial Inclusion Strategy 
(SBP, 2015). Settle’s (2018) critique of this approach highlights the SBP’s lack of 
engagement with alternative monetary forms which are a response to, and also a 
symptom of, financialisation.  
In seeking to enhance saving in order to overcome low-investment, central 
bankers take a distinctly mainstream view in which the quantity of loans disbursed in a 
period is limited by the amount of saving in the same period: so eschewing 
consumption — and also other spending — is necessary to make more credit available 
for investors. This is the core assumption of loanable funds theory, which sees interest 
rates as determined by the demand for investments and supply of savings: this 
underpins the needs for deposits in an intermediated banking system. This perspective 
thus tends to underplay the structural and/or institutional features that shape the 
financial system (Van Waeyenberge and Bargawi, 2015). 
The alternative to a loanable funds approach reverses the causal relation 
between loans and deposits and links investment to money that is endogenously 
created. Whereas the loanable funds model requires banks to hold deposits to make 
loans, the endogenous money — or finance through money creation — approach notes 
that it is deposits that are created through loans (Jakab and Kumhoff, 2015).  
For instance, Vineet Kohli shows in a study of Indian monetary policy that 
attempts by policymakers to enhance the availability of credit ‘fail to materialise when 
money supply is endogenously determined by the level of economic activity’ (Kohli, 
2016: 87).  Given an endogenous money supply, attempts to deregulate and liberalise the 
financial system, through measures such as cuts in the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) 
and cash reserve ratio (CRR), are found to have the unintended consequence of 
increasing commercial bank holdings in government securities. This occurs because the 
freeing up of reserves boosts demand for government securities, and the central bank is 
likely to accommodate this demand by selling these government securities, rather than 
placing downward pressure on interest rate yields. A key implication of this outcome is 
that credit off-take is constrained not because reserve requirements are onerous, but 
because there is a lack of demand for loans from creditworthy borrowers (Kohli, 2017).219 
This portrayal is consistent with earlier discussions about the government as a 
‘dominant borrower’ in Pakistan.220 This is typically seen in the light of monetary 
financing of budgetary deficits and presented as a crowding out argument. Even given 
this arrangement — because policy measures are not equipped to address credit 
demand — inclusive finance is a form of financial innovation and a response to the 
reluctance of commercial banks to lend to small borrowers.  
An endogenous money approach thus draws attention to the structural and 
institutional features that impede the two functions of banking identified earlier: (1) 
_____________________________ 
219 Larger borrowers are more likely than small borrowers to be perceived as creditworthy: this point relates to the earlier 
discussion on black banking and is empirically shown in various studies (e.g, Chen et al, 2017: Kohli, 2015)  
220 See Chapter 4 
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money creation for the functioning of the economy, and (2) lending to productive 
enterprises to support economic activity. While a thorough discussion of these 
impediments is outside the scope of this dissertation, Karwowski’s (2017) observations 
on investment patterns in a financialised South African economy are relevant here: 
notwithstanding the argument that banks create deposits through credit extension, 
financial institutions may be seen in the context of time and space, or national setting. 
As noted by Victoria Chick and Sheila Dow in their exposition of the stages of banking, 
banks may create money through lending when loan creation does not depend on 
deposits: this occurs when the central bank assumes full responsibility for financial 
stability (Chick and Dow, 1988).221 For developing or emerging capitalist economies, 
including India, Pakistan, and South Africa, this is not the case as central banks may 
only partially accommodate monetary expansion because of the inflationary and 
currency depreciation risks associated with a policy of low interest rates.  
The endogeneity of money thus draws attention to asymmetries in money 
creation.222 Developing country central banks typically face structural impediments to 
credit growth. These are binding to varying extents depending on the domestic 
relationship between credit expansion and the exchange rate set by the demand and 
supply of foreign currency: imports and investment motives including speculation 
determine demand, and supply is determined primarily by exports and also 
remittances.223  
‘The process of domestic credit-financed investment expansion influences both 
factors: First, as the increased investment also increases domestic incomes, import 
demand will be stimulated depending on the degree to which capital goods and 
consumer goods are imported. A country with very little domestic manufacturing 
industry to start with might actually see a rather large increase in imports 
stemming from increased investment demand, while a well-diversified economy 
might see only a small increase in imports. Second, with an increase in aggregate 
incomes and aggregate savings, households might increase their demand for 
foreign assets and hence again the demand for foreign currency, again putting 
downward pressure on the exchange rate’ (Dullien, 2009: 17). 
In contrast to poor countries, rich or advanced capitalist countries are adept at money 
creation: (1) banks may create deposits of new money through lending, and in doing so 
are constrained mostly by profitability and solvency considerations (Jakab and Kumhoff, 
2015); and (2) central banks may secondarily create money by purchasing assets — 
including through quantitative easing measures — mainly from nonbank financial 
companies (McLeay et al., 2014). As a result of these asymmetries, poor countries — and 
the institutions within them — are prone to becoming indebted as recipients of credit 
created in rich countries:  
_____________________________ 
221  Chick and Dow (1988) observe: ‘in the fourth stage, a central monetary authority accepts the function of lender of last 
resort. The stock of bank reserves is now responsive to demand from the banks. Banks collectively expanding credit can 
now do so without risk of being caught short of reserves.  
222 Or more specifically, privately created money; this is the description used by Soederberg (2014) for ‘credit’.  
223 More details on the determinants of foreign currency demand and supply are available in 
https://unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20091_en.pdf   
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‘Since the 1990s, a dominant strategy employed by capitalists to absorb the 
tensions of over-accumulation has been the creation and extension of credit money 
to low-income workers in exchange for high rates of interest as well as 
commissions and fees’ (Soederberg, 2014: 27). 
The absorption of inclusive finance by shadow banking networks is an outcome of these 
asymmetries. Bifurcated banking emerges as a result and thus may be overcome only 
through a drastic overhaul of the financial system: this could address the structures 
outlined above or take a more targeted approach as presented in the next section.  
8.4 OVERCOMING SHADOW FINANCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
These constraints characterise the subordinated form of financialisation that drives 
shadow banking in the form of inclusive finance. Commercial or mainstream banks are 
systematically prevented from meeting the lending needs of those who are not either 
large or public borrowers. There is thus a need for alternative approaches to meet the 
banking needs of large segments of society. These needs may be summarised thus: safe 
access to deposit facilities, reasonably priced loans, and efficient and affordable means 
of transferring payments. Possible alternatives to mainstream banking that meet these 
needs include (1) post office banking, and (2) central bank accounts for the general 
public. This list of two is not exhaustive, but the examples of post office and central 
bank led approaches highlight how many impediments to financial citizenship may be 
overcome through government involvement combined with technology. 
Post office banking 
The origins of post office banking are British: first used in 1861, it spread from Great 
Britain to the Empire and commenced in Canada in 1868, New South Wales in 1871, and 
in New Zealand in 1876: by the turn of the century almost every Western country had 
adopted nationwide post office banking (Baradaran, 2015).224 The goal of post office 
banking was financial inclusion. In Great Britain these banks initially offered a deposit 
rate of 2 per cent which was less than what mainstream banks offered. In the United 
States, post office banks were endorsed by President Ulysses S. Grant in 1873: earlier 
proposals for these banks to offer deposit rates of 4 per cent to attract savings had been 
rejected because of pressure from mainstream banks (Baradaran, 2015).  
American post office banking was largely successful until deposit insurance 
quelled instability in banks in the 1950s. The appeal of post office banks before this is 
attributed to their role as a safe haven for deposits, particularly in the 1930s, and also to 
their role in mobilising funding through treasury bonds in the form of Defense Savings 
Stamps, for the war during the 1940s (Baradaran, 2015). The formal demise of post office 
_____________________________ 
224 Germany was the exception which chose not to adopt this approach because of an already existing system of savings 
banks and credit unions (Baradaran, 2015). 
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banking was in 1970 when the United States Postal Service ceased to be a cabinet 
department and became an independent agency which was now required to fund itself 
(Baradaran, 2015).  
The recent push for a revival of post office banking in the United States comes 
from a white paper report published in 2014 by the Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) of the United States Postal Service (USPS).225  More recently, in April 2018, 
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand sponsored legislation to ‘provide that the United States 
Postal Service may provide certain basic financial services, and for other purposes’.226 
Support for post office banking assumes that a public bank with a wide geographical 
presence can offer a broad range of services at a lower cost. Not only would such an 
institution avail of economies of scale and scope from existing infrastructure, it would 
also be able to offer products at or close to cost because of the absence of profit-
maximising shareholders (Baradaran, 2015).  
A supplementary point made by Baradaran (2015) as well as the CGAP (2014) is 
that placing the USPS in a banking role would stem the financial decline of a historic 
institution which has suffered from the rise of digital communications. Given the 
experience of post office banking in the United Kingdom, this is not a secondary issue. 
Examining the initiative to offer universal banking through the post office, Midgely 
(2005: 283) finds that post office banking ‘became tied to finding new business to 
maintain the viability of the Post Office network’.  
Here it is worth noting that the system of post office banking in the United 
Kingdom is different from what was used, and now proposed again, in the United 
States. The former system is centred on the POCA or Post Office Card Account which 
provides a facility for the withdrawal of benefit, pension and tax credit payments: this is 
not equipped for deposits but it is possible for customers with deposits at some other 
banks to carry out transactions through the post office. An auxiliary issue then is the 
disinclination of mainstream banks to cooperate with financial inclusion initiatives 
involving competitors: this has been expressed in their reticence to sign up for network 
banking agreements (Midgely, 2005). Until recently, only a small number of banks 
offered their customers access through the post office, but with recent agreements, it is 
expected that customers of most major banks would be able to manage their accounts 
through the Post Office (Financial Times, 2017). Given the experience of the United 
Kingdom, it is likely that for post office banking to be successful, assistance from the 
state to ensure linkages with the mainstream system is essential.  
Central bank deposit accounts 
Another strategy that would extend financial citizenship proposes accounts for the 
general public at the central bank. Ricks et al. (2018) refer to this form of account, which 
_____________________________ 
225 https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2014/rarc-wp-14-007.pdf  
226 https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2755/text  
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would be used for deposits and payments, as ‘FedAccounts’. A related proposition, 
discussed by the Bank for International Settlements is that of central bank digital 
currencies or CBDCs (BIS, 2018). These proposals have a common starting point in the 
acknowledgement that central banks already provide digital money in the form of 
reserves or settlement account balances that are held by commercial banks and certain 
other financial institutions at the central bank.  
‘Among the perks of being a bank is the privilege of holding an account with the 
central bank. Unavailable to individuals and nonbank businesses, central bank 
accounts pay higher interest than ordinary bank accounts. Payments between 
these accounts clear instantly; banks needn’t wait days or even minutes for 
incoming payments to post. On top of that, central bank accounts consist of base 
money, meaning they are fully sovereign and nondefaultable no matter how large 
the balance’ (Ricks et al., 2018: 1).  
The proposed FedAccount would be an extension of the privileges currently offered to 
financial institutions and have all the functionality of an ordinary bank account but 
without overdraft coverage. Essentially, such a FedAccount would do for non-physical 
money what the government already does for physical money to make it function like 
an ‘open-access resource’ (Ricks et al., 2018).  
Linking the proposals would see the FedAccount allowing for transactions using 
a CBDC: the salient features of such transactions include the ease of cash transfers, 
which could be done either peer-to-peer or via an intermediary, and the feasibility of 
interest payments — or even deductions in case of a negative interest rate — on 
deposits (BIS, 2018). For Ricks et al. (2018), particularly compelling is the viability of real 
time payment transfers that can be carried out free of cost, and instantly: they also note 
that interest payments on CBDC deposits would have the same internal rate of return 
that the central bank pays to commercial banks on deposits.  
This FedAccount-CBDC approach does not involve lending and as such does not 
offer a full solution to the problem of predatory lending: however, as discussed earlier a 
key feature of shadow financial citizenship relates to the nature of fintech that is used 
for payments and remittances. A real time, free or even low cost, payments system 
would overcome the problem of exploitative fees as well as that of financial intrusion 
which occurs when data is harvested for value extraction.  
One facet of CBDC which might restrict its tractability in poor countries, 
particularly where the informal economy is large, is its emphasis on digital transactions. 
Ricks et al. (2018) suggest various ways to address this issue — which arises from the 
reliance of large swathes of the population in rich as well as poor countries on cash — 
and emphasise the need for coordination with existing infrastructures, including of the 
post office, third party banks, credit unions, and ATM networks.  
The CBDC approach is radical in that it effectively entails a shift from fractional 
reserve banking to a central bank administered narrow-banking system. Writing in ‘The 
Guardian’, Nouriel Roubini points out that if private banks were to shift their deposits 
into CBDCs, then traditional banks would become loanable funds intermediaries. 
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Additionally, the implementation of a central bank system of digital money would 
obviate the role currently played by cryptocurrencies because ‘CBDCs would likely 
replace all private digital payment systems, regardless of whether they are connected to 
traditional bank accounts or cryptocurrencies’  (Roubini cited in The Guardian, 2018). 
8.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter makes the contention that inclusive finance, particularly as reflected 
through the case study of Pakistan, contains generalisable features which reveal its 
connections with broader, structural patterns of financialisation. More specifically: 
inclusive finance as a form of shadow banking exemplifies subordinate financialisation 
and Pakistan’s subordinate position in the global financial system is responsible for a 
bifurcated banking sector. To expand upon this connection, the notion of debtfare is 
applied to Pakistan. Through this it is argued that the macroeconomics of debt and 
austerity, and also the intrusions made by debt capital into an informal economy, make 
the Pakistani state prone to applying a mode of governance which facilitates a ‘poverty 
industry’.  Inclusive finance is a component of this poverty industry, which may be 
considered through a lens of subordinate financialisation. Such an approach 
acknowledges that financialisation is encountered differently by poor or emerging 
capitalist countries relative to their advanced capitalist counterparts.  More specifically, 
asymmetrical constraints on policies relating to reserve accumulation, credit creation, 
and currency management are responsible for shaping domestic financial structures in 
poor countries, and thus producing shadow financial citizenship. This is not to say that 
shadow financial citizenship cannot be overcome. The examples of post office banking 
and central bank currencies and accounts demonstrate that a substantial overhaul of 
the financial system is needed in order to expand financial citizenship and thus 
overcome shadow financial citizenship.  
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CONCLUSION 
In the preceding chapters of this thesis, I have examined bifurcated banking as a general 
and also specific phenomenon associated with inclusive finance; particularly as it 
overlaps with shadow banking. Bifurcated banking is an issue of financial citizenship; it 
occurs because financial systems have an inside as well as an outside. As such,  I resist 
the view that bifurcated systems exist because poor people have a specific requirement 
for inclusive finance. I advance the alternative view that inclusive finance is offered to 
poor people because of shifting models of banking. A central argument of my thesis, this 
draws on the original literature on financial citizenship to attribute the persistence of 
the unbanked and underbanked to shifting models of banking. The incorporation of 
shadow banks and shadow banking practices into my analysis allows for an augmented 
version of financial citizenship, which I introduce in this thesis as shadow financial 
citizenship. 
The absorption of inclusive finance by shadow banking is expressed in the 
concept of shadow financial citizenship. Inclusive finance as shadow banking has been 
previously mentioned — briefly and tangentially — in studies about transformations in 
development practices. I extricate these mentions from two sets of scholarship: (1) on 
the proliferating commercialisation of the 1970s microcredit model, and (2) of the 
Finance for Development agenda derived from the funding requirements of MDGs and 
SDGs. Particularly, in the context of the latter, incursions made by shadow banking 
networks into global development strategy, are a core proceeding of the ‘Wall Street 
Consensus’ as an approach distinct from previous ones, including the Washington 
Consensus.  
My use of Pakistan as a case study to examine the linkages between shadow 
banking and inclusive finance reveals how this nexus is a corollary of, what is often 
described as, a ‘sustainable’ model of inclusive finance: independent from subsidies and 
charity. But in an intriguing twist, the inclusive finance industry has come to be a 
favoured destination for philanthrocapitalist initiatives such as impact investing, and 
strategies which emphasise patient capital, such as blended finance. Moreover, the 
fixation of inclusive finance with data — as credit scoring technologies become intrinsic 
to financial innovation — is shown to be a key aspect of the ‘value proposition’ of this 
industry.  
Institutional investment in the Pakistani inclusive finance also reflects a policy 
stance, tacit as well as stated, which sees products and services centred on microcredit, 
branchless banking, mobile money etc. as a core tool to complete the financial 
spectrum. Mainstream banking is geared to lend to the Pakistani government and to 
large corporates, and the implications of this are reflected in studies on the ‘missing 
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middle’ and data on private credit offtake. To equip inclusive finance to plug these 
systemic gaps, the central bank has actively shaped this industry as an alternative — 
and hence conspicuously different — to mainstream or commercial banking. Bifurcated 
banking is an attribute of this differentiation, which I problematise here through a 
shadow financial citizenship framework. This framework reveals that there is a distinct 
set of inequities faced by those who are expected to use inclusive finance. 
These inequities may be summarised as (1) inequities in rates, exemplified 
through relatively expensive credit and charges for payments and related transactions; 
(2) inequities in requirements, exemplified through KYC and other documentary 
requirements as well the collateralisation of everyday life such as through gold jewellery 
and livestock; and (3) inequities in surveillance, exemplified by alternative credit scoring 
techniques which rely on personal data. These inequities, which are anchored in the 
dependence of inclusive finance on disintermediated models of funding, seek to create 
new asset streams and extract value by expanding the frontiers of the global financial 
system.   
Contributions 
The conceptual framework that I assemble in this thesis and my empirical analyses from 
the case section contribute to the disciplines of international political economy, and 
also development studies.  The analytical tools which I use to study bifurcated banking, 
and by extension, inclusive finance and shadow banking, advance the academic 
literature in three key areas. These are (1) the political economy of financial citizenship, 
(2) financialisation in the Global South, and (3) the political economy of subordinate 
financialisation.   
Earlier scholarship on financial citizenship uses the concept to demonstrate the 
exclusionary tendencies of new models of banking. This literature expresses concerns 
about the withdrawal of financial infrastructure, emphasising its role in urban and 
community economic decline in Britain and the United States (e.g. Dymski, 2005; 
Dymski and Veitch, 1992; Leyshon and Thrift, 1995). More recent scholarship utilises the 
term primarily to discuss ‘financial subject formation’ (e.g. Lai and Tan, 2015; Kear, 
2013): in this set of literature, there is some scepticism directed at financial citizenship 
for tacitly — albeit unintentionally — endorsing financial forms of governance.  In this 
thesis, I resist engagement with the misgivings associated with financial governance. By 
focusing on the ‘outside’ relative to the ‘inside’ of the financial system and probing the 
role of shadow banking in this arrangement, financial citizenship — as a necessary 
concept — is defended and reinvigorated in the form of shadow financial citizenship. 
Furthermore, this augmented concept allows for a more thorough consideration of the 
shifting boundaries of the financial system by noting how these shifts reproduce 
inequalities.  
As mentioned earlier, my thesis identifies primarily with what has been 
described as a contemporary view of financialisation: the contribution made here 
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expands the literature on the financial logic and technologies associated with a specific 
setting. The contemporary view is relevant here because it emphasises the processes and 
practices associated with the rising influence of financial logic and tools on firms, 
households and individuals. This contemporary view may be contrasted with the 
‘epochal’ view, which concerns itself with the wider transformation of the economy and 
society that is pushed by the dominance of the financial system. A concise but thorough 
survey of these views on financialisation, as well as the underlying perspectives and 
schools of thought, is available in French et al. (2011). Based on this, the authors make 
the argument that there is — among other, related issues — a need for the scholarship 
‘to recognize how many of the processes associated with financialization are 
geographically uneven’ (French et al., 2011: 814).  My thesis speaks to that need by (1) 
probing the unevenness of how financialisation is exerted, and (2) by explicitly 
attributing such processes to the structure of the international financial system. 
The international element of inclusive finance is a core theme of this thesis. In 
particular, the case study underscores how financial integration can reproduce 
inequalities. The subordinate financialisation literature is crucial for articulating how 
for poor countries, not only is the encounter with financialisation from a subordinate 
position; financialisation further undermines their subordinate position in global 
structures (Bonizzi et al. 2019).  To advance these contentions, I provide empirical 
evidence to demonstrate the linkages between the focal points of this thesis — shadow 
banking, bifurcated banking, and inclusive finance — and global financial structures 
which impose fragilities through currency hierarchies and volatile capital flows.  
Limitations  and avenues for further research 
The contributions of this thesis should be considered in the light of some limitations. Of 
particular relevance are the shortcomings associated with the single case study 
methodology: I highlight these in the introductory chapter. These shortcomings may be 
overcome by exploring the phenomenon of bifurcated banking and the conceptual 
framework of shadow financial citizenship in other settings where inclusive finance is 
prominent. Other avenues for further research offered here further highlight the 
limitations of the present study. Given its cross-disciplinary nature, these may pertain, 
for instance, to international political economy, development, and human geography. A 
brief set of suggestions is given below: 
The operationalisation of shadow financial citizenship is one possible avenue for 
further research. The idea that financial citizenship as a concept has ‘operability’ is not a 
novel one and has policy relevance from the standpoint of individual financial 
responsibility and security.227  Building on this, there is scope for defining a measure or 
set of measures that capture how the reality of financial inclusion and financial 
_____________________________ 
227 See for instance Lindsey Appleyard and Shaun French‘s project on financial citizenship and credit unions: 
‘https://www.coventry.ac.uk/research/research-directories/current-projects/2016/financial-citizenship-building-financial-
security-capability-and-inclusion-in-communities/ 
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exclusion is such that binary conceptualisations are ineffective. An approach of this 
nature has direct applicability to global development practice, particularly for instance, 
when it is centred on the SDGs: 
‘Financial inclusion is positioned prominently as an enabler of other 
developmental goals in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, where it is 
featured as a target in eight of the seventeen goals. These include SDG1, on 
eradicating poverty; SDG 2 on ending hunger, achieving food security and 
promoting sustainable agriculture; SDG 3 on profiting health and well-being; SDG 
5 on achieving gender equality and economic empowerment of women; SDG 8 on 
promoting economic growth and jobs; SDG 9 on supporting industry, innovation, 
and infrastructure; and SDG 10 on reducing inequality. Additionally, in SDG 17 on 
strengthening the means of implementation there is an implicit role for greater 
financial inclusion through greater savings mobilization for investment and 
consumption that can spur growth’ (UNCDF, 2019: 1). 
A measurable version of shadow financial citizenship might assume the form of a 
multidimensional indicator structured as a composite variable.  As such it would enable 
quantitative analyses on the relationship between development goals and the extent and 
nature of financial inclusion. 
Another theme which has been mentioned — but not exhausted — in the 
present study is that of Pakistan as a financialising economy. The example of the 
inclusive finance industry here demonstrates how financial logic has suffused 
government led poverty reduction initiatives.  This analysis may be supplemented with 
others that scrutinise processes and practices that are indicative of financialisation; 
additionally there is an absence of studies on Pakistan that evaluate financialisation as 
expressed in the growth patterns of the FIRE — finance, insurance and real estate — 
sector, and/ or the financial activities of nonbank companies.  
An additional topic that might build on the present study is that of credit 
creation in poor countries. I have shown in this thesis that asymmetries in the capacities 
of national central banks and domestic financial institutions to produce money in the 
form of credit, place poor countries at a disadvantage. This weakness is expressed as 
constraints poor countries must contend with — relative to their advanced capitalist 
counterparts — in implementing monetary policy.  These asymmetries are empirically 
revealed in the responses of central banks to the global financial crisis of 2007-9; this is 
supplemented by analytical proof from an emergent set of literature, including from the 
Bank of England (Jakab and Kumhoff, 2015). But there has been only limited discussion 
on how such strategies — in theory as well as practice — carry implications for the 
Global South. This deficiency in the scholarship may be summarised as two questions: 
(1) What can Global South countries do to gain more autonomy over monetary policy? 
(2) How is the Global South affected by private and public money creation in the Global 
North?  
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEWS 
Organisation Description Head 
Office 
Bank Islami Islamic commercial bank Karachi 
CDC Development finance institution owned by the UK 
government: investment arm of DFID 
London 
Enclude Advisory firm dedicated to building more sustainable 
businesses and institutions 
Islamabad 
(regional 
head office) 
Finja  Fintech working on payments and e-commerce platforms.  Lahore 
First MicroFinance Bank Deposit taking microfinance bank, indirectly owned by a global 
development agency, directly owned by large Pakistani 
commercial bank.  
Karachi 
Habib University Private university collaborating on financial inclusion project 
with Institute for Money, Technology & Financial Inclusion 
UCI School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine. 
 
Karachi 
HBL Large Pakistani commercial bank  Karachi 
JS Private Equity Private equity and venture capital firm specialising in 
investments in expansion capital, growth capital, and buyout 
investment opportunities. 
Karachi 
Oraan Fintech startup focused on conventional saving mechanisms 
and financial technology to provide simpler financial access 
and money-management tools. 
 
Karachi 
Paysys Labs Fintech/ Digital Financial Solutions Company Karachi 
Planet N High-tech and social impact investment firm 
dedicated to development through digitalization 
Karachi 
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PMIC Investment Finance Company offering financial and 
institutional services to  individuals, micro-entrepreneurs and 
micro-enterprises 
Islamabad 
PMN Policy institute to support the financial sector, especially retail 
financial service providers, to enhance their scale, quality, 
diversity etc.  
Islamabad 
State Bank of Pakistan Central bank Karachi 
Telenor Microfinance Bank Deposit taking microfinance bank, largely fintech and telecom 
owned.  
Karachi 
Up Trade Social enterprise focused on energy solutions for off-grid, water 
stressed communities.  
Karachi 
WomenX World Bank Women's entrepreneurship programme conducted by World 
Bank  
Islamabad 
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APPENDIX B: PAKISTAN KEY ECONOMIC DATA 
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APPENDIX C: REGIONAL COMPARISONS WITH PAKISTAN DATA 
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APPENDIX D: PAKISTAN KEY COMMERCIAL BANKING DATA 
 
Source: SBP (2018a) 
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APPENDIX E: PAKISTAN KEY MICROFINANCE DATA 
Year  2
013 
2
014 
2
015 
2
016 
2
017 
 Active 
Borrowers (in 
millions)  
2.
4 
2.
8 
3.
6 
4.
2 
5.
5 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio (PKR 
billions) 
2.
4 
2.
8 
3.
6 
4.
2 
5.
5 
 Active 
Women Borrowers 
(in millions)  
1.
4 
1.
6 
2 2.
3 
2.
7 
 Branches  1,
606 
1,
747 
2,
754 
2,
367 
3,
533 
 Total Staff  17
,456 
19
,881 
25
,560 
2
9,413 
3
6,053 
Total Assets 
(PKR billions) 
81
.5 
10
0.7 
14
5.1 
22
5.3 
33
0.4 
Deposits 
(PKR billions) 
32
.9 
4
2.7 
6
0 
11
8.1 
18
5.9 
Total Debt 
(PKR billions)  
2
6.9 
31
.1 
4
4.5 
5
4.7 
7
4.1 
Total 
Revenue (PKR 
billions) 
17
.3 
2
4.3 
32
.8 
41
.8 
6
5.7 
Operational 
Self Sufficiency 
(percentage)  
11
8.1 
12
0.6 
12
4.1 
12
7 
12
4.7 
Financial Self 
Sufficiency 
(percentage)  
11
6.5 
11
9.6 
12
1 
12
3.9 
12
2.4 
 PAR > 30 
(percentage) 
2.
5 
1.1 1.
5 
1.
2 
0.
5 
 Return on 
Assets (ROA)  
3.
3 
3.
5 
3.
6 
3.
4 
3.
2 
 Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
16
.1 
16 15 18
.9 
19
.5 
Source: PMN (2017) 
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APPENDIX F: FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES COMPARATIVE 
REGIONAL POSITIONS 
Gross international reserves (USD million) 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Central Asia      
Armenia 2,252 1,489 1,775 2,204 2,314 
Azerbaijan 14,153 13,758 5,017 3,974 5,335 
Georgia 2,800 2,695 2,500 2,800 3,100 
Kazakhstan 24,715 29,209 27,871 29,710 30,745 
Kyrgyz Republic 2,238 1,958 1,778 1,969 2,177 
Tajikistan 636 511 494 653 1,272 
Turkmenistan 29,300 32,400 … … … 
Uzbekistan 22,515 24,149 24,300 26,428 28,076 
East Asia      
Hong Kong, China 311,209 328,516 358,823 386,241 431,370 
Mongolia 2,248 1,650 1,323 1,296 3,008 
People's Republic of China 3,880,383 3,899,285 3,406,112 3,097,845 3,235,895 
Republic of Korea 346,460 363,593 367,962 371,102 389,267 
Taipei,China 416,811 418,980 426,031 434,204 451,500 
South Asia      
Afghanistan 6,873 7,311 6,808 7,582 8,159 
Bangladesh 15,315 21,508 25,025 30,168 33,407 
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Bhutan 917 998 958 1,119 1,078 
India 304,223 341,638 360,176 369,955 420,758 
Maldives 368 615 564 467 586 
Nepal 5,614 6,939 8,148 9,737 10,495 
Pakistan 6,008 9,098 13,525 18,143 16,145 
Sri Lanka 7,495 8,208 7,304 6,019 7,959 
Source: ADB (2018) 
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APPENDIX G: LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
AFI Alliance for Financial Inclusion 
AKAM Aga Khan Agency for Microfinance 
AKDN Aga Khan Development Network 
AKFED Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development 
AKRSP Aga Khan Rural Support Programme 
APR Annual Percentage Rate 
ATM Automated Teller Machine 
BB Branchless Banking 
BTCA Better Than Cash Alliance 
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio 
CDC Commonwealth Development Corporation 
CDD Customer Due Diligence 
CGAP Consultative Group for Assisting the Poor 
CNIC Computerised National Identity Card 
DEE Developing or emerging economy 
DFID Department for International Development 
DTA Digital Transactional Account 
ECE Emerging country economy 
EUR Euro 
FATF Financial Action Task Force 
FDI Foreign direct investment 
FfD Finance for Development 
FMFB First MicroFinance Bank 
FSB Financial Stability Board 
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G-20 International forum for the governments and central bank governors from 19 
countries and the European Union 
G2P Government to person 
G-7 Group of seven largest IMF-described advanced national economies  
GDP Gross domestic product 
GLP Gross loan portfolio 
GPF Global Policy Forum  
GSMA Global System for Mobile Communications/ Groupe Spécial Mobile, Association 
HBL Habib Bank Limited 
IFC International Finance Corporation 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency 
JPY Japanese Yen 
KfW German state-owned development bank, originally Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
M&A Mergers and acquisitions  
MCR Minimum capital requirements 
MDG Millennium Development Goal 
MFB Microfinance bank 
MFI Microfinance institutions 
MSEL Micro and small enterprise lending 
NADRA National Database and Registration Authority 
NFIS National Financial Inclusion Strategy 
NPL Non-performing loan 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OTC Over the counter 
OTD Originate to Distribute model of banking 
OTH Originate to Hold model of banking 
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PKR Pakistani Rupee 
PMIC Pakistan Microfinance Investment Company 
PMN Pakistan Microfinance Network 
POS Point of sale 
PROPARCO Private sector focused subsidiary of Agence Française de Développement  
PTCL Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited 
ROA Return on assets 
ROE Return on equity 
RSP Rural Support Programme 
SBP State Bank of Pakistan 
SDG Sustainable Development Goal 
SECP Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
SME Small and medium sized enterprise 
TMB Telenor Microfinance Bank 
UN United Nations 
UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund 
UNCTAD United Nations Commission on Trade and Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USD United States Dollar 
 
 
